The West Ukrainian National Republic

From the very beginning of World War I in August 1914, the western Ukrainian lands, in particular Galicia and Bukovina, were in the center of military activity along the eastern front.

Austria’s Ukrainians prepare for their postwar future

By the fall of 1918, however, when it became obvious that the Central Powers had lost the war, certain Galician and Bukovinian Ukrainians began to prepare for the inevitable change in the status of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By late 1918, the international situation had altered radically. The Entente powers had already adopted as their war aim the so-called Fourteen-Point Peace Program issued in January 1918 by the United States president Woodrow Wilson, with its procla­mation that a future peace should be governed by the principle of national self­determination.

Realizing that the old order was doomed, on 16 October 1918 Emperor Charles (reigned 1916-1918) issued a manifesto proposing that the Austro-Hungarian Empire be transformed into a federal state and calling upon the nationalities to organize themselves for that transformation. Once again, Vienna was responding to a pressing political crisis with a solution that was too little too late. Federalism was hardly an acceptable proposal for national movements that already had embarked on separate paths toward independence and were acting as if the empire already had ceased to exist. The Ukrainians, however, ever hopeful of a Habsburg solution, responded.

Four days before the October 16 manifesto, Galicia’s best-known Ukrainian leaders - levhen Petrushevych, luliian Romanchuk, and Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi (back home after his release from detention in a Russian monastery) - had met to make plans to convoke a Ukrainian constituent assembly. The emperor’s manifesto now seemed to confirm the legality of such an assembly. With the cooperation of other political and religious leaders from Galicia and Bukovina, the Ukrainian National Council (Ukrai’ns'ka Narodna Rada) was con­stituted in L'viv on 18 October. The new council chose levhen Petrushevych as its president and, invoking the principle of national self-determination, proclaimed the existence of a state on all Ukrainian lands within Austria-Hungary.

West Ukrainian independence and war

The Ukrainian National Council did, however, claim the right to rule over the ter­ritories it considered its own, and on 1 November it demanded that the viceroy in Galicia (Karl Huyn) surrender his authority. Faced with pressure by Ukrainian units of the imperial army, the last Habsburg viceroy turned over his governmen­tal offices to the Ukrainians. That same day, the National Council proclaimed that the state, which had first been called into being on 18 October, was henceforth an independent country. Thus, 1 November 1918 became the ‘second’ Ukrainian independence day. Two weeks later, the new state was given the name West Ukrainian National Republic (Zakhidn'o-Ukrains'ka Narodna Respublika).

Blossoming out of a dying empire, western Ukrainian independence seems to have been achieved with ease. But appearances are frequently deceiving. The Poles were not about to let the Ukrainians take over what they considered their

own national patrimony, Galicia - both the heavily Ukrainian-populated eastern half and the Polish western half. Several Polish organizations in L'viv armed them­selves, and on i November, the same day the Austrians surrendered the reins of government, the Ukrainians found themselves engaged in a war with the local Poles. Initially, the Ukrainians held L'viv and other cities in eastern Galicia, but by 21 November they had been driven from their new capital, and they were forced to move their government, first to Ternopil' and in early January to Stanyslaviv.

In the midst of war with the Poles, the Ukrainian National Council passed a law on 13 November 1918 that formally created an independent West Ukrainian National Republic. Its territory was to include the Ukrainian-inhabited lands of Galicia (primarily east of the San River), of Bukovina, and of Transcarpathia (parts of seven counties in northeastern Hungary). It was only in eastern Galicia, however, that the Ukrainians were able, at least for a while, to set up an adminis­tration, because Bukovina had already been occupied by Romanian troops, on 11 November, and with the exception of the short-term presence of a few troops Transcarpathia never came under West Ukrainian control.

