Putative Title

CASE 87

D 41.10.5 (Neratius libro quinto membranarum)

(pr.) Usucapio rerum, etiam ex aliis causis concessa interim, propter ea, quae nostra existimantes possideremus, constituta est, ut aliquis litium finis esset.

(1) Sed id, quod quis, cum suum esse existimaret, possederit, usucapiet, etiamsi falso fuerit eius existimatio.

Translation: (Neratius in the fifth book of his Legal Notes)^[180]

(pr.) Usucapion, which is allowed also for other reasons nowadays, was established with regard to those things that we possess in the belief that they belong to us, in order that there be some end to litigation.

(1) But someone can usucapt the thing he possesses in the belief that it is his property, even if his belief is incorrect. This should be understood to mean that an excusable error of the possessor does not stand in the way of usucapion—for example, if I erroneously believe that my slave or a slave of someone to whose place I succeed by hereditary right, has bought the property. This is true because ignorance of another's con­duct is an excusable error.

Discussion Questions:

1)      Neratius attempts to provide a historical perspective.

2)      Do you think the formulation of Neratius is correct? How is the historical devel­opment of acquiring of ownership through use (usucapion) explained today?

3)      As to what condition of acquiring ownership is the adverse possessor in error under the facts of this case?

4)   Is Neratius saying that only an excusable error could count as bona fides?

Literature:

Mayer-Maly (Case81) 54 ff.

Hausmaninger (Case 82) 44 ff.

Greiner, Reinhold. Opera Neratii; drei Textgeschichten, Bd. 37. Karlsruhe: C. F. Muller, 1973, 41 ff.

Bauer (Case 84) 80 ff.

D 41.10.3 (Pomponius libro vicensimo secundo ad Sabinum)

Hominem, quem ex stipulatione te mihi debere falso existimabas, tradidisti mihi: si scis­sem mihi nihil debere, usu eum non capiam: quod si nescio, verius est, ut usucapiam, quia ipsa traditio ex causa, quam veram esse existimo, sufficit ad efficiendum, ut id quod mihi traditum est pro meo possideam. Et ita Neratius scripsit idque verum puto.

Translation: (Pomponius in the 22nd book of his Commentary on the Ius Civile of Sabinus)^[181]

You have transferred to me a slave that you erroneously think you owe me on the basis of a stipulatio [i.e., a legally enforceable oral promise].

Discussion Questions:

1)      Verius est [“it is more correct”] could signal a controversy (see Case 8). How would the opposing view have been explained?

2)face="Times New Roman">   Discuss the relationship of this text to Neratius at D 41.10.5.1 (Case 87).

Literature:

Mayer-Maly (Case 81) 62 ff.

Hausmaninger (Case 82) 46 ff.

Bauer (Case 84) 126 ff.

D 41.4.2.6 (Paulus libro quinquagensimo quarto ad edictum)

Cum Stichum emissem, Dama per ignorantiam mihi pro eo traditus est. Priscus ait usu me eum non capturum, quia id, quod emptum non sit, pro emptore usucapi non potest: sed si fundus emptus sit et ampliores fines possessi sint, totum longo tempore capi, quo­niam universitas eius possideatur, non singulae partes.

Translation: (Paul in the 54th book of his Commentary on the Praetor’s Edict)^[182]

When I had bought Stichus, Dama was mistakenly transferred to me in his place. Priscus says I could not usucapt him, because that which has not been bought also cannot be usucapted pro emptore [“by someone acting in the good faith belief that he is a purchaser”].

Discussion Questions:

1)  Can the jurist Neratius Priscus (see Case 87 [D 41.10.5.1] and Case 88

[D 41.10.3]) be meant?

2)   Does Paul recognize usucapion of a putative title in land?

Literature:

Mayer-Maly, Th. “Der Ersitzungsbesitz am Sachbestandteil,” SDHI 26 (1960) 176-189, at 187.

D 41.4.11 (Africanus libro septimo quaestionum)

Quod volgo traditum est eum, qui existimat se quid emisse nec emerit, non posse pro emptore usucapere, hactenus verum esse ait, si nullam iustam causam eius erroris emptor habeat: nam si forte servus vel procurator, qui emendam rem mandasset, persuaserit ei se emisse atque ita tradiderit, magis esse, ut usucapio sequatur.

