Medieval Period of Shite Legal Theory

The protagonists of the next phase of developments made in the Shi'ite legal discourse were scholars from Hilla, Iraq. The fall of the Abbasid empire due to the Mongol invasion in the 13th century brought about an era of perdition for the Shi'ite seminaries.

72 See Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy, 553-55; and Sachedina, The Just Ruler, 9-12. For a thorough study of how the Buyid Scholars took over the functions of the Hidden Imam see Calder, “The Structure of Authority in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence”.

73 Zysow categorises the four main Sunni Schools of jurisprudence, Hanafl, Malikr, Shafi'i and Hanbali as formalists, whereas he categorises the Zahiri and the Shi'ite Schools of jurisprudence as materialists. See Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 1-3.

74 1.,282-28¢..

75 See Modarressi, Introduction to ShLlLaw, 45.

to become a distinguished centre of scholarship was the seminary of Hilla. This was because the Shi'ite scholars of Hilla supported the Mongol overthrow of the Abbasid empire, and consequently held high positions within the Mongol ruling ranks which they used to further their influence.?® In spite of their influ­ence, it is important to note that the scholars of Hilla never enjoyed the same level of political security as the Buyid Scholars, as there was much tension and hostility that was created during this period by the complex relationship that existed between the Shi'ites and the Seljuqs.??

One of the most radical opponents of Shaykh Tsrs legal theory in Hilla was Ibn Idris al-Hillr (d. 1201). Ibn Idris challenged TusTs acceptance of isolated reports in the deduction of Sharia knowledge and more astoundingly slated the state of Shi'ite scholarship for its intellectual stagnation, whereby he criti­cised post-Tusr Shi'ite scholars for uncritically imitating him for over a century.

During this period, the most significant development made in the dis­course of Shi'ite legal theory was by Muhaqqiq's student and nephew Hasan b. Yusuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillr, who is more famously known as 'Allama al-Hillr (d. 1325). 'Allama studied the Shi'ite legal discourse under the auspices of Muhaqqiq. In addition, he also studied rational sciences, such as theology, logic, and philosophy under the illustrious Shi'ite theologian Khawaja Nasrr al-Drn al-Tusr (d. 1274). Furthermore, under the patronage of his Sunni teach­ers, Allama was introduced to the legal works of renowned Sunni scholars, including Abu Hamid al-Ghazalr (d. 1111), Fakhr al-Drn al-Razr (d. 1209), Sayf al-Drn al-Aidi (d. 1233), and Jamal al-Drn ibn al-Hajib (d. 1248). One of the

76 See Mazinani, “Hilla”, 149; Sachedina, TheJust Ruler, 13-4.

77 Sachedtna, TheJustRidei, 14.

78 See Modarressi, Introduction to ShtciLaw, 46-7; Mazinani, “Hilla,” 150-1.

79 See Sachedina, TheJust Ruler, 14-6. most impressive features of their works that appealed to 'Allama was how they integrated peripatetic80 logic and epistemology within the discourse of legal theory.81 According to W.

1. Like his Sunni predecessors, he graded isolated reports into hierarchical categories based on their degree of reliability (or their chains (isnad) of transmission); into sound (sahlh), dependable (muwaththaq), accept­able (hasan), and weak (da^clf). His categorisation of isolated reports points out that he probably accepted Ibn Idris's criticism against Tusi, and therefore acknowledged that not all isolated reports transmitted by Shi'ite narrators were necessarily reliable. However, rather than com­pletely rejecting their juristic utility, he upheld that isolated reports (or the conjecture they generate) can be utilised in the deduction of Sharia knowledge depending on how a jurist evaluates their reliability.84

2. He claimed that every human action is accompanied by a Sharia precept that determines its status in accordance with God. By this he means that

80 By peripatetic, I mean Greek philosophical thought that is derived from Aristotle and further developed by Muslim philosophers such as AbQ Yusuf al-Kindi (d. 873), Abu Nasr al-Farabi (d. 950) and Abu 'Ali Sina (d. 1037), who is also known as Ibn Sina or Avicenna. For a comprehensive study of Muslim philosophers and their contribution to the devel­opment of peripatetic philosophy see Corbin, The History ofIslamic Philosophy), 153-79; Nasr and Leaman (ed.), The History ofIslamic Philosophy, 40-52, 89-105, 165-277: Fakhry, A History ofIslamic Philosophy, 1-240.

81 See Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy, 60: Madelung, “Authority in Twelver Shiism,” 168; Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shi'ite Islam, 26, 30, 85.

82 See Hallaq, “Logic, Formal Arguments and Formalization of Arguments in Sunni Juris­prudence,” 319.

83 Also pointed out by Stewart, IslamicLegal Orthodoxy, 197-210, 526-30; Moussavi, Religious Authority, 26-30, 85, 170; Madelung, “Authority in Twelver Shiism,” 168.

84 See Calder, “Doubt and Prerogative,” 67; Modarressi, Introduction to ShTl law, 48, and a!--iylSi, FoundatlonsofJurisprudence, 1917.

every day-to-day human action is either considered obligatory (wajib), prohibrded (⅛ccιm)), recommended (ynusta⅛abb^, dr⅛⅛ed (ynakrhb), or premissible (mubah) by God.85 As such, he advocates that the sub­ject matter of legal theory is to search for evidence that conveys knowl­edge of the Sharia status of different actions. Like some of his Sunni predecessors,86 'Allama in Nihayat al-wusul ila dm al-usul accepts the general peripatetic notion that knowledge of all kinds (including Sharia knowledge) is obtained within the mind as a concept (tasawwur) or a judgment (tasdlq), and that each kind of knowledge is attained either in an immediate (darurl) manner or an acquired (kasbl) manner.87 Using this philosophical jargoning, Allama specifically elucidates that knowl­edge of Sharia can either be attained in an immediate manner through evidence that generates certainty (qat^f), such as evidence that generate knowledge of the obligation of praying (salat) and giving alms (zakat); or it can be attained in an acquired manner through evidence that gener­ates conjecture 88.(دي In other words, Allama essentially advocates that knowledge of Sharia can be attained through certainty-bearing or definitive (qafl) forms of evidence as well as conjectural أدي) forms of evidence.

85 1.,3,5,,8¾.

86 For details of peripatetic notions accepted in Sunni discourse of usul al-fiqh see Hallaq, “Logic, Formal Arguments,” 315-58: Hallaq, A History ofIslamic Legal Theories, 138-41.

