Collectively Available Options and We-Reasoning

So when exactly should we think of our obligations as collective? I shall explain the conditions in the following. To start with, I argue that two (or more) agents have a collective moral obli­gation to do x if x is an option for action that is only collectively available and if each of them has sufficient reason to rank x the highest out of the options available to them.

Let me explain what this means. In a scenario like that of the trapped motorcyclist each indi­vidual could reason in the following way: ‘I can walk over and attempt to lift the car but on my own I will not be able to lift it. Trying to lift it will only make sense if several other bystanders also contribute.’

Naturally, most of us would probably make an attempt to get others to contribute (provided no countervailing circumstances obtain). But why is this so? To me it seems that the reason why one would try to establish collective action in this kind of scenario is because it seems like the (morally) best option.

Before I continue note two things here: I do not commit to a view on what actually is mor­ally best in this scenario, that is, I make my argument independently of any particular substantive moral theory. Evidently, different substantive theories vary significantly in what they consider morally best. However, I am hoping that the example used here is one where the major moral theories and common moral intuitions converge. Further, note that calling an option ‘morally best’ does not imply that I am committed to some kind of consequentialism. The morally best option for a Kantian may be to respect someone’s autonomy and for a virtue ethicist it may be to act in the way most constitutive of eudaimonia.

Returning to our individual decision-maker: Let us assume that she perceives the option as best where several passers-by lift the car together. It is important to note that this option is not actually available to her (alone), but it is only available to them.

If that is what our individual deliberator does, then she we-reasons. This means that the starting point of her deliberation is not merely the options available to her (individually). Instead, she also includes in her deliberation those options that are only collectively available, such as lifting the car and freeing the trapped motorcyclist. She reasons from the top-down, so to speak. Starting from the best option (which is only collectively available) she derives indi­vidual contributory actions.

I am not alleging that someone who acts like our exemplary deliberator necessarily engages in we-reasoning, but empirical evidence suggests that people faced with similar scenarios regu­larly do (Butler, 2012; Butler, Burbank, & Chisholm, 2011). And my contention here is that they often should.

Let me now explain the idea of ‘we-reasoning’ in some more detail. The way I am using the term is slightly different from how similar ideas of reasoning from the collective perspective are employed, e.g. in philosophy of economics and (non-standard) game theory (Bacharach, 2006; Butler, 2012; Gold & Sugden, 2007; Hakli, Miller, & Tuomela, 2010; Sugden, 2015; Sugden & Gold, 2007; Tuomela, 2013).¹3

Importantly, I am adopting the term from its original context of decision- theoretic discussions of strategic interaction for the field of moral deliberation and decision-making. As moral agents, we regularly face problems wherein the outcome of our actions depends on how others choose.

Let me illustrate this by returning to the example of the trapped motorcyclist. The individual passerby might reason in the following way:

If sufficiently many others contribute then the morally optimal thing for me to do is to also contribute (provided that this will make a difference to the outcome). If not enough others contribute then the morally optimal thing for me to do is not to try to lift the car on my own, but perhaps to call an ambulance or the police.

This would be an instance of I-mode reasoning (I am adopting this term from Hakli et al. 2010).

Or, the individual passer-by might reason differently:

The morally best outcome is the one where several people join forces to lift the car and free the trapped driver. In order to secure the morally best outcome, each of us should make an effort towards lifting the car. I should get others to make an effort in lifting the car and signal to others my readiness to contribute to the joint endeavor.

Note that this involves two steps: (i) we-framing means to include collectively available options in one’s option set when deliberating about which option is best and identifying an option that is only collectively available as optimal. In a second step, (ii) the deliberating agent determines her individual course of action as playing her part in the collectively optimal course of action. If this is how the individual passerby reasons about what she should do, then she is employing we-reasoning.¹⁴

There are many joint necessity scenarios where by default most of us would reason in this way. Not only would we include collectively available options in our deliberation (we- framing), but also we would take individual steps towards realizing those options as well as encourage others to take the necessary steps.

Sometimes, individual roles or contributory tasks will be clear from the very start. This may be because there exists a joint plan or a habitual pattern of actions for a particular joint endeavor. Take the example of jointly setting a table, for instance. Or a traditional dance or a tune that people know well enough to perform it together instantly.

At other times, it may be relatively straightforward for individual agents to jointly work out a plan and individual contributions if they can communicate with each other. The other day I asked a friend to help me lift my canoe onto the roof rack of my car. We had to adjust our individual contributory actions on the go, but it was fairly easy to do so. If we did this more often, we might form a habitual pattern and could possibly even do this without important communicative (for instance visual) cues.

There are other cases where such patterns, while not habitual or engrained, can be easily established by potential contributors without any need for communication between them. It may be obvious what the collectively best choice is and how each person can contribute to realizing it (as, for instance, in a Hi-Lo game kind of scenario¹⁵). One example would be voting in a referendum on a morally black and white matter, such as the right to have an abortion (as happened in Ireland recently) or the right of same-sex couples to marry (as happened in Australia recently).

But there are also cases where communication is difficult or even impossible and where individual agents cannot divine their contributions to the joint task without communicating to the other agents. Arguably, in those cases individual agents would be less inclined to we- reason. That is, they may be (and probably should be) less inclined to include options that are only collectively available in their moral deliberation and to take steps towards realizing those options.

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