Customary law: lives at half value?
Although customary law ended up providing a more active and effective process of reparation than did the public law, it nevertheless manifests many shortcomings. Among these, there is the fact that it is common for clan relationships to be used to pressure the victim’s family to make concessions to that of the wrongdoer, under the rubric of forgiveness and the inevitability of the loss - the allusion to ‘fate’.
In addition, tribal law is influenced by the relative social status of victim and wrongdoer (i.e. the more powerful one’s family is, the more concessions may be gained from the other party). The factory victims are a case in point, both in the changes in the valuation of diya noted below and in the fact that notables overseeing the customary law process chose to overlook the fact that certain government-appointed officials in positions of formal responsibility were clearly and institutionally implicated in what had happened in their failure to enforce licensing and safety provisions in the existing law.Clan-based politics and processes have in fact been officially encouraged by the Palestinian Authority; an early Presidential Decree (no. 161 for the year 1995) established a ‘Clan Affairs’ Department affiliated to the president’s office (Jad et al. 2000: 51) leading to a resurgence in clan-based affiliations, such as the revival of hamula (clan) associations and their deployment in local and national politics. The effects of this type of action are apparent in the case of the Hebron factory fire.
In customary or clan-based law, there are immediate arrangements for a truce (suspending the possibility of blood revenge) and a peace offering which have to be put in place before any settlement can be made (la tatyib qabl al-tatbib').b2 Immediately after the fire at the factory, notables (wujahat) from the Hebron area convened to negotiate these preliminary arrangements.
Significantly, among these notables were officials of the Palestinian Authority and religious officials. The notables were charged under customary law with deciding upon the mechanism of peace between the families of the fourteeen victims and the ‘guilty’ party or parties, and on the amount of ‘bloodwit’ or compensation (diyd) to be paid to the relatives of the victims, in addition to the length of the truce period, commonly known as hudna or 'atwadiAs a peace offering (firash al-'atwa), 2,500 Jordanian dinars (JDs) were paid to each of the victims’ families and the period of truce between the wrongdoer and relatives of victims was set at one year. The amount of compensation money (here termed al-diya al-mohammadiyya) to be paid by the guilty to relatives of the victims was agreed upon by the two sides in the presence of the notables. According to relatives of victims, the amount agreed upon was given as a hundred female camels, forty of them pregnant, or 4.5 kg of gold, worth JD 35,000, for each victim. The figure of a hundred camels is the ‘classical’ diya for homicide.54 This amount represents an equal valuation of a woman’s life with that of a man, and was set by asking the opinion of local 'ulama, notably the Deputy Qadi al Quda, Shaykh Taysir Tamimi. However, at the time and later, many contradictions arose as to whether or not a woman’s diya should be of the same value as that of a man. Some held that a woman’s diya should be half the amount of a man’s, others held that it should be equal, while a third opinion held that specific circumstances should be taken into account and that in effect such decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis.
The notables constituting the jaha (i.e. those whose role it was to facilitate and oversee the arbitration and settlement process between the two parties, referred to in this case as the ‘committee for clan reconciliation’, Iajnat al-islah al-'asha’iri) advised relatives of the victims to request the release of the factory owner from prison.
The relatives took the advice and signed a petition stating that they had no objection if the owner were to be released while waiting for his court hearing, on condition that he paid 498,000 Israeli shekels (JD 100,000) towards the compensation due the victims’ families (as noted below, a slightly larger amount was finally paid when the owner was released from prison). The rest of the total compensation was to be payable at the end of the hudna period, a year from the date of the agreement. He was also asked to leave the country during the hudna period. Of special note here is the cooperation of the state court in the Customaiy law processes. Indeed, the owner was not formally charged and his case was adjourned until April 2002, presumably after the resolution of the customary law process.As noted above, as a first payment from the total amount of the diya, the sum of JD2,500 was paid to each family. If the factory owner were to prove unable to fulfil his obligation, it would have been possible that the tribal system representatives {wujahaf) would intervene to pressure the victims’ families to settle for the amount they had received and to forfeit their rights to the sum outstanding. In the event that the families refused to forfeit their rights, they would have been able to resort to the judicial system to sue for what was owed them.
However, in the intervening period, the balance of power’seems to have shifted away from the victims’ families. In particular, the ‘classical’ diya rule valuing a woman’s life at half of that of a man was reasserted and in the end only half the full diya as originally agreed was held to be payable. This information, provided by Shaykh Tamimi, was confirmed by the bereaved families in an interview with an Institute fieldworker in November 2001. After the factory owner was released from prison, he paid JDi 1,000 to each family, bringing to JD13,500 the total amount paid by the owner per victim within the year of the hudna period.
Another meeting of the Jα⅛ was set for early 2002, at which time the factory owner was due to pay the remainder of the half diya. As half diya is worth 2.25 kg gold or JD17,500, the remaining sum due for each victim was JD4,000. However, the families expressed concern that they might be pressured by the jaha to forfeit their rights to even the remainder of the half diya. Further, more recent developments55 include suggestions that the jh⅛ may revise the valuation of 4.5 kg of gold from JD35,000 to JD28,000, leaving the half diya at JD 14,000; and that the jaha has come under pressure to differentiate between married and single victims, with a higher diya of JD12,000 for the former and a lower one of JD8,000 for the latter. The lack of formal ‘transparency’ in this process, and the pressures apparently being brought to bear on members of the jaha in the interim are illustrations of certain characteristics of the customary law process referred to above which may combine to undermine the rights of the victims and their families.
More on the topic Customary law: lives at half value?:
- The New Zealand Reform
- Testate Succession
- THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EMPIRE-BUILDING
- CHAPTER FOUR Town and Country Urban devotions and rural rituals
- Public Interest Litigation (PIL): A Deficit for Democracy, Dying Working Class Politics and the Emergence of Middle Class
- REVIEW OF FORENSIC ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS
- Class Formation Behind ‘Overdeveloped’ State
- Cossack Tatar Fighters
- Oman