87 See ‘Atemra Λ-t⅞Sh, Nlhryat a- U U Ha ^Hm al ul, ι‰-2.-, ١٠, Foundations of

Jurisprudence, 17.

88 Ibld,,88.

89 Fbld., 84-93, 225-35.

morphology ('tasrlf); and has knowledge of the status of transmitters of hadith (ma’rifat al-rjal) and the status of abrogation (naskh).90

'Allama's legal understanding was widely accepted and built upon by his con­temporaries and the Shi'ite rationalists that followed. However, by the end of the 14th century, the Shi'ite seminary of Hilla lost its zeal and began declining following the fall of the Ilkhanid dynasty. Renowned scholars who had studied under the patronage of the grand scholars of Hilla moved to Najaf and Jabal al-'Amil in southern Lebanon, where they established small seminaries that continued to promulgate and build upon the legacy of the scholars of Hilla.

The writings of Shi'ite scholars from Hilla and Jabal al-'Amil gained immense popularity within the Shi'ite world. They were studied as textbooks within Shi'ite seminary circles, and a vast number of commentaries and super-commentaries were written on them with the aim of explaining and dis­seminating the legal epistemology of early medieval Shi'itejurists. In practi­cal social terms, the scholastic efforts of early medieval Shi'ite jurists resulted in dividing the Shi'ite community into two tiers: the clerical class of jurists (mujtahids) and the laity (muqallids). The former had the ability and necessary qualifications to participate in the juristic process of deducing Sharia precepts (ijtihad), whereas the latter were simply required to imitate the former by con­forming to their Sharia deductions. Norman Calder interestingly explores that one of the main reasons for the widespread acceptance of Allama's legal theory (or more specifically his acceptance of ijtihad) amongst the Shi'ite rationalist jurists was because it enhanced their authority by enabling them to be situated at the centre of Shi'ite societal structures.93 Calder's point can be evidenced in the works of leading medieval Shi'ite jurists, including Shahid alAwwal (d. 1384), al-Muhaqqiq al-Karaki (d. 1534) and Shahid al-Tha ni (d. 1558), who explicitly argue that a jurist acts as a deputy of the Hidden Imam while the

90 1.,87.

91 See Mazinani, “Hilla,” 154-55; also see Muhajir, “Jabal al-'Amil”.

92 Ibn Shahid al-Thani, Maalim al-dln wa maladh al-mujtahidln, 126.

93 See Calder, “The Structure of Authority,” xx; Gleave, ScripturalistIslam, xviii. Imam remains in occultation.94 The socio-political role of Shi'ite jurists steadily increased within the Shi'ite community. During the reign of the Safavid Empire (between 1501 and 1722), Shi'ism, for the first time, became recognised as an official religion of Iran. During the early part of Safavid history, the dominance and aristocracy of the clerical class of Shi'ite jurists was very apparent. They owned land from mortmain charitable endowments (waqf);95 collected and distributed religious taxes and alms; legitimised and led (previously prohib­ited) Friday congregational prayers (_ιjumu^ca) in place of the Hidden Imam; and exercised authority over the majority of theological-jurisprudential and politi­cal matters due to their close bilateral ties with the Safavid rulers.96

During the course of the medieval period, the Shi'ite rationalists became recognised as the Usulis.97 In essence, although Shi'ite Usulis had minor dis­putes between them regarding their exact scope and function in the absence of the Hidden Imam, they generally maintained that their ability to conduct ijtihad (or the process of deducing Sharia knowledge) made them the most deserved and trusted agents of the Imam.98 After 'Allama, the legal legacy and stronghold of medieval Usulis lasted for around three hundred years over Shi'ite intellectual circles. However, it was met with plentiful opposition in the 17th century, which was instigated by Muhammad Amin al-Astarabadi (d. 1627). Astarabadi brought back and promulgated the traditionalist trend within Shi'ism. He founded what became known as the Akhbari movement, which was principally concerned with rescinding the intellectual and socio-political

94 See Calder, “The Structure of Authority,” 66-107, Sachedina, The Just Ruler, 18-9, 187; Modarressi, IitroductoitoShnLaw, 5,0-1-, Stewart-, l^slam^icl^e^galc^ι1^1^t^d^c^^^ι, ⅛⅛-71.

95 See Savory, Iran under the Safavids, 185-6.

96 See Modarressi, Introduction to ShTlLaw, 50; Sachedina, The Just Ruler, 18-9, 187-9, 235؛ Newman, “Fayd al-Kashani and the Rejection of the Clergy/State Alliance”, 45-6.

97 Modarresss study points out that the first time when rationalists were referred to as Usfilis, or more specifically 'Usfiliyya,' within Shi'ite intellectual circles was in 'Allama al-Hilli's Nihayat al-usul see Modarressi, Introduction to ShTl Law, 42. Saying this, it is important to note that prior to 'Allama the term Usfili can also be traced in the writ­ings of the 12th century scholar 'Abd al-Jalil al-Qazwini al-Razi (d. unknown). In his Kitab al-Naqd, Qazwini refutes false claims against Shi'ites that were made by some Sunnis. In his attempt to justify the true beliefs of the Shi'ite, Qazwini clarifies that Sunnis should not be misled by the false views of heretical Shi'ite groups such as the extremists or the 'Akhbariyya,' instead he propounds that they should only rely on the correct views that are given by the Usfilis or the 'Usfiliyya' (a group which he himself identifies with). For a detailed study of Qazwini's Kitab al-Naqd and his distinction between Akhbari and Usfili beliefs. See Gleave, Scripturalist lslam, 17-25.

98 For a comprehensive study see Newman, Twelver Shiism, 122-133. domination the Ushlis enjoyed over the Shi'ite community.99 Astarabadi was fundamentally disconcerted with the innovations that 'Allama engendered to the Shi'ite legal discourse. He criticised Allama, and medieval Ushlis who followed him, for blindly imitating the legal discourse of Sunni jurists and for adopting Greek logic as a valid basis for deducing Sharia know!edge.]٥٥ In summary, the following are perhaps the two most significant accusations that Astarabadi, or more generally the Shi'ite Akhbari School, levelled against the Ushlis:

1. Firstly, they criticised Ushlis for accepting the juristic utility of evidence that generated mere conjecture of Sharia knowledge. They generally upheld that in contrast to the Sunnis, the infallible Shi'ite Imams cat­egorically rejected and prohibited the juristic utility of any conjecture. As such, they maintained that their own legal methodology ensured that Sharia precepts are only deduced from evidence that generated certainty. In light of this, they denounced the Sunni-inspired four-fold categori­sation of evidence, and they particularly criticised Ushlis for using fal­lible (thus, conjectural) human reason to directly interpret the Quran. Instead, the Akhbaris (as the name suggests) proposed that Sharia knowl­edge can only be deduced from the reported traditions (akhbar) of the infallible Prophet and Shi'ite Imams. The Akhbari framework denied the Sunni-inspired categorisation of isolated reports based on their degree of reliability, and instead contended that all reports contained within Shi'ite canonical works are of equal authenticity and hence are authoritative definitive sources of Sharia knowledge.“!