Translation: (Africanus in the seventh book of his Legal Questions)^[183]

According to Julian, what is commonly said—that the person who only thinks he has bought something but has not actually bought it cannot usucapt it pro emptore—is correct only if the buyer has no legally valid reason (iusta causa) for his error. If, for example, a slave or a procurator, whom he has assigned to purchase the property, reports that he has purchased it and then hands it over, it would instead be decided that usucapion is permissible.

Note on the Text:

On vulgo traditum see the note on vulgo dictum under Case 32.

Discussion Questions:

1)   Formulate the fact-situation and legal issue.

2)      How does Africanus explain his granting of usucapion? Was his opinion uncontested?

3)      Consider what can be concluded from the texts discussed so far regarding the permissibility and interpretation of usucapting putative title.

Literature:

Hausmaninger (Case 82) 66 ff.

Mayer-Maly (Case 81) 30 ff.

D 41.3.27 (Ulpianus libro trigensimo primo ad Sabinum)

Celsus libro trigensimo quarto errare eos ait, qui existimarent, cuius rei quisque bona fide adeptus sit possessionem, pro suo usucapere eum posse nihil referre, emerit nec ne, donatum sit nec ne, si modo emptum vel donatum sibi existimaverit, quia neque pro legato neque pro donato neque pro dote usucapio valeat, si nulla donatio, nulla dos, nul­lum legatum sit. Idem et in litis aestimatione placet, ut, nisi vere quis litis aestimationem subierit, usucapere non possit.

Translation: (Ulpian in the 31st book of his Commentary on the Ius Civile of Sabinus)“^[184]

Celsus says in the 34th book that they are wrong who think that one can usucapt pro suo [“as one's own”] any property of which one has good-faith possession, and that it makes no difference whether one has bought it or not, whether it was given or not, provided only that one merely thinks it was bought or given. Because one could effectively usucapt neither pro legato [“in the capacity of a legatee”] nor pro donato [“in the capacity of a donee”] nor pro dote [“in the capacity of the recipient of a dowry”], if there has been no gift, no dowry, no legacy. The same applies to the litis aestimatio,^[185] so that someone cannot usucapt [the contested property], if he has not in fact undergone the litis aestimatio.

Discussion Questions:

1)  Do you think that Celsus is engaging in a polemic with Neratius at

D 41.10.5 (Case 87) and D 41.10.3 (Case 88)?

2)   Has Celsus expressed a general rejection of any putative title?

Literature:

Hausmaninger (Case 82) 48 ff.

Mayer-Maly (Case 81) 30 ff.

D 41.5.1 (Pomponius libro trigensimo secundo ad Sabinum)

face="Book Antiqua">Pro herede ex vivi bonis nihil usucapi potest, etiamsi possessor mortui rem fuisse existi­maverit.

D 41.5.3 (Pomponius libro vicensimo tertio ad Quintum Mucium)

Plerique putaverunt, si heres sim et putem rem aliquam ex hereditate esse quae non sit, posse me usucapere.

Translation: (Pomponius in the 32nd book of his Commentary on the Ius Civile of Sabinus)^[186]

One cannot usucapt pro herede [“in the capacity of an heir”] anything from the prop­erty of a living person, even if the possessor believes that the property belonged to a deceased person.

(Pomponius in the 23rd book of his Commentary on the Ius Civile of Quintus Mucius)^[187]

Most [jurists] are of the opinion that I could usucapt, if I should be an heir and believe the property belongs to the inheritance, although in fact it does not.

Note on the Text:

On plerique (“most [jurists]”), see Case 8.

Discussion Questions:

1)      Explain why Pomponius sometimes allows usucapion and sometimes does not.

2)      Can someone who knows that he is not an heir usucapt an item from the estate pro herede?

Literature:

Bauer (Case 84) 100 ff.

Mayer-Maly (Case 81) 71 ff.

D 41.8.2 (Paulus libro quinquagensimo quarto ad edictum)

Si possideam aliquam rem, quam putabam mihi legatam, cum non esset, pro legato non usucapiam:

D 41.8.2 (Papinianus libro vicensimo tertio quaestionum)

Non magis quam si quis emptum existimet, quod non emerit.

D 41.10.4.2 (Pomponius libro trigensimo secundo ad Sabinum)

Quod legatum non sit, ab herede tamen perperam traditum sit, placet a legatario usucapi, qui pro suo possidet.

