Ukraine: Second among Equals
Borys Levytsky aptly described Ukraine’s enhanced position in the USSR during the Khrushchev era with the phrase “second among equals.”1 Certainly indications mounted that an implicit understanding had been reached between the Kremlin and Kiev in which the Ukrainians, in return for their support and cooperation, had been offered the role of junior partners – the Russians, of course, were the senior partners – in the running of the Soviet empire.
For those Ukrainians who had no confidence in or desire for self-rule, this modern version of the Little Russianism of the 19th century seemed to offer many career opportunities for them as individuals. For the Kremlin, winning the support of the Ukrainians was essential because they were not only the second most numerous nation in the USSR but also the only ones who could seriously challenge Russian hegemony. The close linguistic and cultural ties between the two peoples encouraged and facilitated cooperation.To celebrate the Russian/Ukrainian partnership, in 1954 the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty was marked throughout the Soviet Union in an unusually grandiose manner. In addition to numerous festivities, myriad publications, and countless speeches, the Central Committee of the all-union party even issued thirteen “theses,” which argued the irreversibility of the “everlasting union” of the Ukrainians with the Russians: “The experience of history has shown that the way of fraternal union and alliance chosen by the Russians and Ukrainians was the only true way. The union of two great Slavic peoples multiplied their strength in the common struggle against all external foes, against serf owners and the bourgeoisie, against tsarism and capitalist slavery. The unshakeable friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples has grown and strengthened in this struggle.”2 To emphasize the point that the union with Moscow brought the Ukrainians great benefits, the Pereiaslav anniversary was crowned by the Russian republic’s ceding of Crimea to Ukraine “as a token of friendship of the Russian people.”
But the “gift” of the Crimea was far less altruistic than it seemed.
First, because the peninsula was the historic homeland of the Crimean Tatars whom Stalin had expelled during the Second World War, the Russians did not have the moral right to give it away nor did the Ukrainians have the right to accept it. Second, because of its proximity and economic dependence on Ukraine, the Crimea’s links with Ukraine were naturally greater than with Russia. Finally, the annexation of the Crimea saddled Ukraine with economic and political problems. The deportation of the Tatars in 1944 had created economic chaos in the region and it was Kiev’s budget that had to make up the losses. More important was the fact that, according to the 1959 census, about 860,000 Russians and only 260,000 Ukrainians lived in the Crimea. Although Kiev attempted to bring more Ukrainians into the region after 1954, the Russians, many of whom were especially adamant in rejecting any form of Ukrainiza-tion, remained the overwhelming majority. As a result, the Crimean “gift” increased considerably the number of Russians in the Ukrainian republic. In this regard, it certainly was an appropriate way of marking the Pereiaslav Treaty.