Introduction

This chapter examines the emergence of new history in Ukraine, as well as the issue of the rehabilitation of the OUN and UPA, which has been taken on as a goal by the government of President Viktor Yushchenko.

The intention is to ascertain the degree to which—after 15 years of independence—Ukraine has changed the way it looks at the recent past, particularly the events cited in this study that are so controversial, painful, and remain in people's memories. It begins with school textbooks, a prime indicator of how a new generation of Ukrainian citizens will perceive its past, and examines the interpretations of the Famine, and those of the Second World War and afterward. It continues with an overview of Ukrainian thinking about the Second World War in general, and the way that this war is commemorated in the country today. In what ways, for example, is this occasion different from that of the Soviet period, when Victory Day (9 May) constituted one of the main holidays in the Soviet calendar? What questions are being raised about the commemoration and to what degree has the Ukrainian government continued past traditions or tried to change them as part of the new image of Ukraine? The later focus of the chapter is devoted exclusively to the issue of the wartime insurgent movement and the most recent debates and narratives in the media and in academic writing.

The discussions have occurred amid a background of profound political change in Ukraine, a period of turmoil and crisis that at the time of writing was far from over. Much has been written about the Orange Revolution of 2004, when mass protests in the streets of Kyiv successfully overturned an official election result that would have seen Leonid Kuchma's Prime Minister, and designated choice as successor, Viktor Yanukovich, elected president. Instead, in a repeated second round, the winner was opposition leader and head of the Our Ukraine party, Viktor Yushchenko.

That election was marred by the attempted poisoning of Yushchenko, the intrusion into the campaign of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and an attempted separatist breakaway movement in the eastern regions of Ukraine, particularly the oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, where the Orange triumph was perceived as the result of Western influence on Ukrainian political life. With the victory of Yushchenko, Ukraine appeared committed to joining the EU and other European structures, as well as the military organization of NATO. In many ways, Ukraine appeared to leave the Russian orbit altogether and embark on a new course under the leadership of Yushchenko, and another pivotal figure in the Orange Revolution, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. This change of regime, had it remained in place, might have acted to further amend the official conceptions of the past as it appeared to signal that at last the country would rid itself of the problematic legacies of the Soviet period: former Communists in power; corruption at the highest levels of government; oligarchs controlling key commodities; and uncertainty about the national image and future strategies. The inauguration of Yushchenko as president of Ukraine in January 2005 therefore appeared to herald a fundamental shift in Ukrainian politics and outlook.

Some eighteen months later, the new government came unraveled. It took just nine months before the Cabinet headed by Tymoshenko was dismissed as a result of internal bickering and disagreement over policies, particularly the privatization of large companies. Yushchenko acted as an executive-style president and declined to delve deeply into the corruption and misdeeds of his predecessor and his prominent officials. This live-and-let-live policy resulted in a public image as an indecisive leader, and during the parliamentary elections of March 2006, Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine found itself in third place. Leading the polls was the Party of Regions led by the once disgraced Yanukovich, who had substantial backing from the wealthy Donets’k oligarch, Renat Akhmetov.

Yulia Tymoshenko’s Bloc came in a clear second. Four months of wrangling followed as groups sought to put together a ruling coalition. Initially it appeared that an Orange coalition was again feasible and that Tymoshenko would return as Prime Minister. However, the defection of the Socialist Party, led by Oleksandr Moroz, rendered this impossible. Moroz received the position of Speaker of Parliament and joined a new coalition headed by the Party of the Regions, and also featuring as members of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Yushchenko then had 15 days to contemplate the prospect of Yanukovich returning as Prime Minister. Ultimately his Our Ukraine faction joined the new coalition, and Yanukovich, Yushchenko, and Moroz signed a new Declaration of National Unity, by which the signatories agreed to continue the course outlined by the president in the direction of Europe and Yanukovich agreed to abandon his policy of promoting Russian to the status of a second state language. On the issue of NATO, Ukraine decided not to join without a national referendum and the public currently is opposed to membership.

So where does this leave Ukraine? Its position is uncertain and in some ways it seems no further ahead in resolving the problem of regionalism than it has been in the past. In virtually every election for president, Western Ukraine has voted for one candidate and Eastern Ukraine for another. The diametrically opposite attitudes to elections, to policies, and to the historical past have been illustrated in an article by historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, which compares viewpoints in the cities of L'viv and Donets'k.¹ L'viv is Ukrainian speaking, oriented toward Europe, and in the most recent presidential election provided the firmest supporters of Yushchenko; Donets'k is Russian speaking, oriented toward Russia, and the political base of Yanukovich. The situation is not so straightforward, however, because Yanukovich is avowedly pro-Europe, particularly in business dealings.

Nevertheless, the comparison is useful because these two parts of Ukraine are also on opposite sides when it comes to constructing a national history and the way in which history should be written. National historians, writers, politicians, and polemicists maintain that modern history includes a genocidal famine, inflicted by the Moscow government on Ukraine, and that the wartime period witnessed a national liberation movement for Ukrainian independence headed by the OUN and UPA. In this perception they have the widespread support of Ukrainians in the West. The opposite view can certainly be found in places like Donets'k. Here the memory of the Soviet period is quite different. Many still deny the existence of the Famine as an act of genocide, ironically, in that this is the territory in which it occurred. There is also a continuing tendency to regard the OUN and UPA as traitors and collaborators. In terms of reanalyzing recent history, however, deep changes have already taken place despite the uncertain political direction of the country, and we will now examine them in turn.

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Source: Marples David R.. Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine. udapest—New York: Central European University Press,2007. — 363 p.. 2007

Introduction

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