Retrospective Responsibility and Prospective Reason for Action

When is it appropriate to blame someone? (We could of course consider occasions for praise — but I will tend to dwell on the negative.) Let S be a condition or state of affairs that is a candi­date occasion for blame.

Even if this much is clear, our schema is likely to prompt a number of questions, and it will not be helpful for someone without some day-to-day familiarity with the notion of blame and responsibility. The schema for example won’t inform us of what exactly counts as reasonable when it comes to doing something about S; how much sacrifice would it be reasonable to make in one’s efforts? There is also the worry about the vagueness of the notion of doing some­thing about. Presumably, to do something about some problematic S would be to act in such a way as to prevent S, or to ameliorate its effects. Or at least to act in such a way as to have some chance of doing these things. We are not given in (1) anything that says what sort of likelihood of success is needed, or the extent of amelioration, for one to count as doing something about S.

Though the schema leaves much unanswered, it does draw a connection between the largely retrospective notions of responsibility and blame on the one hand, and the more prospective notion of reason for action on the other.³ At least, it does this so long as we maintain (I think quite plausibly) that to do something about S is to act for S-related reasons — such as avoiding or preventing S, or ameliorating the badness of S. Taking Φ-ing again to be such a doing, the schema would be

(3) Look-back-look-ahead: An agent is not responsible for S if she is never in a position reason­ably to Φ for the S-related reasons.

Note that blamelessness with regard to S doesn’t necessarily require that the agent Φ for those S-related considerations. One might Φ for other reasons; but so long as Φ is performed, the problematic consequences are averted and no blame is called for.^4,5 Still, I suggest that the pos­sibility or capacity at some point of acting for S-related reasons seems to be relevant for respon­sibility: blame in the matter of S entails some capacity on the part of the agent to act for or in light of those considerations.⁶

Why think so? I take (3) as a plausible understanding of the uncontroversial thought in

(1) that one cannot be blamed for S if one simply can’t do anything about it. It is, of course, a part of the idea of being in a position to do something about S that one has the ability in

(2) simply to perform the requisite Φ-ing. But beyond this, one must have some capacity to Φ for the relevant reasons — even if, as just noted, the Φ-ing one in fact does is not done for those reasons. What is it, after all, to be in a position to do something about S but to have the occasion to act in light of the S-related reasons? Without such a capacity one would not be able to perform the relevant Φ appropriately; one’s Φ-ing would be haphazard with respect to the S-related considerations. If that’s the case, then this is not really to be in a position to do something about S; one wouldn’t be responsible in this matter. Similarly, if one is incapable of making sense of their Φ-ing in terms of the S-related considerations, to grasp the significance of their Φ-ing in light of S, then this too puts in question one’s responsibility for S.⁷ So it’s not merely the ability to Φ that is a condition for responsibility for S; it’s also the ability to Φ for S-related considerations.³

In light of this, let’s work with the idea that the possibility reasonably to act for certain S-related reasons is a condition for responsibility and the appropriateness of blame (and praise) for S. If the agent has conducted herself faultlessly; if there simply was no obligation or reason with respect to S, then the agent cannot be blamed for it. Or if there was a reason to act with respect to S, but it simply would be unreasonable for the agent to undertake it given other demands she faces, then here too it is unclear how they can be blamed for it.⁹

Thus, with Look-back-look-ahead, the backward-looking notion of responsibility is connected with the forward-looking notion of acting for reasons. What implications might this have for collective responsibility?¹⁰

17.2