Translation: (Paulus in the 54th book of his Commentary on the Praetor’s Edict)^[188]

If I possess something that I believe has been bequeathed to me, although it has not been, I would not usucapt it pro legato.

(Papinian in the 23rd book of his Legal Questions)^[189]

any more than if he thought something was purchased that had not been.

(Pomponius in the 32nd book of his Commentary on the Ius Civile of Sabinus)^[190]

What has not been bequeathed but has nevertheless been mistakenly delivered by the heir, according to established doctrine can be usucapted by the legatee, since he possesses it pro suo.

Note on the Text:

On placet (“according to established doctrine”), see Case 36.

Discussion Questions:

Interpret the decisions of the three jurists in light of Cases 87 to 92.

Literature:

Bauer (Case 84) 94 ff., 131 ff.

Mayer-Maly (Case 81) 66 ff., 85.

C.     Occupatio through Hunting and Fishing

CASE 94

D 41.1.1 (Gaius libro secundo rerum cottidianarum sive aureorum)

(pr.) Quarundam rerum dominium nanciscimur iure gentium, quod ratione natu­rali inter omnes homines peraeque servatur, quarundam iure civili, id est iure proprio civitatis nostrae, et quia antiquius ius gentium cum ipso genere humano proditum est, opus est ut de hoc prius referendum sit.

(1) Omnia igitur animalia, quae terra mari caelo capiuntur, id est ferae bestiae et volucres pisces, capientium fiunt.

D 41.1.2 (Florentinus libro sexto institutionum)

Vel quae ex his apud nos sunt edita.

D 41.1.3 (Gaius libro secundo rerum cottidianarum sive aureorum)

(pr.) Quod enim nullius est, id ratione naturali occupanti conceditur.

(1)     Nec interest quod ad feras bestias et volucres, utrum in suo fundo quisque capiat an in alieno, plane qui in alienum fundum ingreditur venandi aucupan- dive gratia, potest a domino si is providerit, iure prohiberi, ne ingrederetur.

(2)     Quidquid autem eorum ceperimus, eo usque nostrum esse intellegitur, donec nostra custodia coercetur: cum vero evaserit custodiam nostram et in natu­ralem libertatem se receperit, nostrum esse desinit et rursus occupantis fi t.

D 41.1.4 (Florentinus libro sexto institutionum)

nisi si mansuefacta emitti ac reverti solita sunt.

D 41.1.5 pr.-2 (Gaius libro secundo rerum cottidianarum sive aureorum)

(pr.) Naturalem autem libertatem recipere intellegitur, cum vel oculos nostros effugerit vel ita sit in conspectu nostro, ut diffi cilis sit eius persecutio.

(1)     Illud quaesitum est, an fera bestia, quae ita vulnerata sit, ut capi possit, statim nostra esse intellegatur. Trebatio placuit statim nostram esse et eo usque nos­tram videri, donec eam persequamur, quod si desierimus eam persequi, desi­nere nostram esse et rursus fi eri occupantis: itaque si per hoc tempus, quo eam persequimur, alius eam ceperit eo animo, ut ipse lucrifaceret, furtum videri nobis eum commisisse. Plerique non aliter putaverunt eam nostram esse, quam si eam ceperimus, quia multa accidere possunt, ut eam non capiamus: quod verius est.

(2)     Apium quoque natura fera est: itaque quae in arbore nostra consederint, antequam a nobis alveo concludantur, non magis nostrae esse intellegun­tur quam volucres, quae in nostra arbore nidum fecerint. Ideo si alius eas incluserit, earum dominus erit.

Translation: (Gaius in the second book of his Jurisprudence of Daily Life, also known as the Golden Rules)^[191]

(pr.) Of some things we acquire ownership by means of the ius gentium, which on the basis of natural reason is observed equally by all peoples; of others, by means of the ius civile, which is the particular law of our people. And since the ius gentium along with the human race itself came into being first, it is appropriate that it be discussed first.

(1) All animals that are caught on the earth, in the sea or in the air—i.e., wild beasts, birds and fish—are the property of the person who catches them.

(Florentinus in the sixth book of his Institutes)^[192]

as also their young that are born on our premises.

(Gaius in the second book of his Jurisprudence of Daily Life, also known as the Golden Rules)

(pr.) That which is the property of no one will, by natural reason, belong to the person who takes possession of it.

