Bolshevik Victory

After their second defeat in Ukraine in the late summer of 1919, the Bolsheviks reevaluated their policies. The Ukrainians in the party, led by Iurii Lapchynsky, were sharply critical of their colleagues’ tendency to ignore Ukrainian particularities.

Lenin’s advice, however, was not to give in to Ukrainian demands for independence – neither the independent statehood that the nationalists wanted nor the organizational independence that many Ukrainian Bolsheviks desired – but to add more Ukrainian “color” to Soviet rule in that country. Therefore, the formation, on 21 December 1919, of the third Ukrainian Soviet government was accompanied with patriotic rhetoric such as “the free and independent Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic again arises from the dead.”¹¹Another manifesto announced that one of the main goals of the Communist Party of Ukraine was to “defend the independence and integrity of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Ukraine.”¹² The party’s few Ukrainians were given prominent (but not key) positions in the government and instructions went out to party functionaries to use the Ukrainian language whenever possible and to show respect for Ukrainian culture.

To placate the Ukrainian peasantry, the Bolsheviks ceased the collectivization of landholdings, a policy that had met much greater resistance in Ukraine than in Russia. Although they continued to expropriate grain, the Bolsheviks now argued that it was destined for the Ukrainian Soviet army, not for Russia. And greater emphasis than before was placed on tactics that raised tensions among the rich, middle, and poor peasants. Realizing that all attempts to win over the approximately 500,000 kulaks were hopeless, the Bolsheviks concentrated on attracting the middle peasants by assuring them that they could retain their land. The party also expanded its old policy of forming Committees of Poor Peasants (komnezamy) in order to neutralize the influence of the kulaks in the village.

Despite these adjustments, it was still the military power of Soviet Russia that assured the ultimate triumph of Bolshevik rule in Ukraine. By fall 1919, the Red Army had 1.5 million men; in spring 1920 it numbered close to 3.5 million, led by about 50,000 former tsarist officers that the Bolsheviks pressed into service. Thus, when the Bolsheviks returned to Ukraine in full force in early December 1919, their victory over their enemies was practically assured. Nonetheless, even when the last of the Ukrainian and White armies were pushed out in November 1920, Bolshevik control of the Ukrainian countryside was far from secure. Large numbers of peasants, especially the kulaks, remained vehemently opposed to communism and they continued a stubborn but uncoordinated guerrilla war against the Bolsheviks.

The anti-Bolshevik partisans, who formed more than 100 major units, numbered over 40,000. In the south, the famous Makhno, benefiting from widespread support, held out until August 1921. In the Kiev region, some of Petliura’s otamany, such as Iurii Tiutiunnyk, led large, well-armed units of 1000–2000 men and maintained steady contact with the exiled Ukrainian government in Poland. Only after the Bolsheviks committed over 50,000 men, most of whom were members of Cheka, did they manage to break the back of the partisan movement in late 1921.

At a time when empires collapsed and almost all the peoples of Eastern Europe, including such small subject nations of the tsars as the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, gained their independence, why was it that the 30 million Ukrainians did not? The question is all the more pertinent because the Ukrainians probably fought longer for independence and paid a higher price in lives than any other East European nation.

In considering the general reasons for the Ukrainian defeat, it is necessary to distinguish between internal and external factors and the East and West Ukrainians’ situations. In terms of internal factors, the basic dilemma of the Ukrainians – and this applies mainly to the East Ukrainians – was, to repeat a crucial point, that they were forced to begin the state-building process before they had completed nation-building. The delay and underdevelopment of nation-building was a result of tsarist suppression and of nation-buliding’s weak social base. Of all the social groups and classes in Ukraine, the intelligentsia was most prominent in the national movement and the state-building effort. However, the intelligentsia made up only 2–3% of the general population and only a small part of it was involved in the Ukrainian cause. Many of these intellectuals were as deeply steeped in Russian as in Ukrainian culture and it was psychologically difficult suddenly to sever their bonds with Russia. Hence their wavering on independence and their attraction to autonomy and federalism. Finally, even in the course of the revolution and the Civil War, many Ukrainian intelligentsia were still unsure as to which goal was more important: social transformation or national liberation. Therefore, in Eastern Ukraine, the revolution placed idealistic, patriotic but inexperienced intellectuals into positions of leadership and forced them to act before they were sure of what they wanted or how to get it.

