Shiti usul, in general, has received little attention in scholarly discussions of Islamic legal theory. Whilst Twelver usul has gained some attention, there is almost no coverage of the Ismatili and Zaydi usul traditions.[1]
This volume, a collection of eight chapters, aims to a) critically edit hitherto un-edited Shiti usul manuscripts; b) examine distinctive features of the Shiti usul tradition when compared to its Sunni counterpart; and c) highlight the nuances of intra-Shiti usul discourse addressing questions such as: What makes Ismatili usul different from Zaydi and Twelver usul? How is Zaydi usul different from Twelver and Ismatili usul? What are the key themes debated in Twelver usul which are absent in Zaydi and Ismatili usul traditions? The following introduction addresses these pertinent questions and sets the tone for the subsequent edited texts and their commentaries.
A careful side-by-side reading of these texts and commentaries will help us identify distinctive themes peculiar to the Shiti “family” of legal theories. It is in detailing these nuances and putting Shiti usul texts in conversation with each other that this introduction is primarily concerned.In the Muslim intellectual tradition, God’s law (the sharica) has been the subject of intense scholarly investigation. God has rules; he expects human beings to obey them; he will punish those who do not obey them; he will reward those who follow the rules. These are theological assumptions which underpin Muslim legal discussions. Some scholars have sought to prove these assumptions but the juristic writings of the Muslim tradition (primarily those works falling into the category of fiqh) have generally accepted these as discursive ground rules. Discussing what God wishes you to do in a particular situation presupposes, one might say, that God has a rule and that he demands obedience to it.
Alongside these discussions of the content of the sharica, there has also been a vibrant history of more philosophical or theoretical discussions.
That is, some Muslim scholars have gone beyond the question of what the content of God’s command might be - they have explored more fundamental questions. Where does God’s law come from? Why should human beings obey it in the first place? What was God’s purpose in making these rules? How are God’s rules to be discovered for situations not covered in the rules God has revealed so far? Who, within the Muslim community, can make a valid pronouncement on the content of the law and must the community obey the rules which that person makes? The answers to these questions have been debated and discussed by Muslim scholars throughout the centuries. They are often associated with a particular genre of literature and tradition of learning called usul al-fiqh (“the roots of jurisprudence”), glossed in English language secondary literature as “Islamic legal theory”. This book is a collection of texts of previously unpublished or rare works of usul al-fiqh, along with commentaries and summaries of the ideas within the texts. They have all been edited by contributors from manuscripts; they stretch over many centuries and reflect discussions in many different places; they are all taken from the Shi'i Muslim tradition, broadly conceived. The distinctive Shi'i contribution to the history of usul al-fiqh has not received the attention it deserves in contemporary scholarship. This volume forms part of wider attempt to bring the richness and diversity of Shi'i usul to the wider field.The term usul al-fiqh (often abbreviated to usul) refers, primarily, to two linked phenomena. First, usul al-fiqh is a topic in the curriculum of nearly all Muslim seminaries (madrasas); trainee Muslim professionals are required to discuss the various possible answers to the theoretical questions mentioned above, and they are supposed to bear them in mind when developing and promulgating their version of God’s law. Second, the term refers to a specific genre of literature. Though the date of the inception of writings of usul al-fiqh is much debated, the usul genre became formalised from at least the 4th∕10th century.
This formalisation comprised the gradual establishment of a consistent structure (with predictable chapter titles in a regular order), a stable set of technical terms (though definitions remained much debated), a canonical group of problemata (often termed masa1il) and a distinctive method of argumentation in which these issues were discussed. Once established as both a curriculum subject and a legal genre, usul al-fiqh became one of the recognised “religious sciences” (al-culum al-diniyya) of the post-formative period of Islamic thought. It survives until today as a subject much studied in traditional seminaries across the various schools and traditions. Although the previous abundance of both the study and composition of usul has suffered in the transition from the late (or post-) classical to modern periods, it still remains a fundamental element of religious training in many parts of the Muslim world.Usul al-fiqh works were composed in great volume in the premodern period, and within the broad genre of usul there were numerous sub-genres, including extended monographs, epitomes, commentaries, supercommentaries, marginal glosses and short focused treatises. Works of usul al-fiqh (perhaps more than works of fiqh, in which the rules are laid out in detail) were able to transcend their authors’ specific theological and legal schools. As has been remarked, usul, because it functions at the elevated, theoretical level, adopts a discourse which rises above the restrictions of a specific tradition.[2] Nonetheless, since usul works are supposed to establish the basis for subsequent legal discussion, argumentation (and the conclusions reached through these arguments) may be distinctive to particular traditions. Despite this internal specificity to a particular Muslim tradition, the assumed audience of works of usul appears to be broad, stretching across Muslim sects and schools, and sometimes even beyond the imagined Islamic community.