(1)     And with regard to wild beasts and birds it makes no difference whether someone catches them on his own land or the land of another: recog­nizing, however, that anyone who enters another's land for the sake of hunting or fowling can be rightfully prevented from entering by the owner of the land, if the latter has foreseen it.

(2)     Whichever of these animals we have caught counts as our property, as long as it is kept within our custody. But if the animal escapes our custody and returns to its natural state of freedom, it ceases to be our property and can be taken in ownership by an occupier.

(Florentinus in the sixth book of his Institutes)

unless [they are] tamed beasts who are accustomed to be sent out and to return.

(Gaius in the second book of his Jurisprudence of Daily Life, also known as the Golden Rules)

(pr.) It is to be understood that a wild animal has recovered its natural state of freedom if it has either fled from our view or can only be seen in a location where pursuit is difficult.

(1)     The question is asked whether a wild beast that has been wounded suffi­ciently that it can be caught should be understood as immediately becoming our property. Trebatius was of the opinion that it did and that it remained our property as long as we continued to pursue the beast. But if we desisted from pursuing it, the beast ceased to be ours and became once again the prop­erty of whoever takes it first. Therefore if, while we are pursuing the beast, another takes it with the intention of securing the profit of it, he is deemed to have committed a theft against us. Most jurists, however, hold that the beast does not become ours until we capture it, since many things can happen to prevent us from capturing it. This is the more correct opinion.

(2)     The nature of bees is also wild. Consequently those that build a nest in our tree are no more our property before they can be enclosed in our beehive than birds who have built a nest in our tree. Therefore if some other person encloses them, he becomes the owner.

Notes on the Text:

The compilers have broken up the text of Gaius, which they are using as an intro­duction to Title 41.1 of the Digest, with expansions (not always substantive ones) taken from the schoolbook of Florentinus. On Gaius D 41.1.5.1, see Case 8, where it was discussed in the context of acquiring possession.

Discussion Questions:

1)      The owner of land forbids entry into his forest. A hunter enters the forest anyway and captures a beast. Has he acquired ownership thereby?

2)      What means can a landowner use against a hunter who enters the land despite the prohibition?

3)      How can the hunter (or fisher) defend against interference with hunting (or fishing) by the landowner or a third party?

4)      Distinguish between wild, tamed, and tame animals: when and how do pos­session and ownership end:

—        of an escaped chicken?

—        of a swarm of bees?

—     of a stag that is accustomed to return to his enclosure each evening and now has stayed away for three days.

5)      The tortoise belonging to Gaius has hidden itself in a thorn bush or walked around the corner of the house. Has Gaius lost ownership of it? How could one better formulate the statement: vel oculos nostros effugerit vel ita sit in conspectu nostro, ut difficilis sit eius persecutio [“if it has either fled from our view or can only be seen in a location where pursuit is difficult”]?

6)      Smith's bees formed a swarm and settled in Jones' tree. Smith and Jones observed this event. Jones encloses Smith's bees in his own hive before Smith enters the tree. Has Jones acquired ownership of the bees?

7)      Do you think it justified to treat a swarm of bees and birds in a nest in the same way with respect to acquiring ownership?

8)      An animal that is destined for the beast-fights in the arena escapes. Titius captures him. Has Titius acquired ownership?

9)      Formulate as precisely as possible a legal maxim that expresses your own understanding of the acquisition of ownership of wild animals.

Compare with this Case:

§ 381 Austrian Civil Code:

Title to ownerless property exists in the natural freedom of taking it into posses­sion. The way of acquiring possession is occupation, through which one gets con­trol over ownerless property with the intent of treating it as one's own.^[193]

§ 384 Austrian Civil Code:

Domestic bee-swarms and other tame or tamed animals are not subject to free capture; on the contrary, the owner has the right to pursue them on another's land, although he must compensate the landowner for any damage that is caused. If the owner of the parent stock does not pursue the swarm within two days; or if a tamed animal remains by itself for forty-two days, anyone on common land, or the landowner on his own land, can take and keep them.^[194]

§ 958 I German Civil Code:

Whoever takes ownerless movable property into his proprietary possession, acquires ownership of the property.”^[195]

§ 960 German Civil Code:

I        Wild animals are ownerless, as long as they are free. Wild animals in zoo­logical gardens and fish in ponds or other enclosed private water are not ownerless.