In assuming the leadership in the struggle for independence, the Ukrainian intelligentsia counted on peasant support. However, this huge reservoir of potential backers did not live up to its expectations. Uneducated, parochial, and politically immature, the peasant knew what he was against but was not sure of what he stood for. He could understand that he was an exploited toiler. Hence the early success of Bolshevik propaganda. Yet the more complex idea of nationhood was difficult for him to grasp and it was only late in the Civil War that many of the better-educated peasants definitively began to favor national self-government. But by that time the best opportunities for independence had already passed.

Even when the peasant was willing to support the cause of independence, organizing this support was exceedingly difficult. Unlike the small but compact groups of workers who were concentrated in a few of the largest cities and thus easily accessible to the Bolsheviks, the peasants were scattered in thousands of villages. Convincing them to cooperate was a logistical problem with which the inexperienced intelligentsia found it difficult to deal. If the support that the Ukrainian nationalists had among the intelligentsia and peasants was problematic, the support they lacked in the cities – this applies to Galicia as well – was decisive. Unable to count on the workers, the urban bourgeoisie, and the administrators, officers, and technicians, the Ukrainian armies had great difficulties holding on to cities, which were the centers of communication, transportation, and administration. Thus, the sociological weaknesses of the Ukrainian movement in 1917–20 became strategic disadvantages that had a major impact on the outcome of the struggle.

Although the internal weaknesses of Ukrainian nationalism were considerable, external factors were decisive in its defeat. In the case of the Galician Ukrainians, whose national movement was as strong as those of other East European countries that attained independence, it was clearly not internal weakness but the overwhelming strength of the Poles that was primarily responsible for its failure.

The success of Lenin’s party was due not only to its excellent leadership and formidable organization, but also to the fact that it had the vast financial, administrative, industrial, and human resources of Russia at its disposal. The Bolsheviks could count on the support of the Russian and Russified workers in the cities of Ukraine, which allowed them to mobilize adherents when and where it counted most. And the East Ukrainians had another implacable enemy: the Whites. To defeat such enemies would have required greater strength than most emergent national movements could muster.

Confronted with overwhelmingly powerful enemies, both the East and West Ukrainians were unable to gain the recognition and aid of the victorious Entente powers. Among the reasons why the Entente – which was quite forthcoming with military and diplomatic support for the anti-Bolshevik Whites and numerous new East European nation-states – turned its back on the Ukrainians were the following: ignorance of actual conditions in Ukraine, the energetic and effective anti-Ukrainian propaganda of the Poles and Whites, the association of the Central Rada and Hetmanate with the Germans, and the leftist (”Bolshevik”) tendencies of the Directory. Finally, the extremely chaotic conditions that existed in Ukraine in 1917–21 greatly impeded the establishment of national self-government.

Yet the Ukrainians emerged from the revolution and Civil War with gains as well as losses. National consciousness, which had been limited to a part of the intelligentsia, spread to all segments of Ukrainian society. On the one hand, the peasant, who had demonstrated his ability to bring down governments and fight for his interests, gained confidence and a sense of self-worth.

While the struggle for national self-determination accounted for the distinctive features of the Ukrainian Revolution, the socioeconomic transformation of the land linked it with the all-Russian Revolution. In Ukraine, as elsewhere in the former tsarist empire, the old order disapppeared and the peasants distributed much of the confiscated lands among themselves. Thus, while the dreams of independence were unfulfilled, many Ukrainians had reason to believe that they did not emerge from the upheaval empty-handed. All depended on whether the Soviet government would allow Ukrainians to consolidate and expand on the gains of the revolution.