2. Secondly, the Akhbaris criticised medieval Ushlis for accepting and introducing ijtihad within the folds of Shi'ism and thereby dividing the Shi'ite community into the clerical class of jurists and the laity. In accordance with the earlier Akhbari thought, jurists had no theological basis for being leaders of the Shi'ite community. They vehemently con­demned them for usurping the rights of the Hidden Imam and encroach­ing all theological-jurisprudential, political, and economical matters of the Shi'ite society by illegitimately extending their role and function. It is important to know that Robert Gleave, in Inevitable Doubt, claims that it was only in the 18th century where the Akhbari legal discourse

99 For a thorough discussion between pre-Astarabadi and post-Astarabadi understanding of Akhbarl thought see Gleave, Inevitable Doubt, 7-10; also see Mallat, The Renewal ofIslamic Law, 28-35; Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy, 475-86.

100 Modarressi, Introduction to ShTiLaw, 54.

101 See Etan Kohlberg, 'Akbaiya,'' in Encyclopaedia Iranica (2011), retrieved 26th June 2018, from http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/akbariya. reached the highest level of sophistication. He points out that rather than eschewing all notions of authority, the moderate neoAkhbari trend pre­sented by Yhsuf b. Ahmad al-Bahrani (d. 1772) endorsed that jurists pos­sessed a certain level of authority not because they belonged to an elitist class, but because Sharia itself possessed authority and thus by implica­tion those who knew how to interpret, deduce, and relay it also possessed authority.i02

The Akhbari movement gained immense popularity within the Shi'ite commu­nity during the later period of the Safavid rule. They maintained an intellectual stronghold amongst Shi'ite seminarians (students and teachers). Although it is beyond the scope of my study, an important question that arises is how and why the Akhbari movement wielded so much sway within the Shi'ite seminary circles. Nevertheless, the Akhbari dominance inevitably led to the suppres­sion of the Ushli thought, to the extent that Gleave notes that “some sources describe Ushli fiqh being taught in secret, discrimination against Ushlis and students of Ushlifiqh. having to hide their books with kerchiefs whilst walking in the streets for fear of attack ”103

The Ushli revival was once again brought about in Shi'ite seminary circles in the late 18th century. The chief protagonist who reportedly played a major role in stalling the Akhbari momentum was Muhammad Baqir al-Bihbihani, who is also known as al-Wahid al-Bihbihani (d. 1792). After the death of the neo-Akhbari Bahrani, Bihbihani received acknowledgement for his triumph over the Akhbari thought. He has been celebrated in Shi'ite Aiabic and Persian biographical and historical texts as the 'renewer' (mujaddid) and 're-founder' (mu^cassis) of Ushli thought.104 In his Fawa^lId al-ha¹iriyya, Bihbihani makes a distinction between knowledge (i'lm) and reality (waqi^c) and asserts that it is not necessary that what we know always accurately corresponds to reality. He elucidates that although evidence such as the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet and Imams may in themselves be sufficient in leading a person to real­ity (or that which is actually in the Mind of God), a jurist, due to his fallibility, will always interpret their textual indication (dalala) in a conjectural manner. However, in comparison to an untrained person, a jurist's interpretation (or conjecture) is taken to be more accurate, insofar as there is more of a probabil­ity that it accurately corresponds with reality. The reason for this is that a jurist is well trained in utilising a systematic methodology of interpretation and thus his interpretation is always confined within the limits set forth by Ushli legal

102 Gleave, InevtDoubt, 220232.

103 Ibid.,9*.

104 Ibid.,!!', Moen, AnIrttroduction., !8⅛', Heern, TheEntergenceof Modern Shi'ism, 23-4. theory.105 In line with this argumentation, Bihbihani asserts that Akhbaris are wrong in criticising Ushli jurists for acting in accordance with conjecture when they themselves do the same. He points out that although Akhbaris claim that they only deduce Sharia precepts from the definitive sources of evidence, their methodology of understanding these sources is flawed, as they fail to use cor­rect hermeneutical principles to interpret their textual indication. Therefore, for Bihbihani it is inescapable for the Akhbaris not to utilise conjecture and, unlike their Ushli counterparts, their utility of conjecture is less likely to accu­rately correspond to reality.جهإ

Bihbihans response to the Akhbari movement attracted a lot of popularity amongst the intellectual Shi'ite (predominantly Akhbari) seminary circles, as many students started to converge towards his Ushli thought.107 He trained a generation of prominent jurists including Sayyid Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulhm (d. 1797), Shaykh Ja'far Kashif al-Ghi a' (d. 1812), Mirza Abh Qasim al-Qummi (d. 1816), and Muhammad Husayn Isfahani al-Hiri (d. 1838-9). These jurists not only authored influential works on Ushli legal theory, but also attracted immense recognition as supreme religious figures of Iran and Iraq. It is impor­tant to note that in addition to Bihbihans efforts, Zackery Heern in The Emergence ofModern ShTlsm, highlights that other factors that may have con­tributed to the strong revival of the Ushli thought were the 1772 plague that hit Iraq and the decline of the Safavid dynasty.108 Bihbihans Ushli successors operated independently of state sponsorship; rather they relied on the support of the local and global wealthy Shi'ite business community. Their influence over Shi'ite grassroots grew to such an extent that in the late 18th and early 19th century they turned out to grant legitimacy to the Qajar dynasty of Iran. 109 The post-Bihbihani period therefore marks the phase when the Ushli clerical class began to assume supreme authority once again in place of the Hidden Imam. This period would eventually lead to the unprecedented establishment of an Islamic theocracy marking the last, and present, stage of evolution of clerical authority in Shi'ite Islam.