Given the assumed audience (namely, the supposed addressees or readership) of works of usul al-fiqh, delimiting a tradition might be seen as problematic: are not all usul works in conversation with all other usul works? Nonetheless, traditions of usul enquiry can (and have) been identified. For example, the well-known division by Ibn Khaldun of usul writings into “juristic” and “theological” has been much discussed by secondary scholarship.[3] The identification of the former (i.e. the “juristic” trend) primarily with the Hanafi legal school and the latter (the “theological”) with the Shafitis has been a very influential typology both within the Muslim intellectual tradition and in much secondary literature. The distinctive structures of works of Hanafi and ShafiT legal theory have also been the subject of some analysis and investigation.[4] [5] Specific usul doctrines are associated (or predominate) in particular schools and have become markers for those school: the Malikis argue that the actions of the “People of Medina” (camal ahl al-Madina) have a specific legal authority; the Hanafis promote individual juristic reasoning (stereotypically called ra,y); the Shafltis give particular precedence to the results of analogical reasoning (qiyas); the Hanbalis give great legal force to isolated reports (khabar al-wahid); the Zahiris demand adherence to the “apparent” meaning of the text and reject qiyas; Muttazili usulis require God to be fair, and therefore require him to be clear and unambiguous about what he demands of humanity. The list of these general characteristics supposedly typifies the approach of the traditions of usul thought - and it could be extended and elaborated, and greater nuance given to these generalisations. These “distinctive” doctrines, though, are repeated regularly in the literature, and have become almost formulaic characterisations of a particular theoretical or legal trend. For some commentators, these legal theory doctrines represent the unique contribution of each school to the scholastic discipline of Islamic legal theory as found in works of usul al-fiqh.In this volume, we have collected a series of passages taken from works of Islamic legal theory. The authors of these works are all Shiti - and the discussions we present here, in general terms, touch on distinctive Shiti doctrines, using styles of argumentation which are often distinctively Shiti. By “distinctively Shi'i” we mean that the passages presented in this volume come from authors who adhered to the fundamental Shiti belief that the true, designated successor of the Prophet Muhammad was his cousin and son-in-law, tAli b. Abi Talib. For the Shi'a, tAli should have been leader of the Muslim community, but the wider community decided, for whatever reason, to ignore this suggestion and other prominent Companions of the Prophet were selected or elected; tAli only assumed leadership in 656, a quarter of a century after what was, for Shiti Muslims, his rightful time. This commitment to tAli represents the defining Shiti belief - other doctrines and practices may vary, but all groups described as Shiti (both within the Muslim tradition and in secondary literature) promote the legitimacy of tAli’s claim to religious, spiritual and political leadership. The various Shiti traditions dispute how Muslim leadership should have evolved after tAli’s death in 661, though nearly all hold the view that subsequent leaders of the community should come from tAli’s descendants.
A commitment to upholding the teaching of tAli and his descendants runs alongside the claim that they were (and are) the rightful leaders of the Muslims. The reasoning for the privileging of tAli and the assertion of his rightful leadership are linked first to the Prophet’s designation of tAli as his successor. In addition to this designation, tAli - either due to his close familial relationship with the Prophet or due to a more direct divine intervention - has special religious insight, and this gives him and his statements a privileged position in the quest for religious knowledge.
