Contents

Introduction, ix

PART I: EVIDENCE AND INDUCTION

1 Concepts of Evidence, 3

2 Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought to Be) Ignored by Scientists, 34

3 The Grue Paradox, 47

4 The War on Induction: Whewell Takes on Newton and Mill (Norton Takes on Everyone), 61

5 Waves and the Scientific Method, 85

PART II: EXPLANATION

6 An Illocutionary Theory of Explanation, 103

7 The Pragmatic Character of Explanation, 123

8 Can There Be a Model of Explanation?, 143

9 Explanation versus Prediction: Which Carries More Weight?, 168

10 Function Statements, 181

PART III: REALISM, MOLECULES, AND ELECTRONS

11 Is There a Valid Experimental Argument for Scientific Realism?, 211

12 Jean Perrin and Molecular Reality, 237

13 The Problem of Theoretical Terms, 266

14 What to Do If You Want to Defend a Theory You Can't Prove: A Method of “Physical Speculation”, 286

15 Who Really Discovered the Electron?, 309

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