Until the convocation of parliament (Soim), to which elections were planned for June 1919, the supreme authority of the West Ukrainian National Republic rested in the National Council headed by Petrushevych. To administer the lands under its control, the National Council set up the Provisional State Secretariat on 9 November 1918, which was headed first by Kost' Levyts'kyi and then, beginning with the new year, by Sydir Holubovych. The proposed parliament, which never came into existence, was to have 226 members, 66 of whom were to be from national minorities (33 Poles, 27 Jews, and 6 Germans). Also, as early as 10 Novem­ber 1918 the Galicians made plans to unite with their fellow Ukrainians in Dnieper Ukraine. These plans were formalized on 3 January 1919, when the National Council, meeting by then in Stanyslaviv, passed a law approving the uni­fication of the West Ukrainian National Republic with the Ukrainian National Republic in Dnieper Ukraine. The Galicians sent a delegation to Kiev, where, on 22 January 1919 (the ‘third’ Ukrainian independence day), a great national mani­festation before the Cathedral of St Sophia proclaimed, ‘From this day the two parts of a single Ukraine - the West Ukrainian National Republic (Galicia, Buko­vina, and Hungarian Rus' [Transcarpathia]) - that have been separated from each other are merging together.’¹ In theory, the West Ukrainian National Republic became the Western Province (Zakhidnia Oblast’) of the Ukrainian National Republic.

By the spring of 1919, that existence was becoming more and more threatened. In January, the western Ukrainian armed forces had been reorganized into the Galician Ukrainian Army (under General Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko), and within a month this effective fighting force was able to push back the Poles and surround L'viv. Their efforts, however, were soon to be undermined by the military and diplomatic superiority of their enemy.

In the world of international politics, Ukraine had a serious problem. Both Dnieper Ukraine and eastern Galicia were relatively unknown in the West. Poland, in contrast, had strong support among the Entente, which by early 1918 had made Poland’s independence one of its war aims. As in the old Austrian Galician days, in crucial moments, the Habsburg government had favored Polish over Ukrainian interests, so in 1919 the victorious Entente powers allowed Polish interests to prevail over those of the relatively unknown and therefore unimpor­tant Galician Ukrainians.

Not that the Galician Ukrainians were completely unknown. The leading Entente powers, already meeting at the Paris Peace Conference in early 1919, all had ‘eastern experts.’ Some were not only aware of but even sympathetic to Ukrainian demands. The Ukrainians, for their part, had diplomatic representa­tives preparing memoranda in Paris, and immigrants in the United States and Canada were lobbying their respective governments to recognize the cause of Ukrainian independence, whether in Galicia or in Dnieper Ukraine. After all, President Wilson’s inspiring principle of self-determination for nations could cer­tainly be applied to the Ukrainians in eastern Galicia.

But whereas the Ukrainians were limited to memoranda and proclamations, the Poles had official representation at the Paris Peace Conference and could make their case known direcdy, especially through their popular (in western cir­cles) spokesperson, the concert pianist and first Polish minister of foreign affairs, Ignacyjan Paderewski.

Finally, in April 1919 the well-trained and well-equipped Polish Army, consist­ing of 100,000 men under General Jozef Haller, arrived in Poland. Haller’s army had experience fighting alongside the Entente in France, and it was expected to stave off the threat of a westward advance by Soviet Russia. Stopping the Bolshe­viks was certainly something the Entente would welcome, but instead the Polish government sent Haller and his forces to Galicia. Despite stiff resistance on the part of the Ukrainian Galician Army (especially during the Chortkiv offensive in June), by 16-18July 1919 the Poles had succeeded in driving the Ukrainians and their government out of Galicia.

And as for Wilson’s principle of the right of nations to self-determination? It was sacrificed in the face of what at the time was considered an even greater danger - Bolshevism. That danger was outlined in a cable, dated 25 June, from the Entente powers in Paris to the government of Poland in Warsaw:

With a view to protecting the persons and property of the peaceful population of eastern Galicia against the dangers to which they are exposed by the Bolshevik bands [sic], the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers have decided to authorize the forces of the Polish Republic to pursue their operations as far as the river Zbruch.... This authori­zation does not in any way affect the decisions to be taken later by the Supreme Council for the setdement and political status of Galicia.²

Despite the cable’s qualifications, Poland was in effect given an imprimatur from the victorious Entente to occupy all of Galicia.