105 Gleave, Inevitable Doubt, 235-36; Also see Mul ammad Baqir al-Walid al-Bihbihani, aLF∞vfi,tda⅛fftriyya,⅛1-48..

106 Gleave, InevttabteDoubt, 2,6al-usul (also known as Rasa¹iΓ), with the chapter on 'certainty' (qat^f). In response to the heavy criticism levelled by the Akhbaris upon the Usdli utility of conjecture, Ansari from the very outset attempts to introduce and reinforce the pivotal role that certainty plays within the Usdli thought. In his attempt, he lays out what I term the fundamental epistemological underpinnings that determine what evidence a jurist can utilise to deduce Sharia knowledge. Ansari's episte­mological underpinnings can be described as the backbone of modern Shi'ite legal theory. Accordingly, in the forthcoming chapters of my study, I examine how Ansari and his Usdli successors analyse these underpinnings and their impact on the juristic deduction of Sharia precepts.

A natural outcome of Ansari's method and epistemological discourse was that it expanded the scope of Sharia and thereby thejurisdiction of a jurist. He contributed to this expansion by devising a set of guiding procedural prin­ciples (usulal-’amaliyya) that could be utilised by a jurist (or even the laity) to formulate Sharia precepts in cases where there was doubt (shakk).111 In other words, he expressed that in cases where there is either no or limited/ambig- uous access to evidence that conveys Sharia knowledge as it may be in the Mind of God, a mukallaf (a Muslim jurist or a lay person who is endowed with Sharia responsibilities/duties) must refer to one of the following procedural principles:

1. The principle of precaution (asalat al-ihtiyat), which is normally referred to in cases where a mukallaf has ambiguous knowledge that he is required to perform a Sharia duty but has doubt on what the exact duty ^{[6] [7] is. In such a case, the Sharia responsibility of a mukallaf would be to enact the maximum duty possible. For example, a mukallaf has knowl­edge that he is obliged to pray (salat) but does not know the exact direc­tion (qibla) he is required to face whilst praying (i.e., the direction of Mecca). In such a case, the maximum possible duty that he would be required to enact to ensure that he has fulfilled his obligation is to pray in all four directions.}

2. The principle of exemption (asalat al-bam^,d), which is normally referred to in cases where due to a lack of evidence, a mukallaf is unaware (or has no knowledge) of a Sharia duty that he may be required to perform. In such a case, his Sharia responsibility would be that he is exempted or excused from the performance of any responsibility. For example, if due to a lack of evidence a mukallaf does not know whether the Sharia pro­hibits the act of smoking or not, then the act of smoking is categorised as being permissible (mubah) by the Sharia, and as such the mukallafhas a choice to either perform it or not without being held liable.

3. The principle of continuity (asalat al-istishab), which is normally referred to in cases where a mukallaf starts doubting a Sharia duty that he previ­ously knew with certainty. In such a case, the Sharia responsibility of the mukallaf would be to resolve his doubt by acting in accordance with his previous certainty and simply ignoring his doubt. For example, a mukallaf knows with certainty that he performed ritual ablution (wudΩ>) before leaving his house. If after some time he entertains doubt about whether he is still in the state of ablution or not, then he resolves this doubt by continuing with his previous state of certainty and thereby accepting that he is still in the state of ablution.

4. The principle of choice (asalat al-takhar), which is largely referred to in cases where a mukallaf has doubt about two mutually conflicting Sharra duties. In such a case, the Sharia responsibility of the mukallaf would be to choose to act in accordance with one of the two mutually conflicting duties. For example, if a mukallaf finds two conflicting iso­lated reports, wherein one clearly indicates that it is prohibited (haram) to wear a black turban, and the other clearly indicates that it is obliga­tory (wajib) to wear a black turban, then the mukallaf has the choice to choose to act in accordance with either one of the two.

Ansari's legal theory and his expansion of the scope of Sharia seems to have significantly impacted his jurisprudential discourse on political theory. In his study of commercial jurisprudence entitled Kitab al-makasib, Ansari empha­sises the potential role a jurist has in absence of the Twelfth Imam. He argues that a jurist acts as a special deputy (al-na^,ib al-khass) of the Hidden Imam and is in charge of maintaining general guardianship (al-wilayatal-'amma) over all affairs of the Muslim community whilst the Imam remains in occu!tation.]]2 Ansari never took an official position of leadership during the lifetime of his teacher Muhammad Hasan al-Najafi (d. 1849). It is important to note that Najafi, who is also famously known as al-Sahib al-Jawahir, was one of the first Shritejurists to be acknowledged as marja^cal-taqlld (the point of refer- ence/emulation). His success in achieving the highest form of authority, and thereby giving the position of a jurist unprecedented recognition within the Shi'ite world, probably stems from his illustrious work on juristic deduc­tions (fiqh) entitled Jawahir al-kalam.113 In Jawahir al-kalam, Najafi gave an extended commentary on Muhaqqiq al-Hilli's SharaF al-Islam by listing opin­ions of prominent past Shi'ite jurists. His comprehensive work attracted a lot of scholarly attention, and this was perhaps one of the main reasons why it (and its author) became a major point of reference in the Shi'ite diaspora, insofar as most lay Shi'ites started to follow and emulate the deductions and opinions of Najafi therein. Prior to his death, Najafi himself appointed Ansari as his successor. Accordingly, Ansari became universally recognised as the sec­ond marja^r al-taqlld of the Shi'ites. Ansari's most significant contribution in the development of Shi'ite authority structures was that he successfully ensured the centrality and the permanency of a single marja^r al-taqlld. He did this by firstly asserting that a jurist can only be recognised as a marja^r al-taqlld if he was the most learned (a^clam) amongst the clerical class. Secondly, he asserted that since lay people do not hold expertise in deducing Sharia knowledge, it is incumbent upon them, as part of their Sharia responsibilities (takalif), to fol­low and act in accordance with the opinions of a marja^r. He argued that if they failed to do this then all their ritual acts of worship (such as praying, fasting, giving alms etc.) would be null and void.114

Ansari's development of Shi'ite authority structures (or more specifically his opinion on marja^c al-taqlld) became recognised around the Shi'ite world, including countries outside the Middle East, such as India and Turkey. To this day, his Fara¹id al-usul and Kitab al-makasib are taught within traditional Shi'ite seminaries as advanced texts of Shi'ite legal theory (usul al-fiqh) and legal deductions (fiqh). Only after rigorously understanding and completing

