Customary Law and Personal Law
On the intersections of identities, Amartya Sen lucidly puts it, “The crucial need to take note of the plural identities ofpeople and their choice ofpriorities survives the replacement of civilizational classifications with a directly religious categorization”.19 Thus, identities can never be seen in vacuums.
India has a vast socio-religious and geopolitical diversity owing to India’s rich heritage of multiculturalism and being home to major religions — in fact four major religions, viz. Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism and Jainism, emerged from India. These diversities, of various natures and degrees, inevitably have impressions over the history of law in India.
A well-recognized principle of jurisprudence is that the State is not the only source of law. In both Hindu and Muslim jurisprudence, the importance of custom has been well acknowledged. If we go back to the early history of the subcontinent, besides religious groups following their different religious laws, the presence of customs and usages acquiring the status of law in different parts of the country is historically prevalent.
After initial ignorance towards the customary law, owing primarily to the imperialistic approach, the colonial administrators acknowledged the importance of customs and usages statutorily.20
The Bombay Presidency, Regulation IV of 1827 assigned precedence to custom over the personal law. The object of Sec. 37 of the Bengal Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887), and the old regulations was to make it clear that the Muhammadans were not to be governed by the English law, and the personal law of the Muhammadans was left intact. Sec. 37 did not preclude a party from proving a custom at variance with the Muhammadan law. Such custom could be proved in the Punjab and in Oudh. The colonial state, after the annexation in Punjab (1849), had to make a declaration that “native institutions and practices shall be upheld as far as they are consistent with the distribution of justice to all classes” considering the region of Punjab, particularly the rural areas, were inhabited by various tribes following various customary laws.21 Consequently Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872, laid down the precedence of native law over Hindu and Muhammadan law regarding succession, special property of females, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, adoption, guardianship, minority, bastardy, family relations, wills, legacies, gifts, partitions, or any religious usage or institution.
Similarly, in Oudh Laws Acts, 1876 (Section 3), N.W.F.P. Reg. VII of 1901 (Section 27), Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, customs were given precedence over the personal laws. Large tribes like Baluchis had their special customs while adhering to Islamic faith. The Hindus were governed by their special customs, and so were the Khojas and Memons in Bombay to the matrilineal laws in Malabar and Travancore.In the year 1868,22 while deciding a Hindu religious endowment right of succession, the Privy Council stated that “the duty, therefore, of an European Judge, who is under the obligation to administer the Hindoo Law, is not so much to enquire whether a disputed doctrine is fairly deducible from the earliest authorities, as to ascertain whether it has been received by the particular School which governs the district with which he has to deal, and has there been sanctioned by usage. Under the Hindoo system of law, clear proof of usage will outweigh the written text of law.” In 1869,23 in relation to Hindoo laws, again the Privy Council stated that “where a custom is proved to exist, it supersedes the general law...”.
In the year 1847,24 the Bombay Supreme Court upheld the practice of Hindu customs of inheritance and succession for Khojas25 and Cutchi Memons26 over Muslim law. Much later in 1913,27 in a suit by a Muhammadan lady against her brothers for recovery of her share in their father’s property, the defendants having set up the plea that according to family custom female descendants could not inherit in the presence of male descendants, the courts in India refused to admit evidence in support of the alleged custom on the ground that evidence of custom at variance with the ordinary rules of Muhammadan law was inadmissible in regard to matters, mentioned in Section 37 ofthe Bengal, N.W.P and Assam Civil Courts Act. Reversing the lower courts, the Privy Council held that evidence with respect to the issue as to family custom should be admitted.
Thereafter, in 1917,28 a Shiite Muslim of Sind died intestate and an administration suit was filed. It was alleged by the appellant that contrary to the general rule of Muhammadan law, by a custom of the family the sister of the intestate was excluded as a female in favour of male collaterals. The Court emphasized on the burden of proof that lies heavily upon the Plaintiff alleging custom in order to succeed in altering the devolution of property according to Muhammadan law to a devolution determined by a family custom.29In a case in 1922,30 the parties to the litigation were Lubbai Muhammadans of the Sunni sect residing in the district of Coimbatore in the Madras Presidency; the question was whether succession to the estate of a deceased member of the sect was governed by Muhammadan law or by a rule of descent excluding females. The Privy Council stated that “The litigants are Muhammadans to whom this Act applies so that prima facie all questions as to succession among them must be decided according to Muhammadan Law”. It clarified that in India, however, custom plays a large part in modifying the ordinary law, and it is now established that there may be a custom at variance even with the rules of Muhammadan law, governing the succession in a particular community of Muhammadans. But the custom must be proved.
