The Great Transformation

A visitor to Soviet Ukraine in the mid 1920s would have been struck by the important changes that had already been brought about by the Soviets. The new ideology, government structure, economic organization, legal order, education, and high culture attested to their far-ranging innovations.

Stalin perceived the situation as not only depressing, but threatening. Under NEP, the kulaks, bitter enemies of the new regime, had been growing stronger economically. More ominous was the danger of an attack that, Stalin warned, the capitalist countries were planning against the fledgling socialist state. Among party members these perceptions gave rise to a sense of urgency, to a feeling that radical action was needed to preserve the revolution and fulfill its promise.

Despite the fact that he was not a strong theorist, Stalin produced an appealing formula at this critical juncture. Rejecting as unrealistic the appeals of his rival Leon Trotsky for a renewed effort to spread the revolution abroad, Stalin urged the party to build “socialism in one country,” in other words, to transform the USSR – as quickly as possible and regardless of the cost – to a modern, industrial, and completely socialist society.

Adopted by the party in 1928, the initial design for the great transformation was called the first Five-Year Plan (FYP). Its general goal was to “catch up with and bypass the capitalist world” economically. Emphasizing the development of heavy industry, it set stunning objectives for the country: a 250% increase in overall industrial development, with a 330% expansion of heavy industry alone. The other important part of the plan called for the collectivization – the formation of large, communally owned farms – of 20% of all peasant households. It was envisaged that agricultural production would rise by 150%. Eventually, collectivization was to encompass almost all peasant households, thereby removing the “pernicious, bourgeois influence” of private ownership of property.

The plan aimed, in effect, at transforming the entire labor force in the countryside as well as the city into employees of state-controlled enterprises. This structure would not only give the state complete economic control of its citizens but it would also greatly expand its political dominance of the formerly self-sufficient peasants. Stalin expected some resistance to the plan, especially from the peasants who were to be deprived of their lands. But he cynically dismissed it with the famous comment, “You can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs.” Industrialization

In terms of industrial development, Ukraine fared well in the first FYP. It received over 20% of the total investment, which meant that of the 1500 new industrial plants built in the USSR, 400 were located in Ukraine.

In the second and third FYPS, however, the republic received a disproportionately small amount of investment. Arguing that in the event of war, the industrial centers of Ukraine would be too vulnerable to attack, the economic planners in Moscow decided to concentrate on the development of industrial centers in the Urals. Thus, of the 4500 plants built during the second FYP (1932–37), only 1000 were in Ukraine. In the next FYP the drop in Ukraine’s share of investment funds was even more marked: it received a mere 600 of the 3000 new plants built. Nevertheless, the construction of thousands of new plants in little more than a decade did turn Ukraine into a major industrial country.

Never before in history had a society attempted such a vast economic transformation in so short a time period. Whereas in the industrial boom of the 19th century, it had taken decades to construct several dozen industrial plants in Ukraine, in the 1930s, the Soviets were building hundreds of plants every year. But achievements like these were possible only if workers were pushed to their limits. It was necessary, therefore, to create an atmosphere of tension, of titanic struggle, of economic war with capitalism in which the outcome depended on the exertions of each and every worker. Stalin set the tone in his famous 1931 speech: “To slow down the tempo [of industrialization] means to lag behind. And those who lag behind are beaten… We are behind the leading countries by 50–100 years. We must make up this time in ten years. Either we do it or we go under.”³ This appeal to Soviet patriotism (and Russian nationalism) urged Soviet citizens to “show” the world that theirs was the superior system.

Various techniques were used to arouse enthusiasm for this effort. References to economic activity were couched in military terminology: the “breakthrough on the tractor-building front,” “the victories of workers’ shock brigades,” and the “storming of new quotas.” Outstanding workers were honored as “heroes of socialist labor.” Plants, cities, and even republics competed with each other in the race to fulfill the plan. To a considerable degree, these methods were successful. Among many workers, especially members of the party or Komsomol (Communist Youth League), there was genuine pride in and excitement about what was being achieved and they willingly committed themselves to the challenging tasks set for them by the party. Others who were less enthusiastic were subjected to a battery of coercive measures. Unauthorized lateness, absenteeism, or neglect of duties became a criminal offense that could lead to the loss of food rations (thus raising the prospect of starvation) or housing, and even to imprisonment in Siberian labor camps.

The media’s constant exhortations for workers to fulfill their quotas and meet their timetables did not mean that the industrialization drive was conducted in an orderly manner. As early as 1930 it was evident that the frenzied pace of construction was frequently accompanied by astounding confusion, ineptitude, and waste. In some cases, new factories stood empty because the machinery for them was lacking; often machines could not be housed in poorly designed plants. While untrained operators ruined new machines in one factory, experienced workers sat idle in another for lack of the proper equipment. Moreover, the quality of many products was poor.