112 See Sachedina, TheJust Ruler, 210-25: Murtada al-Ansari, Kitab al-Makasib, 3: 561.

113 See Sachedina, TheJust Ruler, 22: Cole, “Imami Jurisprudence,” 401

114 See Cole, ''ImamiJurisprudence,'' 44-5: it is important to note that the legal necessity of following a marja'al-taqlld was first explicitly stated by Sayyid Mul ammad Kazim alTabataba'i al-Yazdi (d. 1919), who, in his famous work on juristic deductions (fiqh) enti­tled 'Urwat al-wuthqa, based his opinions on the ideas set forth by Ansari, see Walbridge, “Introduction: Shi'ism and Authority,” 4: Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shi'ite Islam, 39: Sachedtna, The JustRuler, 222-⅛ his works can seminarians become qualified as future juHsts.15 Ansari's sys­tematisation of legal theory and his impact on Shi'ite authority structures led his Usuli successors to attain a very powerful and authoritative position within the Shi'ite world. The following are some of his successors, who I refer to as post-Ansari or modern Usulis, who not only held prominent leadership posi­tions within the Shi'ite community but also made important contributions in furthering Shi'ite legal theory by clarifying, scrupulously examining, and build­ing on Ansari's legal epistemology:

1. Akhund Muhammad Kazim al-Khurasani (d. 1911), also known as Sahib al-Kifaya, studied directly under the tutelage of Ansari. Apart from authorfngommenLarfesonAn^aris Fccdal-L and Kitdbalmakdsih, Khurasani authored Kifdyat al-usul, where he innovatively built on Ansari legal epistemology by rigorously presenting his own take.™ Owing to the conciseness of Kifdyat al-usul, it received over a hundred commentaries.“? It eventually replaced Mirza Abu Qasim al-Qummi's Qawdnin al-usul as one of the main seminarian texts of legal theory, and continues to be taught at a higher level of traditional Shi'ite semi­nary education to this day. “8 When his contemporary and teacher Mirza Hasan Shirazi (d. 1896) moved to Samara, Khurasani took charge of the seminary of Najaf and became the lead instructor of the Shi'itejuris- prudential discourse to a large cohort of students. After the demise of Shirazi, Khurasani became recognised as the sole marja^r al-taqlid of the Shi'ite community and used his position of leadership to support the Iranian Constitutional Revolution.™

2. Muhammad Husayn al-Gharawi a!-Na'ini (d. 1937) was one of the three main students of Khurasani who taught legal theory at the seminary of Najaf.120 Like his teacher, Na'ini also supported the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. Moreover, in his lifetime, he also supported the revolt against

115 See Momen, An Introduction, 187, 201-3; Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy, 577-8.

116 Although Khurasani's scholarship was largely shaped by Ansari, there were numerous minor points, or as Ardihayi claims, 'UsQli nuances,' that were contended by Khurasani, see Ardihayi, “Najaf,” 122; For a thorough study of the minor difference between Ansari and Khurasani see Murtada al-Firuzabadi, ^rInayat al-usulfi sharh Kifdyat al-usul, 6 vols. (Qum: Firuzabadi, 1979).

117 See Moezzi, “Akhund al-Khurasani”.

118 Momen, AnIntroduct 01,20⅛∙, SAewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy, 5777;, Litvak, Shli scholars of nineteenthcentury Iraq, 92,181-.

119 For a broader study of the impact of Khurasani's scholarship and leadership in the Shi'ite world see Moezzi, “Akhund al-Khurasani”; Momen, An Introduction, 246-250; Litvak, ShiI scoarsof nineteenthcentury, 912-, Mottahedehc TheMantleof theProphet,218-Islam: The Cuture and Poiittcs of MModem Musiim I^c^t^(^a^t:i٢^n (Iinceton'. Ptfnceton Unersttty Press, 2007), 243-244; Rodger Shanhan, “The Islamic Da'wa Party: Past Developments and Future Prospeets'' ttn Mitt^dleEastR^eviitw of International Affairs 8'2 f2004) 16-25,', Arddiaytt, “Najaf,” 45-46; for an extensive biography of Muzalfar see Kirmani, “Introduction,” 13-39; Keiko Sakai, “Modernity and Tradition in the Islamic Movement in Iraq: Continuity and Discontinuity in the Role of Ulama” in Arat Studies Quarterly 23:1 (2001) 37-53. in leading Shi'ite seminaries. 126 It seems that from all his teachers of legal theory, Muzalfar was most inclined towards Isfah ni.127 For instance, fol­lowing Isfah ns proposal, Muzalfar in his Usul al-fiqh rearranges issues debated in legal theory into the following sections or discussions:

a. Discussions on Linguistics (mabahith al-alfaz): in this section of legal theory, Muzalfar examines hermeneutical methods that can be utilised to deduce, understand, and interpret the linguistic indication of textual sources of evidence. For example, a typical issue discussed in this section is regarding the indication of ver­bal commands (al-awamir). Do verbal commands indicate obliga­tory (wajib) Sharia duties? Or do they indicate recommended (mustahabb) Sharia duties? If they are obligatory, then that would imply that if a mukallaf abstains from enacting them, then he would be sinning and possibly subjected to chastisement; whereas if they are recommended, then that would imply that if a mukallaf abstains from enacting the command then he would not be sinning and cannot be subjected to chastisement. Other such discussions found under this section include studies relating to the indica­tion of verbal prohibitions (al-nawahτ); indication of explicit and implicit texts (al-mantuq wa-l mafhum); indication of general and particular texts (al-^cam wa-l khass); indication of unrestricted and restricted texts (al-mutlaq wa-l muqayyad); and indication of clear and ambiguous texts (al-mubayyan wa-l m¾,'mal).

b. Discussions on Rationality (mabahith al-’aqliyya): Muzalfar devotes this section to theologically presenting and categorising the role, function and limits of reason and the different types of judgments it makes.

c. Discussions on Authority (mabahith al-huja): in this section, Muzalfar introduces his readers to fundamental epistemologi­cal underpinnings that form the foundations of the modern Usulr method. Considering these underpinnings, he examines the nature and the authoritativeness (hujjiyya) of various forms of evidence that are commonly used in the Usulr juristic process of deducing Sharia precepts.

126 See Sakai, “Modernity and Tradition,” 28; Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law, 40-41; M⅛hefM-.-y F⅛cher, Iiam: From Reiglous Dls Ute to Revolution W⅛cons⅛'.TheUn⅛ers,⅛j of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 12-61, 247-8.

