The limitations-owning theory of the virtue of humility

Theorists think of virtue in different ways.We will presuppose the personal worth theory (Baehr 2011; Battaly 2015). On the personal worth theory, virtues are excellences of persons, among which are character traits.A character trait of someone is a trait grounded in their motivations and values, both of which are relatively stable.

Not all character traits are virtues, however. Someone's character trait is a virtue only if it makes them better as a person, and it makes them better as a person only if they are a good judge ofwhen, toward whom, and how they exercise it, and only if it is grounded in good motivations and values.To illustrate, consider someone stably disposed to give liberally but at the wrong time, toward the wrong people, or in the wrong way.They might have the trait of generosity but lack the virtue since, for example, they tend to give too much and they tend to give to scams, cons, and fraudulent charities. Or imagine someone stably disposed to give liberally at the right time, toward the right people, and in the right way, but who developed that disposition just to look good in the eyes of others, and thereby extend their power over them.They might have the trait of generosity but lack the virtue since what grounds their disposition is bad.

Theorists also think of humility in different ways.We will presuppose the limitations-owning theory (Whitcomb et al. 2017). On that theory, the trait of humility consists in being both atten­tive to and owning one's limitations. Limitations are, roughly, the bad or not-so-good things

about oneself: cognitive mistakes, e.g., errors in grading exams; gaps in knowledge, e.g., the economics of American slavery; deficits in cognitive skills, e.g. ignorance of statistical analysis; intellectual character flaws, e.g. onesidedness; moral mistakes, e.g., speaking harshly to a student; affective shortcomings, e.g., lacking empathy; deficits in general skills, e.g., housecleaning; or flaws in moral character, e.g., being judgmental—among many other things.

As we said, not all character traits are virtues. The same goes for humility. Someone might be stably disposed to attend to and own their limitations but at the wrong time, toward the wrong people, or in the wrong way; and someone might be stably disposed to attend to and own their limitations at the right time, toward the right people, and in the right way, yet be disposed to do so for the wrong reason, i.e., bad motivations or values ground their disposition. Either way, they will have the trait of humility but not the virtue of humility. On the limitations-owning theory, the virtue of humility is a disposition to appropriately attend to and appropriately own one's limitations.

We can't emphasize strongly enough that the ways in which one appropriately attends to and appropriately owns one's limitations can both vary significantly across situations and differ from their characteristic manifestations. For example, in some cases appropriate owning may call for one to acknowledge one's limitations to someone else, e.g., when you've wronged them, while in other cases it might call for one simply to admit the limitation to oneself, e.g., when we acknowledge our unhealthy sedentariness. Or compare owning one's inability to play basketball with owning one's chronic tardiness. If you can't do anything about the first, say, because you're old and decrepit, but you can do something about the second, say, because you can routinely set your alarm five minutes earlier, then appropriately owning the first might not involve feeling regret or dismay but rather coming to peace with it, while appropriately owning the second might involve feeling regret or dismay and resolving to get rid of it. (The last three paragraphs draw on Whitcomb et al. 2020.)

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