The history of customs taking precedence over personal laws in the subcontinent thus have often been misused in depriving property rights to women. With the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, specific legislation directing courts to apply Muslim law in matters of intestate succession, special property of females, etc. (see Section II) was brought into existence. Any custom that merely excludes women from inheritance has been done away with.31 It is interesting to read the statement of objects and reasons of the Shariat Act of 1937 which records32 that the reason of bringing this legislation was that all Muslim women organizations condemned customary laws and demanded that Muslim Personal Law should be made applicable to them.
The importance attached to customs, particularly in the subcontinent, given the intersections of various identities, can neither be denied nor be reduced.
The Madras High Court33 upheld a custom allowing succession rights to an adopted child in view of the fact that Section 2 of the Shariat Act did not specifically mention ‘adoption’ and secondly it found that there was no prohibition from applying customs in view of the reading of Section 3 of the Shariat Act.34The Calcutta High Court35 has stated that the personal laws of the parties to the marriage would mean ‘customary law of the class to which such person belongs’. This is a generalised observation and at least, to the extent of Islamic Personal Law, this observation is incorrect. Various practices of conducting and terminating marriages can be a matter of custom prevailing amongst a common class of persons belonging to a religion or a tribe that does not follow any major or commonly known religion. Those customary practices may be consistent and followed strictly. Hence, all customary practices can’t be understood to be part of ‘personal law’.
Under the Hindu system of law, clear proof of usage will outweigh the written text of the law.36 The specific legislation, as codified in terms of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, itself makes the Act inapplicable for a very large section of people who may be Hindu in their religious belief but still the mandate of the Act is not applicable for them. Section 2(2)37 of the Act states that the provisions setout therein shall not apply to Scheduled Tribes within the meaning of Clause 25 of Article 366.38 Secondly, in terms of Section 29(2),39 the Act gives a general exemption to all those who may be Hindu but the provisions under the Act shall not affect any recognized custom or any local special laws (which may also be contrary to this Act). The rights of an exempted Hindu under Section 29(2) can be illustrated with the judgment of a High Court40 wherein an approved custom of divorce has been held to be valid. In this case the custom was that if a wife leaves her husband and elopes with another man, the second husband returns the marriage expenses and bride price incurred to the former husband.
If this type of divorce is valid in terms of codified law of marriage and divorce in the Hindu religion, one must keep in mind as to how the legislature has treated utterance of ‘talaq of a particular nature in Muslims by bringing a harsh and excessive criminal legislation. In this context, even the ratio of majority judgment of the Supreme Court on the issue of talaq is somehow a difficult proposition to justify if one views this purely as customary practice.In relation to succession of property, the Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to various tribes having Hindu belief systems. This fact has been recorded in Madhu Kishwar’s case.41
Even today, unlike matrilineal practices among Nayars and Ezhavas of Travancore who were attacked as “non-Hindus” and thus radically transformed or ruined, Mappila Muslims retained a matrilineal kinship structure by placing reliance upon customary practices and utilising institution of waqf.42 The Garo and Khasi tribes of Meghalaya are matriarchate too. Among these tribes, the son-in-law comes to live with his wife’s parents.43 The Portuguese Civil Code remains in force in the territories of Goa, Daman and Diu along with the codes of native customs and usages. Neither the Shariat Act nor Hindu codified laws of 1955—56 are applicable. Hindus are governed by the unreformed Shastric Hindu law on marriage, divorce, adoption and joint family.44 Muslims of Goa are governed by Portuguese law as well as Shastric Hindu law.45 In Puducherry, all the central family laws extend with a rider that they would not apply to the “renoncants”, i.e. the native population that opted for the Code Napoleon of 1804 and not personal laws during the French rule — before the territory’s merger into the Union of India.46 As of late 2019, Jammu and Kashmir remained excluded from the central laws vide Article 370 of the Constitution, overriding the applicability of central family laws.
In Jammu and Kashmir, the local statutes governing Hindus differ from the central enactments.47 Muslims are governed by customary law different from the Muslim Personal Law in other regions. In Nagaland and Mizoram, no parliamentary legislation (here central family laws) can replace the customary law unless demanded by the local legislature.48Furthermore, the sixth schedule of the Constitution of India provides protections to tribal areas in the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram whereby vide certain provisions complete autonomy on matter of family law is provided. These matters can also be adjudicated by the local panchayats following their own procedures.49 Notably, the sixth schedule, which provides for autonomous districts and autonomous regions, provides legislative competence to these district councils and regional councils. Theses councils are competent to deal with subjects like inheritance, succession, marriage and divorce. Interestingly, the special provisions are not only confined to the domain of interpersonal matters but rather stretch over the arena of the administration ofjustice too. These councils are competent to frame rules to lay down the procedures for trial of suits and criminal cases and for execution of orders/judgments. It’s a known fact that the Hindu Marriage Act prohibits marriages amongst close relatives. However, these marriages are considered auspicious among the Hindus of the Southern part of India. These customs are taken care of by Hindu Acts recognizing customs of different Hindu communities. Naturally, even after codifications, all Hindus are also not governed by one law.
III.
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