Conclusion

In this chapter we have discussed group responsibility. According to our account the para­digm of group responsibility is the responsibility of a voluntary group for an internally and externally free group action performed in the we-mode, given that the action is relevant to some normative standard, say N.

It does not follow from our analyses that a group is always responsible for actions performed by its members. For instance, there may be an intentional dissident in the group who inten­tionally deviates from the group’s ethos or acts on purpose against what has been collectively accepted in the group, and thus does not act in the we-mode. In a case like this, according to our account, the dissident primarily bears individual responsibility for such an action and other members of the group qua members of the group are not to blame. However, if there is col­lective commitment to satisfy and/or uphold the ethos, as indeed we have claimed, then the group members are responsible for “correcting” dissidents’ behavior. How “far” they should go in this correction is a moot point depending e.g. on the normative and factual cohesion of the group.

References

List, C. and Pettit, P. (2011) Group Agents, New York: Oxford University Press.

Preyer, G. and Peter, G. (2017) Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with His Responses, New York City: Springer.

Tuomela, R. (1995) The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Tuomela, R. (2002) The Philosophy of Social Practices: A Collective Acceptance View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tuomela, R. (2007) The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View, New York: Oxford University Press.

Tuomela, R. (2013) Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents, New York: Oxford University Press (slightly improved paperback ed. 2016).

Velasquez, M. (1983) “Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do,” Business and Professional Ethics Journa11:1—18.

Further Reading

Copp, D. (2007) “The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis” Journal of Social Philosophy 38:369—388.

Kutz, C. (2000) Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, Cambridge University Press.

Ludwig, K. (2007) “The Argument from Normative Autonomy for Collective Agents” Journal of Social Philosophy 38:410-427.

May, L. and Hoffman, S. (eds.) (1991) Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics, Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Miller, S. (2007) “Against the Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis,” Journal of Social Philosophy 38: 389-409. Pettit, P. (2007) “Responsibility Incorporated” Ethics 117:171-201.

Tollefsen, D. P. (2015) Groups as Agents, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Tuomela, R. and Makela, P. (2016) “Group Agents and Their Responsibility,” Journal of Ethics 20: 299-316.