CONCLUSION

Although Shatibi’s theory represents a novel approach to Sunni legal theory, it can by no means be maintained that it was unique in its reliance on principles of inductive logic.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 1:119 (“waqad ‘ulima anna al-kulliyata idhS ‘aradaha al-juzlyu fala athara lil-juzlyi”); 2:36 (“al-kullTyatu... la yarfa‘uha takhallufu ahadi al-juz’Tyat”); 3:7 (“al-kulllyu la yankharimu bi-juz’Tyin”). It is significant that Ibn Rushd, Talkhis mantiq Aristu, 1:352-353, distinguishes between demonstrative induction (istiqra’ burhani) and dialectical induction (istigra' jadaii). The former must, in order to be valid, encompass all the particulars in existence, but the latter need only include those particulars which are deemed to have gained credence (mashhurat) on account of their acceptance by people in general.

⁷⁰ Muwafaqdt, 3:5, 1.11 (“fa-al-i‘radu ‘an al-juz*iyi jumlatan yu’addi ila al~shakki fi

al-kullF). ’

⁷¹ Ibid., 1:84, 85.

process of theoretical development. The embryonic beginnings of this process first appeared in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries in connection with al~tawatur al-ma‘nawi of ahad re­ports. As one traces down the sources there emerges a clear pat­tern of attempts to lay down a general theory of tawdtur in terms of the tawdtur ma^fnavn.

While Shatibi went beyond his predecessors in developing a le­gal theory of induction, he remained faithful to the logical assump­tions underlying the already established theory of tawdtur, which, as we have indicated, formed the basis for his general theory. The adoption of these assumptions, along with their logical properties, resulted in an inductive theory of law constructed of these same properties. Tawdtur, which in practical terms is a state of imme­diate knowledge obtaining in the mind, is subjectively determined by the hearer and does not need, once reached, to exhaust the entirety of the instances of transmission in existence. The same degree of conclusive certainty is claimed to be reached in Shatibl’s inductive theory, although the enumeration of all the members of a particular class may not be totally exhausted.

The intellectual world of Shatibi and his co-religionists was anchored in the premise that what makes things the way they are in this world is none other than the Almighty. The unshaken belief and faith in the words of the Prophet existed in the factual world of certainty, and that had to be explained in terms of divine intent and volition. Thus knowledge and the lack of it were the works of God; if we “know,” it is because our knowledge has been granted and guaranteed by God. Had Hume been a Muslim jurist, he would certainly have found his otherwise aborted theory of necessary causal connection between events guaranteed to him INDUCTIVE CORROBORATION, PROBABILITY, AND CERTAINTY 31 by his Creator. And if this were not the case, he would have encountered no problem in constructing a world view based on the principle of the uniformity of nature; for, after all, Muslims were indeed the recipients of divine providence, expressed in the ‘adah of their Lord.