Ukraine’s Communist leadership had its own particular criticisms of the industrialization drive. After the first FYP, its input into the formulation of subsequent FYPS was practically nil and was reflected in the steadily decreasing level of investment in Ukraine. Nor were Ukrainians entirely pleased with the nature of industrial development in their land.

Despite these drawbacks, the achievements of the first FYPS were impressive. By 1940 Ukraine’s industrial capacity was more than seven times greater than in 1913 (Russia’s increased ninefold). The productivity of individual workers also increased (but their real earnings generally decreased). Thus, as the USSR as a whole rose from being the world’s fifth largest industrial power to the second, Ukraine (with a productive capacity roughly equal to that of France) became one of Europe’s most advanced industrial countries. Urbanization

The great growth of industry in the 1930s had an effect not only on the number of Ukrainians who were employed, but also on where and how they lived. For centuries one of the great themes in Ukrainian history had been the confrontation between the Ukrainian village and the non-Ukrainian city. As a result of the FYPS, this relationship began to change as millions of Ukrainians poured into cities to work in industrial enterprises. One might well ask why Ukrainians participated in such great numbers in the industrialization drive of the 1930s, having been conspiciously absent from the initial wave of industrial growth in the 1890s. Because the scale of the Soviet effort was so vast, it created a general labor shortage thoughout the USSR. Russian workers no longer came south in search of work in great numbers, so the newly built factories of Ukraine drew on the local work force.

TABLE 4 Percentage of Ukrainians in industrial centers, 1923–33

The expansion of the cities was dramatic. Growing at a rate of about four times that of the population as a whole, the number of urban dwellers in Soviet Ukraine doubled between 1926 and 1939. At the outset of this period, only one in five had lived in an urban environment in Ukraine; before the outbreak of the Second World War, the ratio was one in three. Ethnic Ukrainian participation in the urbanization boom was equally remarkable. In 1920 Ukrainians constituted 32% of the urban population, living mostly in the smaller cities. By 1939, they represented over 58% of urban dwellers and many had moved into large industrial centers. As table 4 indicates, it was in the latter that the influx of Ukrainians was most apparent. The percentage of Ukrainians in the proletariat also rose. Although in 1926 they were a mere 6% of workers, in 1939 almost 30% of all Ukrainians were classified as members of the proletariat.

Most of the expanding industrial centers were located not on the Right and Left banks, where the core of the Ukrainian population lived, but in the Donbas and the south, which had large Russian and Jewish minorities. Later, when the government adopted a policy of Russification, this factor would be of considerable importance. Initially, however, there were simply too many Ukrainians pouring into the cities to be assimilated into Russian culture and it appeared that the traditional Russian hold on the cities was seriously threatened.

The huge influx of new inhabitants created exceedingly difficult living conditions in the cities, especially in regard to housing. Frequently separated from their families, the newcomers were quartered in crowded dormitories, sometimes for years. Those who brought their families along often had no choice but to live in squalid huts on the outskirts of town. Food was scarce and rationed. The only satisfaction that many of these workers could derive from their new situation was that, bad as it was, it was better than what the peasants faced in the villages. Collectivization

Even more dramatic and sweeping than the changes in the cities was the transformation of the countryside. Here, however, the “Second Revolution” was accompanied by such brutality and horror that it can only be described as a war waged by the regime against the peasantry. In fact, it can safely be said that collectivization, with its devastating consequences, was one of the most traumatic events in Ukrainian history.

The Bolsheviks always argued that collective agriculture eventually had to replace small peasant farming. They were aware of the fact that convincing the peasantry to accept their views would be a lengthy and difficult process, especially after the concessions peasants had won during NEP. Peasant response to the collective and state farms established in the 1920s had not been promising, attracting less than 3% of agricultural workers in the USSR. Therefore, when drafting their first FYP, the Bolsheviks estimated that at best they would be able to collectivize 20% of peasant households (in Ukraine the target was 30%). With its attention focused on industrialization, the Soviet leadership apparently preferred not to take on the massive burdens that would be associated with a radical transformation of agriculture.