The West Ukrainian government-in-exile

In the midst of the deteriorating military situation, the National Council of the West Ukrainian National Republic invested its president, levhen Petrushevych, with the title of dictator. This gave him full authority to determine the political and military policies of the West Ukrainian National Republic. After the defeat at the hands of the Poles, Petrushevych left Galicia, going eastward across the Zbruch River to nearby Kam"ianets'-Podil's'kyi, where the Ukrainian National Republic under Petliura’s leadership was itself trying desperately to survive a Bol­shevik offensive that was rapidly bringing under its control most of Dnieper Ukraine.

In theory, according to the January 1919 declaration of Ukrainian unity, Petru- shevych and his government were a part of Petliura’s Ukrainian National Repub­lic. In Kam"ianets'-Podirs'kyi, the Galician and Dnieper Ukrainians had a chance to test their proclaimed unity. Their failure to cooperate could not have been greater. Chapter 38 outlined how, given the situation, Petliura favored an alliance with Poland as a means of repelling the Bolshevik and White Russian advances from the east. Fresh from a brutal military defeat, Petrushevych would have noth­ing to do with the Poles, and some of his supporters (especially the military) favored an alliance with one of Petliura’s archenemies - the White Russian gen­eral, Denikin.

Besides these tactical differences, there were other reasons why the Galician Ukrainians were reluctant to cooperate with the Dnieper Ukrainians. Petrushe­vych and his entourage felt that Galicia was the most developed region of Ukraine in terms of national culture and, most important at the moment, in terms of effec­tive military strength. The old Piedmont theory was still uppermost in their minds. In other words, Galicia should first be made into a strong, independent Ukrainian state, and then other Ukrainian lands would follow its lead. Finally, the Galicians continued to have great faith in the Entente and in the Paris Peace Conference, from which they expected a confirmation of their national rights. Little did they realize that the political maneuvering which had brought some successes in pre- 1914 Austria meant nothing in 1918-1919, when only military strength and diplo­matic leverage with the Entente carried any weight. On both counts, the Galicians, and, for that matter, all Ukrainians, were sorely wanting.

These are some of the reasons for the complete failure of cooperation between Galicia’s West Ukrainian National Republic and the Ukrainian National Republic. By the end of 1919, both republics were in disarray. Petliura fled to Poland to pre­pare, with Polish help, for one last confrontation with the Bolsheviks; Petrushevych fled to Vienna to carry on what proved to be a vain diplomatic struggle in western and eastern European capitals on behalf of his Polish-occupied homeland.

Bukovina and Transcarpathia

Although since its establishment in late 1918 the West Ukrainian National Repub­lic had claimed sovereignty not only over eastern Galicia but also over Bukovina and Transcarpathia, these two territories followed decidedly other paths in the immediate postwar era. Bukovina’s Ukrainian political leadership had worked together closely with the Galicians in Vienna during the war years and then partic­ipated with them in the Ukrainian National Council in L'viv, which proclaimed independence (1 November) for all Ukrainian lands within the disintegrating Austro-Hungarian Empire. Parallel with developments in Galicia, the Ukrainian Committee was set up in Bukovina’s administrative center of Chernivtsi on 25 October 1918, under the leadership of a Ukrainian deputy to the Austrian imperial parliament, Omelian Popovych. The new committee met with a few Romanians led by another parliamentary deputy, Aurel Onciul, who hoped to keep Bukovina within a future Austrian federal state. On 4 November, these leaders and their supporters formed a joint Romanian-Ukrainian provisional government, which two days later forced the Austrian officials to surrender their governing authority. They also agreed to divide the province, so that the northern half might become part of the West Ukrainian National Republic.