Many of the passages in this volume reflect on the implications for legal theory of having leaders (known as Imams) with these special qualities. Whilst the nature of this privilege and how it came about is disputed amongst the various Shiti groups, adherence to the person and teachings of 'Ali is perhaps the defining Shi'i doctrine. For Shi'a, this special status of 'Ali was transferred to his descendants (either individually or as a group). These theological doctrines have implications for Shi'i legal theory: 'Ali’s opinion becomes a legal source alongside that of the Prophet himself, and if 'Ali’s descendants inherit his legal authority, then perhaps their opinions can also be legal sources. If, as a group, his descendants have some particular legal insight and therefore authority, then can their settled opinion (their consensus, perhaps) also be identified as a legal source? Furthermore, what is the relationship between the Prophet’s words and statements and those of 'Ali and his descendants? What is the relationship between these sources and the Qur’an? What happens if these two sources appear in conflict with one another? How might one verify that the opinion of 'Ali’s descendants has been accurately transmitted and that the meaning is fully grasped? These, and many other, questions emerge and they are primarily dealt within works of usul al-fiqh, and examples of such works are edited and presented in this volume.The designation of 'Ali, the elevated position of the Prophet’s descendants through 'Ali and Fatima and the authority (legal or otherwise) of the Imam (manifest or hidden) became hallmark of Shi'i doctrines. There are, though, other tendencies in the various Shi'i traditions of legal theory exemplified in the texts below. Generally speaking, any legal authority the Imam is accorded in the various systems (Isma'ili, Zaydi, Twelver) is tempered by a firm commitment to independent sources of legal knowledge. These independent sources are normally conceived of as “rational” - in the sense that caql (translated here as “reason”) is considered to have the ability to discover or delineate ethico-legal truths. For nearly all the Shi'i traditions examined in this volume, “reason” (either as a human faculty, or as a non-subject, almost scientific, method of deduction) can lead to truth alongside the straightforward dicta of authoritative individuals. cAql is also seen as moderating the operations of legal hermeneutics: If one is to interpret the dicta of authoritative individuals (God, the Prophet, 'Ali and his descendants), the hermeneutic rules one follows to interpret them should be (rationally speaking) justified. This perspective comes, of course, from the complex relationship all the Shi'i traditions have with the Mu'tazili theological school. Even the more traditionalist jurists of the Zaydi and Twelver schools were, broadly speaking, working within a Mu'tazili framework. In fact, many of these jurists made major contributions to the development of the Mu'tazili ideas more generally, particularly in the early period. The alignment between Mu'tazili and Shi'i trends has been explored by others,[6] but in the field of usul al- fiqh the relationship is usually explicit, including regular references to Mu'tazili works and authorities. Furthermore, in the early classical period, it is perhaps true to say that the Isma'ili tradition incorporated philosophical rationalism more readily than the other Shi'i traditions. This is reflected in Isma'ili legal writings, though works in this limited corpus do not, generally speaking, venture into theoretical speculation around the law. Nonetheless, a certain philosophical interest can be seen even in the text presented in this volume when discussing the methods of interpreting the Imam’s words and the nature of linguistic communication more generally. Furthermore, the operations of language - when used by God, Prophets, Imams or humans - represent a knowledge source for these writers which modulates the process of interpretation. This is a feature the Shi'i writers share with the wider tradition of usul writing. Generally speaking, investigations into the workings of language were viewed as essential tools to interpret the intended meaning of the statements of any legal authority (God, Prophet or Imam). The findings of the community’s linguistic experts (in particular, the grammarians) functioned as a body of knowledge in the works of usul al-fiqh which can, generally speaking, be distinguished from revelatory sources. Indeed, in the more mature usul works, there is a series of theological, legal, logi- co-philosophical and linguistic “postulates” (mabadι) which must be first established before the activity of usul can begin; to represent this precedence, works of usul often began with sections exploring these so-called postulates. For many Shi‘i authors, there was a resistance to viewing the sources of law purely in terms of revelatory texts. For them (and for some Sunni authors also), legal theory was nestled within a network of various theoretical, philosophical, theological and linguistic disciplines and bodies of knowledge. These lie alongside the investigation of formal sources (Qur’an, sunna, hadith/akhbar, ijmac) and are complemented by them. This openness to reason, rationality and alternative (non-revelatory) sources of legal knowledge is not always in evidence in Sunni works, and could also be seen as distinctive of Shi‘i usul al-fiqh more broadly.
