Japan's neighbours: South Korea and Taiwan

At the same time as Japan dealt with its political and economic woes, it also found its attempts to take a more assertive role in the world became unstuck. This was not rooted solely in continued uneasiness about its own history and domestic suspicion of ‘normal state’ rhetoric, but was also a response to its troubled relationship with the other countries in East Asia, both communist and non­communist.

The greatest degree of similarity between these three states lay in the economic field. The rise of South Korea and Taiwan as economic powers in their own right began in the 1960s, when these countries shifted from a concentration on import substitution to a focus on the production of manufactured goods for export. The success of this formula can be seen in the fact that between I960 and 1990 both countries achieved growth rates of more than 8 per cent per annum and by the early 1990s produced jointly 8 per cent of the world’s manufactured goods. Obviously, one similarity with Japan was the emphasis on exports, but in addition one can note that in all three countries the state invested heavily in selected sectors of industry and, through highly trained bureaucrats, played an important role in directing the growth of the economy. Moreover, in all three countries the emphasis on economic growth as the main priority of the state, instead of social issues and welfare provision, appears to have met with general consensus. Thus South Korea and Taiwan can also be defined as following the ‘developmental state’ model.

The roots of these similarities can be found in a number of common historical and political factors. The first is that, to a degree, the three states share the same bureaucratic tradition. After all, both Korea and Taiwan had been Japanese colonies until 1945 and therefore some of their civil servants had been exposed to Japan’s wartime efforts to mobilize the economy. A second important factor was that Japan’s defeat in 1945 created the conditions in which it was possible, as in Japan itself, for sweeping land reform programmes to be undertaken in South Korea and Taiwan, thus removing the landlord class as an obstacle to state activity. Third, for South Korea and Taiwan, perhaps even more so than for Japan, economic development was inspired by an atmosphere of crisis, in the knowledge that poverty would only heighten both the internal and external threat from Cold War enemies.

Adding an extra layer of common experience was the fact that all three states displayed a remarkable degree of political continuity, even though they possessed very different governmental systems. In Japan, although a democratic parlia­mentary system existed throughout the period, the LDP’s hold on power meant that the country was in reality under one-party rule, albeit one in tune with the electorate. As a result Japan did not suffer the abrupt changes of policy that sometimes marred growth in the economies of Western Europe where parties from the Right and the democratic Left tended to alternate in government.

In the case of South Korea and Taiwan continuity was largely the result of repression rather than consensus. The fact that these states existed on the frontier of the Cold War divide meant that they needed strong autocratic leadership and could not afford to indulge in the luxury and uncertainties of democracy. The result in South Korea was that it suffered repressive rule under Syngman Rhee from 1948 to 1960 and then, after a brief and unstable brush with democracy in 1960—61, was governed by a military regime led first by Park Chung Hee

Guomindang (GMD)

The Chinese Nationalist party founded in 1913 by Sun Yatsen.

(1961—79) and then by Chun Doo Kwan (1980—87). Meanwhile, in Taiwan the Guomindang (GMD) completely controlled the state, with Jiang Jieshi remaining president until his death in 1975 and then being succeeded by his son, Jiang Jingguo, who died in 1988. Thus in each country, power was exercised by a powerful elite, which owing to its longevity was able to put into practice a coherent long-term programme designed to achieve and perpetuate rapid economic growth. In the end this economic growth, allied in the last years of the Cold War with a general global trend that emphasized democratization and human rights, led in both countries to the rise of a middle class that was determined to install representative government. The result was that by the late 1980s South Korea and Taiwan were on their way to becoming liberal democracies.

Republic of China (ROC) The official name for the government of China in Taiwan.

Republic of Korea (ROK) The official name of South Korea. The ROK came into existence in 1948 under the leadership of Syngman Rhee.

Finally, there are important parallels in the way in which the United States interacted with all three states. For the United States, Taiwan and South Korea were vital buffers to the expansion of the communist bloc towards Japan, but in consequence of their partitioned status they were also important as showcases to demonstrate that capitalism was superior to communism. Accordingly, as in the case of Japan, Washington was willing to provide these countries with extensive economic and military aid and to give them preferential access in the 1960s to the American market.

The degree of shared experience and Japan’s positive role in the industrializa­tion of its neighbours did not, however, mean that Tokyo’s relations with Seoul and Taipei were close and uncontroversial, for, just as memories of the Pacific War shaped Japan’s desire to take a low security posture, so the experiences of South Korea and Taiwan as territories subsumed within the Japanese Empire influenced their attitudes towards their former colonial masters. In addition, as they represented partitioned nations, it was important for South Korea and Taiwan to emphasize their nationalist credentials. The danger was that otherwise a too compromising line might provide the PRC and North Korea with an opportunity to produce damaging propaganda. This fear was confirmed in 1965 when the normalization of Japan—ROK relations led to large-scale protests in Seoul and other cities, and denunciations from Pyongyang.

This lingering distrust has not dissipated over time. If anything, with politi­cians such as Nakasone, Ozawa and Koizumi talking of the need for Japan to become a ‘normal state’ and to take greater pride in its history and achievements, the suspicion has grown. Thus, when this discourse in Japan translated itself into events such as, in 1982 and 2005, the revision of Japanese school textbooks to play down its aggressive past, and the visits in 1985 and from 2000 to 2006 by Nakasone and Koizumi respectively to honour the war dead at the Yasukuni shrine, the reaction among Japan’s Asian neighbours was one of outrage.

Moreover, the strategic position in the region did not require Taiwan and South Korea to bury their grievances against Japan, for they were able to rely on America for security against their most direct enemies — the PRC and North Korea. Indeed, for all three states — Japan, South Korea and Taiwan — their closest bilateral relationship has always been the one with Washington. Tellingly, the only times that South Korea and Japan have moved closer together in the political field have coincided with periods when the American security commitment to the region was in doubt, namely in the aftermath of the Nixon Doctrine and President Carter’s abortive move to withdraw American troops from the Korean peninsula in 1977-78.

The damage that these strained relations with its neighbours could cause to Japanese interests was made abundantly clear in 2005. One of the key aspects of Japan’s quest to become a ‘normal state’ was its bid to acquire a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. By directly linking itself to other aspirants who sought this prestigious goal, such as Germany, India and Brazil, and increasing its aid to the Third World, the Japanese government appeared to be manoeuvring towards a successful outcome, particularly as it was clear that it had the support of the United States. Japan’s optimism was, however, short lived, for in 2005 renewed controversy over its apparent lack of remorse for its con­duct during the Second World War gave both the PRC and South Korea ample excuse to frustrate its aspirations. Indeed, that year saw Sino-Japanese relations deteriorate to their worst point since the reopening of diplomatic relations in 1972. Japan’s tense relationship with its neighbours thus clearly continued to act as an important restraint on its efforts to turn its economic power into political might. By the mid-2000s Japan was therefore caught between two stools - it wished to transform itself into a ‘normal state’ in the future, but still found it difficult to escape its past.