III    A tamed animal becomes ownerless, if it abandons its custom of returning to its particular place.^[196]

§ 961 German Civil Code:

If a bee-swarm migrates, it becomes ownerless, provided the owner does not pur­sue it without delay, or if the owner abandons the pursuit.^[197]

§ 962 German Civil Code:

The owner of a bee-swarm may go onto another's land in pursuit of the swarm]. If the swarm settles in an unoccupied hive belonging to another person, the owner of the swarm may open the hive to enter it and take the honeycomb away or break it out. He must pay compensation for the ensuing damage.^[198]

§ Art. 718 Swiss Civil Code:

Ownerless property can be brought into ownership if someone takes possession of it with the intent of becoming its owner.^[199]

§ Art. 719 Swiss Civil Code:

Captive animals become ownerless [718] if they gain their freedom again and their owner does not search for them without delay and without interruption and try to recapture them.

Tamed animals become ownerless as soon as they return to a condition of wildness and do not return to their owner any more.

Bee-swarms do not become ownerless just because they go to the land of another.^[200]

Compare the following case with these statutes:

Ghen v Rich, 8 Fed. 159 (D. Mass. 1881).

Ghen, a whale-hunter, killed a whale near Cape Cod on April 9. The whale washed up onto the beach 17 miles away on April 12. The finder, Ellis, sold the whale to Rich, the defendant.

The plaintiff relied on the long-standing custom of hunting whales with “bomb­lances fired from guns made expressly for the purpose.” (Because of the fleetness of the type of whale concerned, a hunt with harpoons would not have come into question.) The whale is “instantly killed” and sinks “immediately” to the floor of the sea and within three days floats back to the surface, where it is towed off by boats or washes up onto the shore. The finder informs the owner, who is recognizable by the lance; and the owner retrieves the whale and pays the finder a small fee.

The judge awarded damages to the plaintiff on the basis of the custom, since he was considered to have acquired possession and ownership of the whale. He added that even without the existence of a custom, the Common Law would have led to the same result: “If the fisherman does all that is possible to do to make the animal his own, that would seem to be sufficient. Such a rule might well be applied in the interest of trade, there being no usage or custom to the contrary.”

Literature:

Daube D. “Doves and bees,” in Droits de l’antiquite et sociologie juridique. Melanges H. Levy-Bruhl. Paris: Sirey, 1959, 63-75. (reprinted in Daube, D. Collected Studies in Roman Law, David Cohen and Simon Dieter eds. Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1991, at 899 ff.

Filip-Fröschl, Johanna. “Cervi, qui in silvas ire et redire solent,” in lurisprudentia Universalis: Festschrift Th. Mayer-Maly, Martin Josef Schermaier, Johannes Michael Rainer, and Laurens Winkel, eds. Köln: Böhlau, 2002, 191-213, at 198 ff.

Frier, B. W. “Bees and Lawyers,” CJ 78 (1982) 105-114, at 108.

Knütel (Case 8).

McCleod, Grant. “Wild and Tame Animals and Birds in Roman Law,” in New Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property: Essays for Barry Nicholas. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, 169-176, at 169 ff.

Weiss. Das Willensmoment bei der occupatio (diss. 1955) 13 ff., 22 ff.

D 41.2.3.14-16 (Paulus libro quinquagensimo quarto ad edictum)

(14)   Item feras bestias, quas vivariis incluserimus, et pisces, quos in piscinas coieceri- mus, a nobis possideri. Sed eos pisces, qui in stagno sint, aut feras, quae in silvis circumseptis vagantur, a nobis non possideri, quoniam relictae sint in libertate naturali: alioquin etiam si quis silvam emerit, videri eum omnes feras possidere, quod falsum est.

(15)   Aves autem possidemus, quas inclusas habemus, aut si quae mansuetae factae custodiae nostrae subiectae sunt.

(16)   Quidam recte putant columbas quoque, quae ab aedificiis nostris volant, item apes, quae ex alveis nostris evolant et secundum consuetudinem redeunt, a nobis possideri.

Translation: (Paul in the 54th book of his Commentary on the Praetor’s Edict)^[201]

(14)   Likewise it is understood that we possess the wild animals that we have in enclosures and the fish that we have thrown into man-made pools, but those fish that are in a pond or wild animals that wander about in fenced woods are not possessed by us, since they have been left in their state of natural freedom. Otherwise if someone should buy the forest he would be deemed to possess all of the animals, which is incorrect.

