Humility as a virtue of ignorance

In Driver's account, humility is ‘a disposition to underestimate self-worth in some respect' (1999, p. 827). Hence, humility requires ignorance or underestimation of one's good qualities and achievements (1989, 1999).¹ The underestimation of strength characteristic of humility must be limited in extent and scope, since those who severely underestimate their worth or under­estimate all of their good qualities are better described as self-deprecating rather than humble (Driver, 1999, p.

Driver argues that actual ignorance of one's own good qualities, rather than mere pretence in conversation with others, is necessary for humility. In her view, the person who downplays her achievements whilst being fully aware of their nature behaves in ways that are characteristic of false modesty. Interlocutors often find such behaviour patronising; it is incompatible with true modesty (Driver, 1989, pp. 377-378).True modesty thus requires that one has false beliefs about one's good qualities, or that one has no idea about what they are. Thus the surprising conse­quence of Driver's view is that, in order to be humble, a person must, in contravention of the Socratic maxim, not know herself.

It is often objected to Driver's view that a robust disposition to be ignorant cannot be virtuous (Flanagan, 1990). This charge is especially pressing with regard to intellectual humil­ity (Tanesini, 2018). Intellectual virtues are usually understood as dispositions or faculties that include epistemically good motivations, such as the desire for truth or cognitive contact with reality (Zagzebski, 1996), and/or those that reliably produce good effects in the form of knowl­edge or true belief (Battaly, 2015; Sosa, 2007).

In response, Driver emphasises that ignorance and self-deception can in fact be valuable in limited doses (Driver, 1999). She points out that, for instance, a parent who deceives herself about her children's talents by selectively focusing her attention on evidence of their achieve­ments, might foster improved performance through praise and thus contribute to increasing their abilities. This kind of self-deception, Driver notes, might be valuable if it has predomi­nantly good effects (1999, p. 380). Even if we grant that ignorance might be in some limited circumstances instrumentally valuable, since some optimistic false beliefs can have the power of self-fulfilling prophecies, we can still resist conceding that ignorance can be virtuous. Driver's defence of ignorance presupposes her consequentialist account of virtue (Driver, 2001). But this is a view that we would want to resist if we think that virtues are both psychologically real and intrinsically valuable.

Be that as it may, the underestimation of one's own strengths, successes, and achievements is intuitively neither necessary nor sufficient for humility. Underestimation is not necessary for humility. Supposing that Einstein has been the greatest scientist of the first half of the twentieth century, it seems compatible with humility that he thought his scientific achievements surpassed those of his contemporaries. Driver disagrees. In her view, Einstein can humbly think of him­self as a good scientist, but he could not be humble and think of himself as the best of his time (Driver, 1999, p. 827). I do not share the intuition. Sure, it would be immodest to brag about one's superiority with fellow scientists. But what makes the behaviour immodest is the bragging, rather than the conviction that one's achievements are more impressive than those notched up by others.

These points can be strengthened by noting that even overestimation of one's own strengths is compatible with humility. Driver appears to deny this possibility when she presents the fic­tional example of Roger, a reasonably successful scientist, who is fooled by his colleagues into believing that he has won the Nobel Prize. Upon learning of his error, Roger feels ashamed (Driver, 1999, p. 831). Driver concludes that Roger's shame is due to his recognition of immod­esty or lack of humility. I disagree. Roger is ashamed because he recognises that his vanity has made him a fool. It is Roger's craving for honours rather than his overestimation of his own strengths that is at issue. Contrast Driver's example with the equally fictional case of Olufemi, who mistakenly overestimates the impact that his new treatment for malaria might have in affected regions. He has evidence of the treatment's effectiveness, but that evidence turns out to be misleading. Looking back, Olufemi recognises his error. He might experience regret but presumably feels no shame. Olufemi is not ashamed because he has not made a fool of himself. He has overestimated his achievement, but his is a mistake. I submit that we are not tempted to think of Olufemi as immodest despite his initially mistaken opinion about the significance of his achievement.This consideration suggests that what causes Roger to feel ashamed is not that he initially believes that he has won, but that he does so because of his susceptibility to flattery.

Underestimation of one's strengths is also not sufficient for humility. Driver acknowledges that severe underestimation is akin to self-deprecation and that it is incompatible with modesty or humility (Driver, 1999, p. 827). Hence, in her view, only limited underestimation would be required. She also adds that a person might underestimate her objective achievements without being humble because she lacks evidence of what these are. Thus, Driver refines her view by stating that modesty or humility is the underestimation of one's actual good qualities, despite having access to evidence about what they are (Driver, 1999, p. 831).

In my view, this is not sufficient (or necessary) for humility. Consider the case of Robert, who is the best rower in his club and in his town. Robert is also rather arrogant. He likes to throw his weight around.As it happens, and despite his unfortunate character, Robert is an even better rower than he thinks he is. He has both technique and strength. Robert has evidence that he is exceptionally good. He should leave his small club and town and aim to join a different outfit, face stiffer competition, and perhaps one day make the national team. But Robert likes to be the biggest fish in a small pond. He does not want to be challenged and thus ignores, out of fear of failure, evidence that he is better than he thinks. Robert is arrogant, but he also underes­timates his ability, despite having access to evidence about it.All of these examples point to the conclusion that underestimation of good qualities is not what is crucial to humility.

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