The Ukrainians of Eastern Europe

The position of the approximately 450,000 Ukrainians who live in Eastern Europe is quite different from that of their compatriots both in the West and in the USSR. Those in Czechoslovakia and Romania continue to inhabit their ancestral lands, which for a variety of reasons Stalin chose not to annex to Soviet Ukraine.

In Poland, as we have seen, the Ukrainians were driven from their homes but continue to live within the borders of that state. And in Yugoslavia, the Ukrainians are early forerunners of the migratory movements of modern times. These will be considered first. Yugoslavia

In the mid 18th century, after the Austrians pushed the Ottomans out of the Baĉka and Banat regions of present-day Yugoslavia, they encouraged peasants from Transcarpathia to move into these depopulated lands. Consequently, Ukrainian colonies arose in the Baĉka region, especially around such towns as Ruski Krstur and Novi Sad. In the early 20th century, the Ukrainian presence in the region grew, when about 10,000 Ukrainian emigrants from Galicia settled in Bosnia, primarily in the area of Banja Luka. Almost all these Ukrainians, or Rusyns, as some still call themselves, were peasants and lived in self-enclosed village communities. This situation, as well as their Greek Catholic rite, helped the approximately 20,000–30,000 descendants of these immigrants in Yugoslavia to reinforce a strong sense of Rusyn/Ukrainian identity to this day. Romania

The Ukrainians of Romania, numbering an estimated 70,000, are probably the worst off of all Ukrainians in Eastern Europe, both in socioeconomic and in national terms. Scattered in such regions as southern Bukovyna, Dobrudja, Maramarosh, and Banat, they are isolated from each other and from Ukrainians in the USSR and in the West. Most are indigent peasants. Because Romania is one of the poorest East European countries, its Ukrainian inhabitants have limited opportunities to improve their socioeconomic status.

The discriminatory policies of the Bucharest government make matters worse. Up to 1947 the government refused to recognize Ukrainians as a distinct nationality. Matters improved somewhat during the relatively liberal 1948–63 period, when Ukrainian-language schools were allowed to function in the villages. About 120 were established with an enrollment of over 10,000 pupils. At the University of Bucharest, a section of Ukrainian language and literature came into being. But in 1964 a reaction set in and the government gradually nullified many gains of the previous years. Today, the cowed Ukrainian minority in the country does not possess a single communal organization. Czechoslovakia

By comparison with their compatriots in Romania, the Ukrainians (or Rusyn/Ukrainians) of Czechoslovakia are much better off. Numbering an estimated 100,000 (official statistics list only 40,000), they inhabit about 300 villages around the town of Prešov in the Carpathian foothills. Although currently the region lies within the borders of the Slovak part of the state, historically it has been closely linked with Transcarpathia, which is now in Soviet Ukraine.

Recent history has not been unkind to the Rusyn/Ukrainians of the Prešov region. The existence of an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine in prewar Czechoslovakia set a precedent that was difficult to ignore. After the Second World War ended, a newly formed Prešov Region Ukrainian National Council arose to represent the region’s populace and to claim autonomy within the Czechoslovak state. Both the Czechs in Prague and the Slovaks in Bratislava refused these political demands. They did, however, make significant cultural and educational concessions.

By 1948, the Rusyn/Ukrainians had their own school system, newspapers, publishing house, youth organization, and theater. Because Russophilism was still prevalent among the region’s intelligentsia – isolated Prešov was the last region where this confusing and once-widespread phenomenon still survived – many of the above-mentioned institutions still used Russian.

However, by the early 1950s, a program of Ukrainization, introduced by the new Communist government of Czechoslovakia, pushed the Ukrainian literary language and national orientation to the fore. Meanwhile, a new, apolitical organization, the KSUT (Cultural Association of Ukrainian Workers), emerged as the representative body of the Rusyn/Ukrainians.

With the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a communist state in 1948 came collectivization and the replacement of the Greek Catholic church by a Moscow-linked Orthodox church. However, when the Dubĉek government attempted to “put a human face” on communism in the late 1960s, the Greek Catholic church was again legalized. But now Slovak influence in the church was greater than before.

As in all of Czechoslovakia, Dubĉek’s innovations sparked an outburst of enthusiasm and activism among the Rusyn/Ukrainians. In spring 1968, plans were made to call a Ukrainian national council. The Ukrainian-language newspapers were filled with calls for political, economic, and cultural autonomy. The literary production of a talented, new generation of Rusyn/Ukrainian intellectuals reached unprecedented heights. And the patriotic Ukrainian tone of Prešov’s Ukrainian-language radio programs worried Kiev as well as Bratislava and Prague. But all this came to an abrupt, disillusioning end in August 1968, when about half a million Soviet and satellite troops poured into Czechoslovakia to smash Dubĉek’s promising “revolution.”

The harsh repression that engulfed Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s did not lead to a total dismantling of Rusyn/Ukrainian cultural institutions. The museum in Svidnik, the Ukrainian section at the university in Prešov, the Ukrainian press, and KSUT continue to function. They are, however, closely monitored by the Slovak government. And pressure for Rusyn/Ukrainians to adopt Slovak nationality has increased. Those who wish to stress the positive side of the current situation point out that materially the Rusyn/Ukrainians are better off than before.