(15)   We possess birds that we hold in enclosures or that have been tamed and remain in our control.

(16)   Some [jurists] have correctly thought that we also possess pigeons that fly out from our buildings, and bees that fly out from our hives and custom­arily return to them.

Note on the Text:

On the argumentum ad absurdum—“alioquin..." (“otherwise...”)—see on Case 34.

Discussion Questions:

1)      Do you think the decision makes sense in denying possession of stags in fenced woods while affirming it of pigeons in a loft?

face="Book Antiqua">2)  Is the similar treatment of pigeons and bees illuminating?

3)  Compare to this the bee-swarms and birds-in-a-nest at D 41.5.2. (Case 94).

D 41.1.44 (Ulpianus libro nono decimo ad edictum)

Pomponius tractat: cum pastori meo lupi porcos eriperent, hos vicinae villae colonus cum robustis canibus et fortibus, quos pecoris sui gratia pascebat, consecutus lupis eripuit aut canes extorserunt: et cum pastor meus peteret porcos, quaerebatur, utrum eius facti sint porci, qui eripuit, an nostri maneant: nam genere quodam venandi id erant nancti. Cogitabat tamen, quemadmodum terra marique capta, cum in suam naturalem laxitatem pervenerant, desinerent eorum esse qui ceperunt, ita ex bonis quoque nostris capta a bestiis marinis et terrestribus desinant nostra esse, cum effugerunt bestiae nostram perse­cutionem. Quis denique manere nostrum dicit, quod avis transvolans ex area aut ex agro nostro transtulit aut quod nobis eripuit? Si igitur desinit, si fuerit ore bestiae liberatum, occupantis erit, quemadmodum piscis vel aper vel avis, qui potestatem nostram evasit, si ab alio capiatur, ipsius fit. Sed putat potius nostrum manere tamdiu quamdiu reciperari possit: licet in avibus et piscibus et feris verum sit quod scribit. Idem ait, etsi naufragio quid amissum sit, non statim nostrum esse desinere: denique quadruplo teneri eum qui rapuit. Et sane melius est dicere te quod a lupo eripitur, nostrum manere, quamdiu recipi possit id quod ereptum est.

Translation: (Ulpian in the 19th book of his Commentary on the Praetor’s Edict)^[202]

Pomponius discusses the following case. When wolves snatched some pigs from my herder, the tenant of a neighboring farm pursued them with strong and cou­rageous dogs that he kept for protecting his cows, and he snatched them back or the dogs wrested them from the wolves. And when my herder asked for the pigs back, the question arose whether they had become the property of the man who had recovered them (because they had been obtained through a kind of hunting) or remained our property.

Pomponius considered whether, just like wild animals that have been cap­tured on land or sea cease to be the property of the person who captured them once they have recovered their natural state of freedom, so also those goods that are taken from our property by wild sea or land animals cease to be our property once the animals have escaped our pursuit. For who would say that what an over­flying bird carries across or snatches from our threshing floor or field remains our property? If it therefore ceases to be our property, it becomes the property of the person who seizes it, as soon as it is taken from the mouth of the animal. Likewise the fish or the boar or the bird that has escaped from our control and is caught by another will become the property of that person.

But Pomponius means that it remains our property as long as it can be recov­ered, even if what he writes may be true of birds and fish and wild animals. He also says that even if something is lost in a shipwreck, it does not cease to be ours: in fact he who steals such property is liable for four times its value. And so it is better for you to say that what a wolf steals remains our property for as long as the thing he stole can be recovered.

Note on the Text:

This exhaustive report of Ulpian's shows evidence of numerous textual omissions, but they have not impaired the substantive content. On the meaning of melius est (“it is better to say”) see on Case 107.

Discussion Questions:

1)  Can pigs be treated as the spoils of hunting?

2)      What arguments speak for and against the loss of ownership in property that is carried off by wild animals?

3)      A ring falls into the sea and is swallowed by a fish. Would Pomponius decide that ownership has been lost?

4)      Do you think that Pomponius would consider that ownership of everything that is lost in a shipwreck remains intact? How long would he let the owner­ship last? Compare Case 97 on this issue.

D.