127 Kirmani, “Introduction,” 26.

d. DiscussionsonProcedura↑Princip↑es(mabahithal-usulal-^camaliyya):

in this section, MuzaiTar introduces his readers to procedural prin­ciples utilised in thejuristic deduction of Sharia precepts. These principles offer guidance to jurists on how to deduce Sharia pre­cepts in cases when there is doubt (or insufficiency of knowledge) about them due to an inadequacy of evidence. Following Ansari, Muzalfar too elucidates upon (the aforementioned) four proce­dural principles. Sadly, he only managed to thoroughly examine the procedural principle of continuity (istishab), as he passed away before he could complete this entire section.

6. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (d. 1980) studied legal theory under the tutelage

of Sayyid Muhsin alHkim (d. 1970) and Sayyid Abu al-Qasim a!-Khh'i (d. 1992). He held an illustrious reputation amongst peers and students for his teaching abilities and his literature on different subjects. Sadr had a keen interest in the philosophical and economical ideas that originated in the West and how they impacted the Middle East and the broader Muslim world. He authored works such as Falsafatuna (“Our Philosophy") and Iqtisaduna (“Our Economy"), wherein he critically engages with and attempts to respond to Marxist, communist and western capitalist and imperialist ideas.128 Sadr was known for wanting to reform the traditional educational methods of Shi'ite seminaries. He found that due to a lack of systematisation they were archaic, and as such, made it impossible to monitor the progress and academic levels of seminarians. He interest­ingly notes that irrespective of their level of study, all seminarians wore turbans and hence the laity normally considered them to belong to the elitist clerical class. This meant that prior to completing their studies, a lot of them attracted fine opportunities and comfortable preaching jobs. Another reform that Sadr proposed was regarding Shi'ite authority struc­tures. He asserted that, to enhance the effectiveness of Shi'ite jurists and increase their function in the international Shi'ite diaspora, it was neces­sary that the concept of marja^r al-taqlld went through a process of evolu­tion. He argued that such evolution was only possible if individuals who had the capability of being marja^r al-taqlld were replaced by institutions that collectively enacted the role of marja^c al-taqlld.129 Sadly, Sadr was unable to follow through with these reforms or even detail their specifics. His support of the 1979 Iranian revolution made him a threat to the ruling Iraqi Ba'th Party. In 1980, Sadr was executed by Saddam Hussein. Apart

128 See Walbridge, “Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr: The Search for New Foundations", 131-2.

129 fbld,,,i43-4.

from training a generation of prominent teachers, Sadr's major contri­bution to the Shi'ite jurisprudential discourse was that he authored his deliberation on legal theory in Durusfi ^rilm al-usul. His work became very popular amongst seminarians and the general public that was interested in gaining insights into the Usulr process of deducing Sharia precepts. This was because it was written using modern Arabic and therefore suc­cessfully presented a rather complicated legal theory in a manageable and accessible manner. Sadr's Durusfi ^rilm al-usul continues to be taught at the Arabic seminary of Qum to this day. 130

7. Ruhallah Musawr Khumaynr (d. 1989), most known in the West as

Ayatollah Khomeini, was the student of 'Abd al-Karrm al-Hirr (d. 1937) and Husayn Burujardr (d. 1961). Both his teachers directly studied the dis­course of legal theory under the tutelage of Khurasanr in Najaf. Apart from being acknowledged as excellent teachers, both Hirr and Burujardr received recognition for their excellent administrative and management capabilities. In 1921, Hirr transformed the seminary of Qum from a regional school into a major centre of learning. He did this by attracting students from around the world, including those who he had previously taught during his tenure at the seminaries of Najaf, Karbala, and Arak.131 The seminary of Qum, which during the time of Hirr became known as al-Hawza al-^rilmiyya, was further developed by Burujardr. Whilst hold­ing the position of marja^ral-taqlτd, Burujardr attracted a lot of grassroots influencers who directed their religious taxes towards supporting his projects. Accordingly, during his reign all budgetary requirements of the seminary of Qum were fulfilled and it was self-sufficient in its operations. One of the greatest achievements of Burujardr was that he introduced a systematic curriculum and examinations for preliminary (muqaddima) and intermediary (sutuh) levels of seminary education. He made student stipends (shahriyya) dependent on each student's class performance and examination results. 132 The change of educational culture brought by Burujardr paved the path for Qum to become a major Shi'ite seminary that attracted thousands of students from around the world. Although both Hirr and Burujardr enjoyed the position of marja^r al-taqlτd, they played passive political roles and shared a cordial relationship with the

130 See Mallat, The Renewal ofIslamic Law, 10.

131 See Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 228-9; Fischer, Iran, 123.

132 See Baghistani et al., "Qum”, 46-9; Also see Algar, "Borujerdl, Hosayn Tabaaba'!". Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (d. 1980).133 Their political pas­sivity was, however, overturned by their student Khumayni. Famously recognised as the leader of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Khumayni was successful in ousting the Shah's monarchic rule and replacing it with a theocratic government.134 Khumayni took the role and function of a jurist within Shrism to another level by insisting that whilst the Twelfth Imam remains in occultation, only a jurist has the necessary qualifications that enable him to possess absolute guardianship and authority over all reli­gious and socio-political affairs of Shi'ite community. ]35 Khumayni's the­ory on the absolute guardianship of a jurist (wilayat al-faqlh al-mutlaq) was adopted as part of the post-revolution constitution of the newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran, and Khumayni was acknowledged as the first jurist guardian or the supreme leader of the new republic. According to Linda Walbridge, Khumayni was not recognised as the most learned (a^clam) jurist of his time, but instead it was Abu al-Qasim al-Khb'i. Despite this, however, she points out that many Shi'ites around the world accepted Khumayni as marja^r al-taqlld. She adds that during his tenure, he “made marja^ciyya a household a term" around the Shi'ite world.136 After his death, Khumayni was succeeded in his position as the supreme leader of Iran (a majority Shi'ite state) by the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei (b. 1939), who remains in place. Nevertheless, before assuming a political role, Khumayni was an intelligent and charismatic seminar­ian who followed Hiri from the seminary of Arak to the seminary of Qum, where he taught advanced classes on legal theory (usulal-fiqh) and juristic deductions (fiqh). It is important to note that after the demise of Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatabar (d. 1981), due to whose efforts the discourse of philosophy was introduced as part of Qum's official semi­nary curriculum, Khumayni became recognised as an exceptional teacher of philosophy.137 His grasp of philosophy enabled him to occasionally critique the works of other Shi'ite scholars by drawing a distinction

133 See Baghistani, “Qum," 45,50; it is important to note that BurQjardi never approved Khumayni's political activism, to the extent that at one point he removed Khumayni from his teaching position at the seminary of Qum, see Stewart, “The Portrayal of an Academic Rivalry: Najaf and Qum in the Writings and Speeches of Khomeini, 1964-78”, 219.