It is true that in recent decades the government has brought in electrification, new roads, and industry to the once-isolated and backward Prešov region. And today, less than 50% of the area’s Ukrainians work in agriculture. Most are employed in industry, the bureaucracy, and the professions. Nonetheless, as of 1968, the average earnings of the Rusyn / Ukrainians were still 40% below the Czechoslovak national average. Thus, in terms of material welfare, as well as national rights, they remain among the underprivileged. Poland

Of all the Ukrainian communities, that of Poland has suffered the cruelest fate. In 1947 the Polish government forcibly expelled about 170,000 Ukrainians, mostly Lemkos, from their ancestral lands in the Carpathian foothills and dispersed them throughout Poland. Most were resettled in the former German lands that the Poles had acquired. Thus, today, approximately 60,000 Ukrainians live in the Olsztyn region, formerly East Prussia; another 40,000 inhabit the Koszalin region in the northwest; and close to 20,000 are located in the vicinity of Wroclaw in the southwest. Because about 20,000 remained in their ancestral lands around Lublin and Peremyshl (Przemyśl) in the southeast, it is evident that the Ukrainians have been neatly dispersed to the four corners of Poland.

Even in their new villages, the government saw to it that the Ukrainians did not form compact communities. Only a few families were assigned to every village. Initially, they received no land and were forced to work for Polish farmers. In the early 1950s, they were allowed to acquire the worst of the former German lands. To make matters worse, the Ukrainian newcomers were exposed to a fierce anti-Ukrainianism, which was especially prevalent among the many Poles who had been expelled from Western Ukraine. For fear of discrimination and insults, Ukrainians were forced to camouflage their nationality, refrain from using their native language, and even conceal their background from their children. In short, the small and vulnerable Ukrainian minority in Poland was made to pay for the centuries of bitter Polish/Ukrainian antagonism.

In 1956, Warsaw granted the Ukrainians some concessions. Perhaps it was because the government realized that they no longer presented a threat to the security of the state. Or perhaps the authorities drew a lesson from the mistakes that the intolerant prewar government had made in its nationalities’ policies. In any case, that year a Ukrainian newspaper, Nashe Slovo, was allowed to appear. And the USKT (Ukrainian Social Cultural Association) was established. Needless to say, it is closely supervised by the Ministry of the Interior. Nonetheless, both the newspaper and the association receive considerable government subsidies. Today, Nashe Slovo has about 8000 subscribers and USKT has approximately 4500 members.

Scrupulously nonpolitical, USKT concerns itself mainly with sponsoring about fifty Ukrainian choirs and dance ensembles. Every year it organizes well-attended festivals of Ukrainian song and music. But the association’s efforts to expand Ukrainian educational facilities have had only limited success. In 1970, only about 5% of Ukrainian children in Poland had access to Ukrainian-language education. There is a Ukrainian lycee in Legnica and a pedagogical lycee for teachers of Ukrainian in Bartoszice. However, because of the lack of Ukrainian schools, most of their graduate teachers cannot find employment. At the University of Warsaw, the philology department has a Ukrainian section, as do several such departments in provincial universities. There is a group of well-trained Ukrainian scholars who hold positions in these institutions. As well, several Polish scholars have shown that they can deal with Ukrainian topics dispassionately and well.

Nevertheless, it is evident that the old wounds have not yet healed. While some improvement is noticeable among the members of the Polish intelligentsia, anti-Ukrainianism is still widespread. Books, articles, and films castigating the “barbarism of UPA bandits” (and, by association, all Ukrainians) appear frequently.

Successful careers are open to Ukrainians, but it is advisable for them to downplay their national background. Efforts of resettled Ukrainians to return to their ancestral lands are continually blocked.

The position of the Greek Catholic church, to which about 50% of Poland’s estimated 200,000–250,000 Ukrainians belong, is an especially sensitive issue today. The premeditated neglect and even wanton destruction of numerous, centuries-old Ukrainian churches in the Lemko region has aroused the ire of Ukrainians in Poland and in the West. Equally disturbing is the reluctance of the Polish Catholic hierarchy to support the appointment of a bishop for the Ukrainian Catholics. However, in fairness to the Poles, it should be noted that they, like the Czechs and Slovaks, are not the only ones who set policy toward their respective Ukrainian minorities. Moscow keeps a close watch on all the Ukrainian communities in Eastern Europe. And it is always ready with forceful advice on how its East European satellites should deal with Ukrainian issues.

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A major function of Ukrainian communities abroad, and specifically those in the West, has been to preserve the political and cultural values and traditions of non-Soviet Ukraine. Another has been to speak up for Ukrainian interests, when compatriots in Soviet Ukraine were forced to be silent. Were it not for the efforts of Ukrainians abroad, their homeland would be an almost unknown entity beyond the borders of the USSR. Not surprisingly, the relationship between Soviet Ukraine and the Ukrainian diaspora has been generally an antagonistic one. The early socioeconomic emigrants were bound to their churches, while the DPS were ardent nationalists. Both had grounds to view the Soviets with suspicion at the very least. Meanwhile, propaganda emanating from Soviet Ukraine constantly portrayed Ukrainians as “lackeys of capitalism, fascism, and Rome.” Thus, unlike some relationships between homeland and diaspora that have been mutually beneficial – Armenia is a good example – the Ukrainian one has brought neither party much benefit. Soviet Ukrainians have been unable to utilize the Ukrainian communities abroad as a sorely needed window to the West, while the Ukrainian diaspora has been deprived of the cultural and demographic revitalization that it desperately requires.

Despite the fact that most Ukrainians abroad have entered the mainstream of their respective host societies, some still gain psychic as well as concrete benefits from belonging to their ethnic in-groups. But time is not on the side of the Ukrainian diaspora. The growing irrelevance of things Ukrainian for people who have little or no contact with Ukraine is having an effect. Everywhere the specter of assimilation into the culture of the host societies looms large. It is to be hoped that Ukrainians abroad and in Ukraine will be able to develop a fruitful relationship, while there is still time to be of use to each other.