The first epistemological underpinning modern Ushlis uphold is that of the non-authoritativeness of conjecture(adam al-hujjiyyat al-zann).

In accor­dance with this underpinning, it is inadmissible for a jurist to deduce Sharia knowledge using forms of evidence (whether independent sources or herme­neutical methods of interpretation) that generate mere conjecture (zann).

In the previous chapter, I elucidated that during the formative period, fore­fathers of Shi'ite orthodoxy, Shaykh al-Mufid and Sharif al-Murtada, were highly critical of mainstream Sunni Schools for accepting the juristic utility of conjecture-generating forms of evidence, such as analogical reasoning (qiyas) and isolated reports (akhbar al-ahad). They asserted that the distinguishing feature of the Shi'ite legal discourse was that its promulgators only relied on (or deduced Sharia knowledge from) forms of evidence that generated defini­tive knowledge (^cilm). The stringent criteria proposed by the Shi'ite forefathers, however, withered over time, as their Ushli successors found it increasingly difficult to exclusively deduce Sharia knowledge from evidence that only gen­erated definitive knowledge, and found that it effected their dynamism in responding to the needs of the Shi'ite community. Accordingly, by the medieval period, Ushlis began to rely on, and accept, the juristic utility of forms of evi­dence that generated conjecture and were formerly abhorred within the Shi'ite legal tradition. Although this allowed Ushlis to consolidate their hold over the Shi'ite community, insofar as it sealed their dominance in representing Shi'ite orthodoxy, it also, eventually, attracted severe criticism from Akhbari coun­terparts. The Akhbari onslaught on the Ushli acceptance of conjecture and its implications were perhaps the key theoretical features that caused the Ushlis to lose their hold and control over Shi'ite intellectual circles and the domi­nance they possessed in representing Shi'ite orthodoxy.

Nevertheless, by the igth century, Ushlis once again regained control of Shite intellectual circles. However, unlike the medieval Ushlis, modern Ushlis make a concerted effort to formulate their legal epistemology in line with the rationalist heritage of the formative Shi'ite forefathers, together with tactfully incorporating the intellectual sentiments of their medieval predecessors. As such, they carefully expound the non-authoritativeness of conjecture as a core pillar of modern Shi'ite legal theory, without letting it affect the standard of dynamism they require to practically deduce Sharia knowledge. In this chap­ter, I present the way modern Ushlis understand the nature of conjecture and the range of scriptural and rational arguments they offer to establish the Oonauthoritativeness of evidence that generates mere conjectural knowledge of Sharia in the juristic process of ijtihad.

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