Abstract
In this paper, I analyse the metaphysical component of scientific realism. I develop and defend the view that the realist claim of mind-independence is captured by what I call ‘the possibility of divergence', viz., the possibility of a gap between what there is in the world and what is issued (or licensed) as existing by a suitable (even ideal) set of epistemic practices and conditions.
I break up the realist commitment to mind-independence into two components: irreducible existence and objective existence. I then show how various versions of anti-realism (in particular, idealism and verificationism) compromise one or both of these conditions. I also show that a verificationist version of scientific realism, though honouring the condition of irreducible existence, compromises the condition of objective existence; hence it is in conflict with the realist demand for mind-independence.1
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