These developments bore little fruit, however, because the majority of Buko­vina’s Romanians had other plans. Just two days after the Ukrainian Committee was formed, on 27 October, Romanian deputies from the Austrian parliament and Bukovinian diet joined with local political activists to establish in Chernivtsi their own national council. Led by lancu Flondor, the Romanian National Coun­cil opposed any division of Bukovina, expecting that the entire province would soon be ‘reunited’ with Romania. When the Romanian-Ukrainian provisional gov­ernment replaced the Austrians on 6 November, Flondor responded by calling on Romania to send troops. Five days later, a Romanian force entered Chernivtsi, the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen withdrew without resistance to Galicia, and all of Buko­vina was annexed to Romania.

In Transcarpathia, the situation was much more complex. Following the exam­ple of other groups within the disintegrating Habsburg Empire, the Transcar­pathian Rusyns/Ukrainians set up several national councils in late 1918 to discuss the fate of their homeland. The Hungarians, too, were not idle. On 31 October politicians led by Count Mihaly Karolyi formed a revolutionary government in Budapest, which two weeks later (12 November) was transformed into the inde­pendent republic of Hungary. The new republic laid claim to all territories under the former jurisdiction of the Hungarian Kingdom, including Transcarpathia.

Hungary’s national minorities were displeased with this turn of events and made plans to dissociate themselves from their former rulers. Among the several national councils that met in Transcarpathia in November and December 1918, three political orientations evolved. One council (Uzhhorod) favored remaining with Hungary; the other two councils looked elsewhere, to joining either the new state of Czechoslovakia (Presov) or an independent Ukraine (Sighet Marmapei). In an attempt to head off moves in either of the latter two directions, the new Hungarian republic passed a law on 21 December 1918 creating an autonomous province called the Ruthenian Land (Rus'ka Kraina). As an autonomous part of Hungary, the Ruthenian Land was endowed in February 1919 with its own govern­mental minister (Oreszt Szabo) and local governor (Agoston Stefan), and in March it held elections to a Ruthenian diet based in the town of Mukachevo.

While the Hungarian republic was trying to assert its control over Transcar­pathia, two local leaders traveled to Galicia, where on 3 January 1919 they asked for help from the West Ukrainian National Republic. Then, on 21 January more than 1,200 Rusyns/Ukrainians met in the small town of Khust to proclaim their desire to join a united Ukraine (Soborna Ukraina). One part of Transcarpathia,

the far-eastern Hutsul region, even declared an independent Hutsul Republic in early January and accepted aid from the West Ukrainian National Republic. The Hutsul Republic managed to survive for the next six months until its government was driven out by Romanian troops.

Neither the Hungarian nor the Ukrainian orientation, however, was to prevail in Transcarpathia. An unexpected source was to make a crucial difference in the political future of the region. This source was the United States, in particular immigrants from Transcarpathia. Known at the time as Uhro-Rusyns (i.e., Rusyns from Hungary), in July 1918 the group chose a young Pittsburgh lawyer, Gregory Zhatkovych, to represent them in finding a solution for the fate of their home­land. Zhatkovych first favored the idea of an independent Rusyn state (Rusinia), but after meeting with President Woodrow Wilson and the Czech leader Tomas G. Masaryk (who was in the United States working on behalf of a future independent Czechoslovakia), the Rusyn-American leader came to favor the Czechoslovak solu­tion. He arranged a plebiscite among immigrants in the United States, who in November voted overwhelmingly (68 percent) to join the Czechoslovak republic.