It soon became evident, however, that industrialization as the Soviets envisaged it demanded extensive collectivization. Stalin appears to have come to this realization during the grain procurement crisis of 1928. Soviet plans for industrial expansion were based on the assumption that the state would be able to buy grain cheaply from the peasants. Doing so would allow it both to feed the growing work force in the cities and to sell grain abroad at a profit that, in turn, would be used to help finance industrialization. But the prices that the state offered – often as little as one-eighth of the market price – were considered too low by the peasants and they refused to sell their grain. Infuriated by peasant recalcitrance, which he termed “sabotage,” Stalin decided that for the FYP to succeed, both political and economic control of the peasantry was essential. Therefore, with practically no advance preparation, he ordered an all-out drive for total collectivization. Liquidation of the kulaks

Realizing that the wealthier peasants would resist collectivization most bitterly, Stalin called for the “liquidation of the kulaks as a class.” This classic divide-and-conquer tactic was calculated to isolate the most successful peasants from the mass of poor peasants. However, defining just who was a kulak (Ukrainian: kurkul) was not a simple matter. Officially, kulaks owned more land than the average peasant and hired labor to work it. It was estimated that they made up about 5% of the peasantry. But the government’s depiction of kulaks as “blood-sucking usurers” and “exploiters” of their fellow peasants rarely fit reality.

Usually a wealthier peasant owned 10–15 acres, several horses and cows, and some sheep. His net worth measured in current dollars was probably no more than $600–800. Since many of the old kulak families had been destroyed in the Civil War, kulaks were frequently former poor peasants who, by dint of hard work, had prospered during NEP. When it came to deciding who was a kulak – and this was generally done by a troika consisting of a secret police representative, the head of the village Soviet (council), and the party secretary – envy, personal grudges, and (very often) opposition to collectivization also played a role. Consequently, many middle and even poor peasants were designated as kulaks or their “helpers.”

What did “liquidation as a class” actually mean? Those kulaks who resisted most stubbornly were shot, and a large number were deported to forced labor camps in the Arctic and Siberia. The rest were deprived of all their property (including their homes and personal belongings), barred from the collective farms, and told to fend for themselves. The “dekulakization” process reached its high point in the winter of 1929–30. Its most widespread feature was the deportations. Hundreds of thousands of peasants and their families were dragged from their homes, packed into freight trains, and shipped thousands of miles to the north where they were dumped amidst Arctic wastes, often without food or shelter.⁴

Of the more than 1 million Ukrainian peasants that the Soviet regime expropriated in the early 1930s, about 850,000 were deported to the north where many, especially children, perished. But some of the deportees, notably young men, escaped from exile. Together with those who managed to avoid deportation, they surreptitiously entered the urban labor force (factories were forbidden to hire kulaks). In this way, a large part of Ukraine’s most industrious and efficient farmers ceased to exist. “Not one of them was guilty of anything,” a Soviet author noted, “but they belonged to a class that was guilty of everything.”⁵

To achieve its goals in the countryside, the regime needed assistance, but the number of Communists in the villages was clearly too small to suffice. Initially, the government placed its hopes on the revived Committees of Poor Peasants, assuming that they had little to lose from “dekulakization” and collectivization. But it soon became apparent that being poor did not mean that a peasant was willing to participate in the destruction of his better-off neighbors. Therefore, the government dispatched thousands of urban workers, frequently Russian and Jewish Communists or Komsomol members, to implement its policies in the villages.

In the fall of 1929 about 15,000 workers were sent into the Ukrainian countryside; in January 1930 approximately 47,000 more arrived. At the same time, the “25,000ers” (mostly workers from Russia who were fanatically dedicated to the “building of socialism” regardless of the cost) appeared in Ukraine to lead the local “dekulakization” drives or to act as heads of the newly organized collective farms. The assignment of outsiders, although assuring the implementation of government policies, added to the brutality with which they were carried out. Restructuring agriculture: phase one

As the kulaks were being crushed, Stalin launched his attack on the peasantry as a whole. Instructions went out to party activists to begin the immediate and total organization of collective farms. Although often hazy on precisely how this massive transformation was to be carried out, Stalin’s orders were clear on one point: it must be done rapidly and without regard to protests, difficulties, or costs. Usually the process consisted of party workers descending on a village and calling a meeting during which they browbeat several peasants into agreeing to form a collective. A party activist usually shouted: “Anyone opposed to the collective farm is opposed to the Soviet government. Let’s vote. Who is against the collective farm?” And then there was a demand that all the villagers pool their land and surrender their cattle to the collective farm.⁶

These measures produced pandemonium and outrage in the villages. Officials were frequently beaten and shot. Particularly widespread were the so-called babski bunty – riots raised by women demanding the return of their property. In several cases, large uprisings of armed peasants forced the regime to send in regular army and OGPU (political police) units to quell them. However, the most widespread form of protest was the slaughter of farm animals. Determined not to let the government have their livestock, peasants preferred to kill their animals and either consume the meat or sell it. The extent to which such acts were committed was staggering: between 1928 and 1932 Ukraine lost about 50% of its livestock. Many peasants fled the collectives and sought work in the cities. To the dismay of Soviet officials, many poor and middle peasants, who had improved their condition during NEP, were often among their most bitter opponents.