The three Shi‘i traditions presented in this volume emerged from contested discussions around the identity and function of the Imam in the post-Muhammadan era. All the Shi‘i groups agreed that the path taken by the Sunni majority was deviant: they disagreed though on what the alternative should be. The history of how these Shi‘i traditions emerged and then established themselves is reasonably well covered in existing research. The most basic Shi‘i identity marker is, of course, the religious legitimacy of ‘All’s inheritance of the Prophet’s position after his death. The continuation of that superiority in the descendants through ‘All’s marriage to the Prophet’s daughter Fatima, appears part of the original package, or at least was formulated very quickly as ‘All’s two sons, Hasan and Husayn, were put forward by the movement as their father’s successors. The generations of descendants from Hasan and Husayn form an identifiable group within the wider Muslim community. This group is often termed “the People of the House” (Ahl al-bayt, meaning the “House” of the Prophet). In some traditions, that name is restricted to a particular set of descendants, in others it has a wider scope. Within Shi‘i communities generally, recognition of descent from the Prophet (that is, according someone, “sayyid” status) continues to give individuals privilege and community authority.
The basic divisions between the three Shi‘i traditions examined here are recounted in the traditional literature according to the following narrative. Following the death of ‘All’s second son Husayn, many recognised Husayn’s designated descendants (one from each generation) to be legitimate leaders, or Imams, of the community. These individuals generally followed a politically quietist path, since Husayn’s foray into politics had ended with the terrible slaughter of the Prophet’s descendants and their supporters in the Battle of Karbala. Some within the movement wished to continue active political involvement, and this trend coalesced around one of Husayn’s younger grandsons, Zayd b. ‘Ali. His rebellion in Kufa in 122/740, along with its brutal suppression by the Umayyad political forces, proved the defining point of origin of the Zaydi Shi‘i trend. This trend’s origins lie, then, in the (failed) rebellion of an Imam who was willing to take on political leadership. These origins were to be reflected in subsequent doctrine around two questions. First, who might be the Imam? He is a descendent from Hasan or Husayn for certain, and he should be someone with religious knowledge (i.e. a scholar or mujtahid). For Zaydis though, the Imam must also be a military and political leader. Second, what role and authority might the Imam have? Whilst he is not considered infallible by subsequent Zaydis, he is supposed to be the most appropriate person to lead the community. He must demonstrate himself worthy of this position by having the appropriate knowledge and skills (see the section below on “Zaydi usul”).
Zaydism, broadly speaking, became the home for those Shi'is who wished to pursue a more rebellious path, challenging the existing structures because they had denied the community its legitimate leader. Much of the remainder of the Shi'i movement became, in time, less confrontational and more accommodating with existing political power. This was the case even if these remaining Shi'a still considered any political leader (other than the designed Prophetic descendent) to be unworthy of the position. The contemporary half-brother of Zayd, Muhammad b. 'Ali (known as Muhammad al-Baqir) and his son Ja'far b. Muhammad (known as Ja'far al-Sadiq) were widely viewed within the Shi'a as the successor leaders of the Shi'a, and are widely considered politically quietist. These positions were not uncontested though. At the death of each Shi'i Imam, the line of succession was challenged. Following the death of Ja'far in 148/765, one of his older sons, Isma'il b. Ja'far, was believed to have been designated by Ja'far. However, he was also believed to have pre-deceased his father: how could a designated Imam die before taking office? It was both a theological and political conundrum which resulted in a heated debate leading to a split between those who followed Isma'il’s descendants as the rightful successors (later to become the Isma'ilis), and those who followed another of Ja'far’s sons, Musa (known as al-Kazim). For the former group, Isma'il and his descendants are the rightful Imams; this group has experienced subsequent internal divisions and splits and the result is a series of independent intellectual traditions within Isma'ili Shi'ism (see the section below on “Isma'ili usul”). For the latter group following Musa, there continued to be successorship divisions, but the majority ended up supporting five further successor Imams, following a father-son generational transfer. Each transfer of leadership was contested and controversial, but eventually recognised in the historical narrative. The twelfth Imam in the line of 'Ali was named Muhammad; as a child he is said to have first been concealed from nearly all Shi'a in 874, and then from all humanity after 941. For these “Twelver” Shi'is, the Twelfth Imam is present in the world, but hidden from human sight and communication. His concealment is not permanent though - he will, the Twelvers believe, reappear at the appointed time. When he does reappear, the “Hidden Imam” will gain control and restore the rightful leadership of the descendants of 'Ali. The Twelvers make up the majority of Shi'a today, and are in a state of permanent anticipation of the returning Twelfth Imam. This theological belief has filtered through into legal theory, and its effect can be seen in the section below on “Twelver usul” and in the relevant sections of this volume (Chapters 1-5).
