3 Conclusions
The above presentation of al-Basri's theory of ethical and legal normativity, as articulated in his work on legal theory al-Murtamad, shows his confidence in human rationality and commitment to continuity between the mundane and divine realm.
In contrast to tAbd al-Jabbar, al-Basri takes this world as the starting point for the assessment of the ethical and legal status of acts. In line with a Muttazili approach, he deems that ethico-legal norms can be known by the intellect alone by weighing the mundane benefit (nafc, manfaca) attained and/or the harm (darar, madarra) averted. Beneficial acts are good and permissible to engage, best done when benefitting another, and obligatory to do when they result not only in benefit but avert harm. Harmful acts are mostly prohibited, though al-Basri does not concern himself much with the category of reprehensible. Revelation provides additional information that the intellect alone cannot grasp. The main dividing line between the realms of rational and religious normativity is the grounds for identifying something as good and bad. With Revelation, the perspective of benefit and harm is directed toward the Afterlife. God's commands and prohibitions provide the information to assess the ethical and legal status of religious acts done under takllf. Here, the pairs of divine punishment (ruqtιha) and reward (thawab) and blame (dhamm) and praise (madh) are the deciding criteria for the ethical and legal status of acts. We see that in both realms, consequentialist considerations determine the ethical and legal value of acts, although for acts that pertain to a person's otherworldly fate, the factor of obedience plays a role. Obeying divine commands leads to maslaha in form of reward in the Afterlife; disobedience leads to mafsada in form of punishment. Ultimately, however, one may assess these religious acts also by benefit and harm. In contrast to tAbd al-Jabbar, al-Basri understands obedience not so much in deontological terms but as taking advantage (Lutf) of the maslaha a divine imposition promises. Otherworldly reward is a (self-)benefit and striving to attain it is rationally obligatory; failing to do so - by disobeying God's commands and prohibitions, and not taking advantage of the opportunity to be rewarded, thus, risking His punishment - is an obvious harm, not only in the eyes of God but also rationally.[419] Al-Basri, more so than Abd al-Jabbar, constructs religious normativity along consequentialist lines, though with a light undercurrent of deontological considerations. Still, for both Muttazilis, attaining benefit and averting harm is a motivating factor (dal) for human action, be it mundane advantages or reward in the Afterlife.Performing religiously good or bad acts is for al-Basri, however, only a gateway to divine praise or blame. One cannot be certain that a particular act is rewarded or punished. This uncertainty in al-Basri's thought, however, is not driven by concerns to preserve God's omnipotence, as we will see in our Ashtari jurists. It is God's justice as the Final Judge that explains al-Basri's hesitance in assigning blame or praise. At the Day of Judgement, God weighs one's good deeds against one's bad ones to determine the desert of blame. A single bad or good act is not necessarily decisive on one's otherworldly fate.
The motivation to pursue benefit and avert harm also explains al-Basri's endorsement of legal analogy (qiyds). It is a rationally obligatory way to maximize one's prospects of otherworldly reward and minimize the possibility of being punished. Like tAbd al-Jabbar, al-Basri refers to benefit that motivates to action as rilla, which suggests that he adheres to what Zysow calls the motive-model of the ratio legis of analogy.
However, when he presents the ways to determine rationes legis used in analogy it is clear that he does not operationalize the purpose and ethical value associated with the ruling in any concrete ways to identify the rilla. The ratio legis is foremost identified by efficacy (fa1thlr), with is known from explicit or implicit syntactical or semantic features of the ruling within its textual or close contextual setting. Al-Basri mostly references apparent, outward characteristics, not the ethical value or purpose or beneficial mundane consequences to recognize that a ratio legis is effective on its ruling. In this regard, he falls squarely within the sign-model of the ratio legis.Even when taking into account that al-Basri sometimes expresses that the ratio legis (4lla) is a motivating factor and that the same incentive of receiving benefit may be the motivating factor to act upon the derivative ruling in analogy to the original, this is tied to the legal status of the ruling being obligatory, prohibited, and the like. As al-Basri illustrates with the example of eating sugar, it is not the ethical content of the act that leads to maslaha but obedience. God's legislative intent is not captured in the rilla of His rulings. Rather, it is to provide people with opportunities to be obedient and thereby attain maslaha in the Afterlife. Why God prescribes a particular course of action on His creatures is not part of al-Basri's legal inquiry - it is enough to know that God only commands what is good and what is a maslaha for the human agent when obeyed. God being a moral agent obviates further inquiry into the moral status of the commanded act. As Farahat remarks, blindly following God's commands is only possible if those commands are “ready-made judgments of another moral agent.”[420] Whether or not divine rulings attain good in this world remains beyond the frame of al-Basri's analysis of legal normativity and religio-legal analogy.
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- Conclusions
- Conclusions
- Conclusions and Forecasts
- Conclusions. Rethinking the Way the Past Can Be Made Understandable
- APPENDIX I PERSONAL CONCLUSIONS (1ST EDITION, 2001)
- CONCLUSiONS
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