Armed with the Rusyn-American decision, the new government in Prague, by then headed by President Masaryk, dispatched troops in late December 1918 to occupy Transcarpathia. By January, the Czechoslovak forces had gotten only as far as Uzhhorod (on the present-day Ukrainian border with Slovakia), because the rest of the region was being administered by the pro-Hungarian government of the autonomous Ruthenian Land. Then, in March, when Hungary became a Soviet state (under Bela Kun), the autonomous region was taken over by a Bolshe­vik regime. This Communist threat to the Danubian Basin prompted war between a Hungarian Soviet army on the one hand and Czechoslovak and Romanian forces on the other. The Hungarian Communists were eventually defeated, and by the summer of 1919 Czechoslovak and Romanian forces were occupying all of Trans­carpathia. On 8 May 1919, Uzhhorod became the site of the convocation of the Central Ruthenian National Council, which accepted the decision of the Rusyn immigrants in the United States and declared its voluntary union with Czechoslo­vakia, although with the understanding that all Rusyn-inhabited territories south of the Carpathians would be granted political as well as cultural autonomy.

The Ukrainian revolution: success or failure?

By the summer of 1919, each of the three Ukrainian territories in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire had found itself in a new country. Eastern Galicia was held by Poland, northern Bukovina by Romania, and Transcarpathia by Czecho­slovakia. Only in the case of Transcarpathia was the new political situation sup­ported by the local population. None of these territorial arrangements, however, was internationally recognized as yet. That recognition had to await the decisions of the Peace Conference in Paris, where leaders of the victorious Entente had been sitting since early 1919 in an effort to redraw the map of Europe.

With the de facto incorporation of western Ukrainian lands into Poland, Roma­nia, and Czechoslovakia by mid-1919, and with the establishment of Bolshevik rule in Dnieper Ukraine in early 1920, the efforts to create a sovereign Ukrainian state uniting all Ukrainian-inhabited territory that would be independent of the sur­rounding powers effectively came to an end. Faced with this result, most non­Marxist writers have subsequently considered the Ukrainian revolutionary era a failure. Their reasoning? Ukrainians were unable to achieve the supposedly ulti­mate goal of national movements - independent statehood. Accordingly, the record of those revolutionary years, 1917-1920, has been searched in detail for what went wrong.

Many reasons are given for the failure of the revolution: (1) political inexperi­ence that resulted in destructive in-fighting and a lack of firm leadership; (2) the total breakdown of cooperation between Galician and Dnieper Ukrainians; (3) submission to foreign powers, especially Germany; (4) invasions by the White Rus­sians and the Bolsheviks; (5) the refusal of the Entente to aid the Ukrainian cause; (6) the failure to resolve the land question and the reluctance of the peasant masses to support their ‘own Ukrainian’ governments, and their tendency to join destructive marauding bands instead; and (7) the opposition of the many minori­ties on Ukrainian territory to the idea of Ukrainian independence. Finally, the most important reason given for the perceived failure is that Ukrainians as a peo­ple were not sufficiently conscious of their national identity in 1917-1920 to want to struggle and sacrifice themselves for Ukrainian statehood.

Looked at in another way, however, the Ukrainian revolutionary era was a success. One might well wonder why so many Ukrainians did in fact struggle and sacrifice their lives for the idea of independence. This was particularly remarkable in east-central, or Dnieper, Ukraine, where the Ukrainian movement was virtually non-existent or, at best, limited to a handful of individuals. Then suddenly, after 1917, energy and sacrifice on behalf of the national cause burst forth, in the polit­ical, social, cultural, and military spheres. And even if these efforts did not bring about the hoped-for independence, the revolutionary experience itself instilled in Ukrainians a firm sense of national purpose - achieved, moreover, not after sev­eral generations of peacetime cultural work, but in less than half a decade. From such a perspective, the Ukrainian revolution was a remarkable success.

On the other hand, this period was never viewed as a failure by apologists for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. After all, it was the revolutionary era that gave birth to the Soviet Ukrainian government, which, after three attempts, finally established its authority over most lands within Ukrainian ethnolinguistic bounda­ries. In Soviet Ukrainian terms, therefore, independence was indeed achieved for most of Dnieper Ukraine between 1917 and 1920. All that remained was for subse­quent generations to bring that achievement to all Ukrainian lands. The next five chapters will explore the impact of Soviet and non-Soviet rule on Ukrainian terri­tories, where the differing heritages and goals of the revolutionary era would be kept alive.