134 For a detailed analysis see Said Amir Arjomand, The Turbanfor the Crown; Keddie (ed.), Religion and Politics in Iran; Dabashi, Theology OfDiscontent; Moin; Fischer, Iran, 181-232.

135 See Mavani, “Analysis of Khomeini's Proofs for al-Wilaya al-Mutlaqa (Comprehensive Authority) of the Jurist", 183-98.

136 See Walbridge, “Introduction: Shi'ism and Authority," 5.

137 See Medolt, “Tabataba'i, Molammad-Hosayn".

between questions of jurisprudence and questions of philosophy« His intellectual prowess not only allowed him to follow the common trend of writing a detailed commentary on Khurasans Kifayat al-usul, but also to author his own independent works on legal theory, entitled al-Rasa¹il and Manahij al-wusul ila ^rilm al-usul. Two of his most celebrated works in the field are entitled Tahdhib al-usul, which is a compilation of his lectures on legal theory that are transcribed by his student afar Subhani (b. 1929) and Tanqih al-Usul, which was transcribed by his student Husayn Taqawi al-Ishtiha rdi (d. 2000). During the supreme leadership of Khumayni, the seminary of Qum inevitably continued to thrive. He established a hierar­chical order of command that clearly demarked positions of responsibil­ity and accountability of seminarian office bearers.139

8. Sayyid Abu al-Qasim a!-Khb'i (d. 1992) studied legal theory at the semi­nary of Najaf under Na'ini, Araqi, and Isfahani. After completing his studies, Khb'i showcased his remarkable teaching skills and enduring dedication to students by teaching at the seminary of Najaf for over fifty years. He was known for his rigorous and detailed scholarship and his distinctive opinions on different disciplines taught at Shi'ite seminaries. He authored books on a wide range of subjects, including juristic deduc­tions (fiqh), biographical studies (rijal), exegesis of the Quran (tafsir), and even astronomy and mathematics. As mentioned, Khb'i transcribed Na'ini's lectures on legal theory in Ajwad al-taqrirat. His own lectures and opinions on the subject were compiled by his students. For example, Abi Qasim al-Kawkabi transcribed κhb'i's lectures in Mabani al-istinbat and Muhammad Surbr transcribed Misbah al-usul. After the demise of Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim (d. 1970), Khb'i became recognised as marja^c al-taqlid. Despite Khumayns political activism in Iran and his over­whelming popularity, Khb'i was recognised as the most learned Shi'ite jurist, and his authority was welcomed by Shi'ites around the world.i4٥ During his tenure as marja^r al-taqlid, Khb'i was criticised for his pas­sivity and his quietist approach on political matters. His passivity was notably evidenced during the lead up to the Iranian revolution, in which Khumayni wrote many letters to him and other seminarians of Najaf to seek their approval and support for the revolution. In his analysis of Khumayns letters, Devin Stewart finds that:

138 See Baghistani, “Qum,” 62.

139 1.,63-40.

140 See Walbridge, “Introduction: Shi'ism and Authority,” 5-7.

Khomeini's earlier writings grant Najaf decided precedence over Qom. Later he criticizes Najaf's scholars for their inactivity and lack of involve­ment with the pressing political issues of the day... Finally, he entirely forsakes Najaf, convinced that it will lose its prominence as a centre of learning and that Qom will replace it as the intellectual and religious capital of the Shi'ite world.]«

Although Khu’r was known for his political passivity, the Iraqi Sunniminority Ba'th Party was conscious of his senior position as marja^r al-taqlld and therefore took all necessary measures to ensure that there was no Shi'ite uprising in Iraq. Under the same political circumstances, Khh'!'s status of marja^r al-taqlld, his worldwide networks and followers, and his position as the head of the seminary of Najaf, were inherited by his student the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid 'Alr al-Husaynr al-Srstanr (b. 1930), who occupies these positions to the present day.

Peldto ModernLegodTheory

Prior to analysing the fundamental epistemological underpinnings and the legal epistemology propounded by modern Usulrs, it is important to discuss what Usulrs understand to be the remit or the subject matter (mawdu^f) of legal theory and how they define and understand what is meant by the all-important notion of authoritativeness (Hujjiyya).

Deliberation on the subject matter of legal theory is of immense relevance to Usulrs, as it allows them to outline what issues (masd>i[) fall within the remit of legal theory and how this remit differs from the remit of other seminary sci­ences. Before the modern period, it seems that Usulrs predominantly upheld that the remit of legal theory was to evaluate the authoritativeness of the four-fold categorisation of sources. For instance, with the aid of philosophi- caljargon, Muzaffar explains that in al-Qawanln al-Muhkama fl Usu[, Mirza Abu Qasim al-Qummr (d. 1816) writes that the subject matter of legal theory is to evaluate the authoritativeness of evidence qua evidence (alalll bi-ma huwa dall[).]42 Therefore, for him, the subject matter of legal theory is restricted to evaluating the authoritativeness of the Quran, sunna, ijma^r and ^raq[, whose evi­dentiary nature is already assumed and historically accepted amongst Usulr scholars.143

141 Stewart, “The Portrayal of an Academic Rivalry,” 221-2.

142 See Muzaffar, Usul al-fiqh, 2:10-13.

143 See Mirza Abu Qasim al-Qummi, al-Qawanln al-Muhkamafl Usu[, 3:3-4.

The view of Qummi was, however, critiqued by his contemporary Muhammad Husayn Isfahani al-Hiri (d. 1838-9). In Fusul al-Gharawiyya fi-l usul al-fiqhiyya, Hiri argued that Qummi deliberations were found on the basic assumption (mabadl al-tasawwuriyya)i44 that Quran, sunna, ijma^c and ^raql are the only forms of evidence that can generate Sharia knowledge. Instead, he proposed that rather than limiting the remit of legal theory to the evaluation of evidence that is already assumed as evidence, it is more fitting that its remit is broadened to include the evaluation of the evidentiary nature and the authoritativeness of any evidence - or evidence per se (al-adilla bi-ma hiya hiya) - that potentially reveals Sharia knowledge.i45