Whether the origin stories of these three Shi'i traditions (Zaydi, Isma'ili, Twelver) are historical or mythical, the theological commitments which come out of this early history form the backdrop for many elements of the legal theory in the texts presented in this volume. The Twelvers’ loss of access to their Imam means, for some scholars, a loss of certainty as to the content of the law; the epistemological ramifications of this loss are worked out in Twelver usul texts. The Zaydi commitment to the legal authority of the descendants of Hasan and Husayn establishes the unique legal authority accorded to the consensus of these descendants. In the various Isma'ili traditions, the presence of the Imam (or his trusted representative - the daci mutlaq) means religious certainty is more readily available, and the need for usul al-fiqh (with its speculative approach to the law) is therefore substantially reduced. In these ways, the stories of the formation of any particular Shi'i trend feed through into their legal theory. The traditions brought together in this volume are discrete and operate with their own rules and modalities: in their mature phases, at least, they were (mostly) internally focused, with limited intra-Shi'i intellectual communication. Nonetheless, their shared commitment to the Imam as the crucial operator of the law (namely, the belief that the appropriate descendent from 'Ali b. Abi Talib holds a central role in legal exposition) makes Zaydis, Ismatilis and Twelvers a “family” of legal theory traditions. Understanding this family of traditions will, we hope, be facilitated by bringing together these texts in a single volume.
More on the topic Shiti usul, in general, has received little attention in scholarly discussions of Islamic legal theory. Whilst Twelver usul has gained some attention, there is almost no coverage of the Ismatili and Zaydi usul traditions.[1]:
- Zaydi usul
- Twelver usul
- IJTIHAD IN LEGAL THEORY (usul al-fiqh)
- Ismacili usul
- XII USUL AL-FIQH: BEYOND TRADITION1
- Qantarat al-wusul ila cilm al-usul of al-Mu’ayyadi (d. c. 1044/1634)
- Chapter 8 Why Early Muslims Divided into Sects? A Chapter from the Mukhtasar al-usul of cAli b. Muhammad b. al-Walid (d. 612/1215)1
- The theme ‘religion and violence' or ‘religious violence' gained worldwide attention after the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon in 2001.1
- Chapter 1 Are Rulings of the Prophet Due to Ijtihad and Are all Mujtahids Always Correct? A Chapter from the Sharh. Zubdat al-usul of al-Mazandarani (d. 1081/1670)
- From 1918, when the Bolsheviks created secret organs to identify and neutralize enemies, Ukraine’s intellectual elite received special attention, partly because of the country’s geopolitical and economic significance, but also because Soviet leaders viewed the independence movement, which was finally crushed only in 1920, as a dangerous threat.
- The Focus of Attention
- Attention and Arousal
- ATTENTION-DEFICIT HYPERACTIVITY DISORDER
- Most of the attention on British Imperialism1 has justifiably focused on its treatment of the nineteenth century.
- Over a period of many centuries, Chinggis Khan and his exploits have attracted widespread attention.
- CHAPTER 1 Introduction to Islamic Legal Theory