To reinforce its officials, the regime sent in the OGPU to arrest the more vociferous protesters and deport them to Siberia. With such coercion, it was only a matter of time before Soviet authorities would impose their will on the peasantry. By March 1930 about 3.2 million peasant households in Ukraine had surrendered to the invaders of their villages and had sullenly entered the collective farms to await their fate.

But the calamitous disruption of the rural economy (not the human cost) worried Stalin. Suddenly, on 3 March 1930, he published an article entitled “Dizziness with Success.” In it he claimed that “the fundamental turn toward socialism in the village may be considered already secured.” This remark was followed by an astounding assertion: “It is impossible to establish collective farms by force. To do so would be stupid and reactionary.”⁷ Stalin’s intent was clear: first, he wanted to send a message to party activists to ease the pressure for a time, and second, by blaming the lower officials who had obediently followed his directives, Stalin tried to distance himself from the disasters brought on by collectivization.

Interpreting Stalin’s statements as a retreat from collectivization, the peasants responded accordingly by abandoning the collective farms in droves. Within three months almost 50% of the collectivized peasants in Ukraine had returned to individual farming. It seemed that the great drive to transform the countryside was an economic and political fiasco. Restructuring agriculture: phase two

Stalin’s retreat helped to stabilize the situation in the villages. It soon became apparent, however, that this was only a temporary maneuver and that the regime intended to continue imposing collectivization, only using different tactics. Its new approach was to make individual farming economically unfeasible. Peasants who left the collective farms were often prevented from taking their farming implements and surviving livestock with them. They received meager plots that were difficult to farm, while the collectivized farmers retained all the best land. Taxes on individual farmers doubled and tripled, while the collectivized farmers were absolved from payment for several years. Furthermore, there was still the possibility that stubborn resisters might be called kulaks and deported. Consequently, many peasants had no choice but to join the collective farms, which by 1932 accounted for about 70% of farming households. By 1940 almost all Ukraine’s peasants belonged to its 28,000 collective farms.

Although owned in theory by the peasants, the collective farms were obliged to deliver assigned amounts of produce to the state and were controlled by its officials. Only after a collective farm had fulfilled its obligations to the state were its members allowed to divide what remained among themselves. The less-numerous state farms (radhospy) were essentially state-owned agricultural factories in which peasants worked as hired labor, while the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) provided mechanized aid to the collective farms. The government’s monopoly on tractors and other farm machinery also served as a means of coercing the peasants. Indeed, this entire system was designed to give the regime not only economic but also political control over agriculture and those who engaged in it.

Although adept at coercion, Stalin and his cohorts were astoundingly inept when it came to farming. Frequently, the party activists who headed the collective farms would order the planting of inappropriate crops. As was the case in industry, they often succumbed to a mania for the gigantic and created huge, unmanageable agro-enterprises. Because of poor transportation facilities, much of the stockpiled grain spoiled or was eaten by rats. Even more serious was the lack of draught animals, many of which had been slaughtered earlier. Government officials were confident, however, that they could provide enough tractors to replace the missing horses and oxen. But the production of tractors fell badly behind schedule and a very high percentage of those delivered broke down almost immediately. As a result, in 1931, almost one-third of the grain yield was lost during the harvest; by 1932 the total area sown in Ukraine contracted by a fifth. To make matters worse, a drought hit southern Ukraine in 1931.

All these factors contributed to the steadily deteriorating conditions. But the decisive factor was Stalin’s ruthless policy of grain procurement. The regime was in desperate need of grain to finance industrialization and continued to impose high grain quotas on the peasants, deteriorating conditions notwithstanding. Because there was not enough grain to meet both government demands and peasant needs, in 1931 Ukrainian Communists beseeched Moscow to lower its quotas. Although Stalin agreed to a small reduction, the new quota he set was still unrealistically high.

To ensure that all the grain required by the regime would be collected, Stalin dispatched two of his closest lieutenants, Viacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich, to supervise grain procurements in Ukraine. Once again party activists were mobilized and sent into the countryside to confiscate the peasants’ grain. Many apparently balked at the task, for about one-third of all those who held reponsible positions in the collective farms had to be purged at this time. To reinforce the activists, Soviet officials used regular troops and the OGPU units, which mercilessly crushed villages that refused to give up their food. Even seed grain needed for sowing next year’s crop was expropriated. In spite of these measures, by late 1932, the regime had collected only 70% of its quota. In a speech delivered in January 1933, Stalin ordered the party apparatus to redouble its efforts: “Do not allow your attention to be overshadowed by worries about all sorts of funds and reserves; do not be diverted from the main task; develop the grain procurement campaign… and speed it up. The first commandment is – fulfill the grain procurements.”⁸