Following Hiri, most modern Usulis agree on a broader remit of legal theory.146 For instance, Muzalfar asserts that the remit of legal theory is to evaluate “anything that is competent in establishing Sharia precepts and can be identified as evidence (dalll) or authority (huj'a).^,,i47 Accordingly, in his Usul al-fiqh, he not only evaluates the authoritativeness of the commonly accepted four-fold categorisation of evidence, but also the more contentious forms of evidence that were historically rejected by Shi'ite Usulis; including qiyas (ana­logical reasoning), istihsan (personal juristic preference), and istislah (social interest). It is important to note that although modern Usulis agree with a broad remit of legal theory, unlike Muzalfar (or Hiri), they are careful in not over-broadening it to include the evaluation of ‘anything that can poten­tially disclose Sharia knowledge'; rather they define its remit to include the

144 In usul al-fiqh, a basic assumption is the proposition that is assumed (or taken for granted) in one discipline because it is an issue (masa^,il) that is analysed in another discipline. For instance, the infallibility of the Prophet and the Shi'ite Imams is something that is assumed in the discipline of usul al-fiqh as it is an issue that is analysed in the discipline of theology film al-kalam). Accordingly, when HaTrt claims that Qummi's deliberations are found on a basic assumption, he means that for Qummi the authoritativeness or evi­dentiary nature of the Quran, sunna, ijma' and aql is not an issue that is discussed in usul al-fiqh, but rather it is an issue that is analysed in another discipline and merely assumed within usul al-fiqh. Therefore, in essence, Hii is critical of Qummi for already assum­ing that the Quran, sunna, ijma' and aql are the only sources of evidence that can reveal Sharia knowledge.

145 See Muzalfar, Usul al-fiqh, 2:10-11: also see Mul ammad Husayn alH'iri all fahani, Fusul atGharιwviyyafitι,sutal-fiqlιiyya,ι¾.

146 For instance, see Isfahani, Nihayat al-Diraya, 1:35: R Iallah al-Khumayni, Tanqlh al-Usul, 1:21: Khii, Mabanl al-Istinbat, 1:27-8: Mul ammad Husayn a!-Na'ini, Ajwad al-Taqrlrat, 2 vols. Transcribed by Abi Qasim al-Khι'i (Qum: al-Irfan Press, 1973), 1:26-8: Mul ammad Kazim al-Khurasani, Kifayat al-Usul (Qum, Miassasat Al al-Bayt, 1988), 1:8.

147 SeeMuzaSar, U⅞Ualfiqlι, 215⅛.

evaluation of evidence that is commonly accepted or utilised by Usls.148 As such, in addition to the four-fold categorisation of evidence, they normally also evaluate the evidentiary nature and the authoritativeness of the primacy of apparent meaning (asalat al-zuhur), which is the most commonly accepted hermeneutical method of interpretation, and the procedural principles (usul al-’amaliyya) that are commonly used in cases of doubt (shakk).

After clarifying that the remit of modern legal theory is to examine the authoritativeness of different forms of evidence, it is important to elucidate what Usulrs mean by authoritativeness (or Kujjtyya). Muzalfar explains that in Arabic the term Kujja (authoritative) literally refers to an 'argument' that can prove or establish a point. 149 He elaborates that the party that possesses ‘hujja’ is always considered victorious because it is a) able to completely silence and disprove the party that does not possess hujja, and b) able to convince the party that does not possess hujja of its point of view.150 He then moves on to clarify that in the discourse of legal theory, Usulrs have historically used the term hujja in two different ways: in a literal manner and in a technical manner. In its literal manner, Usulrs use the term hujja to refer to evidence that gen­erates certainty and accordingly they define hujja as “anything that discloses and reveals another thing, insofar as it establishes it.” On the other hand, in its technical manner, Usulrs use the term hujja to refer to evidence that generates conjecture that is substantiated or sanctioned by God and accordingly they also define hujja as referring to “anything that establishes its referent with­out reaching the level of certainty (qat’).”i5i At thisjuncture, it is important to note that Muzaffar also clarifies that, in addition to the term hujja, Usulrs also interchangeably and synonymously use terms such as amara ('sign'), tarlq ('path'), and dalll (evidence) to refer to evidence that generates substantiated conjecture.152

After distinguishing the different usages of the term hujja in Usulr legal theory, Muzaffar explains that Usulrs associate the notion of authoritative­ness with accountability (munajjaziyya) and excusability (muadhdhary,a).i53

148 For instance, Mulammad Baqir al-Sadr asserts that the subject matter of legal theory “consists of the common evidence that are used in the process of derivation and that the purpose of its studies is to establish the evidentiary value of these common evidences.” See Sadr, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 43; for a similar definition also see Khu MateniaIstint 1.2.7.

149 M∞za‰ι, UsUialjiqh, 21⅛.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid.,19.

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

They uphold that if a jurist deduces Sharia knowledge from Uonauthoritative (or non-hujja) evidence and his deduction is erroneous, insofar as it contra­diets the Sharia precepts that are in the Mind of God, then thejurist can be held accountable by God and possibly even subjected to chastisement in the hereafter. Conversely, if a jurist deduces Sharia knowledge from authoritative evidence (i.e., evidence whose authoritativeness is established within the dis­course of legal theory), then he is granted with the right of excusability, even if his deduction is erroneous and contradicts that which is in the Mind of God.154

The association formed by Usulrs between the notions of authoritative­ness, accountability, and excusability demonstrates that apart from being con­cerned with deducing accurate knowledge of Sharia that corresponds to the Mind of God, Usulrs are also concerned (if not more concerned) with making sure that they deduce Sharia using a sound methodology and correct tech­niques of argumentation. For this reason, they stress that a jurist is immune from being held accountable for incorrect deductions of Sharia, so long as his deduction is from an authoritative evidence whose authoritativeness is estab­lished in legal theory.

154 For instance, see KhurasanI, Kifayat al-Usul, 279, 405; DIya' al-Dιn al-ΛraqI, Maqalat al-Usul, 2 vols., 2:34-35; IsfahanI, Nihayat al-Diraya, 1:42, 3:284-92; Na'ιnI, Ajwad alTaqrlrdt, 2-.Ï-, Khumaynt, Tanq⅛ aUd, 4-.691-2-, KhnA, MabdnI albt, 11004-, ‘Ah Husayn al-SIstanl, al-Rafidfi'Ilm al-Usul, 34; Sadr, Durus, 1:187-8.