Royal and Early Rome

The myths of Rome's earliest history, from the eighth to the sixth centuries bce, are full of military violence.^{[471] [472]} In Vergil's poem on Rome's origins, the Aeneid, the prophet Sybil predicts: ‘I see war and all the horrors of war.

The ancient historians of early Rome present it as powerful and aggressive, but it is impossible to say whether its kings were ‘imperialistic'. The large size of the sixth century bce Temple of Jupiter suggests that Rome dominated central Italy, though whether this was through force or great wealth is unknown. After the overthrow of the Etruscan kings and the establishment of the Republic, the sources portray Rome as conquering areas that were already under its control under the kings. This either means that the Republic had lost and had to reconquer territory, or, more sceptically, that the earlier conquests were mythical. In any case, the legends of early Rome should not be taken to represent the actual character of royal Rome. The stories of war and noble heroes might overlay the history of a trading city and merchant families.

By the sixth century bce Rome had a militia-style army made up of propertied citizens, which was called into service by magistrates and dis­banded after wars. This was typical for a Mediterranean city-state of the period in having a Greek-style system of recruitment, weaponry and fighting, the so-called ‘hoplite system'.^[473] While later evidence makes it clear that clans (gentes) led by aristocrats were important in early Rome, what this tells us about early Roman military practice is debatable.

Over the course of the fifth century bce Rome fought a series of wars that established its hegemony over Latium, an area of about 894 square kilo­metres. At the same time it went through an extended period of struggle over power between the Patricians and the Plebeians. It is striking that while the ‘Conflict of Orders' saw violent incidents, it did not lead to the sort of endemic intra-state violence and civil strife seen in contemporary Greek city­states, something that calls an automatic Roman recourse to violence into question. Stories of warfare relating to the Early Republic must also be viewed critically.

Wars make up a big part of our historical narrative, but Livy is almost certainly inventing the details of early battles. For example, after defeating the Volscans in battle in 494 bce Livy describes what happened thus: ‘More blood was shed there, in the promiscuous slaughter of all sorts of people, than had been in the battle itself. A very few were granted quarter, having come without arms and given themselves up.’^[475] The practice of killing inhabitants captured in a siege was a common, and Livy’s description should not be taken as referring to the Early Republic specifically. In another case describing military violence, Livy says that in the aftermath of a battle he dates to 462 bce ‘The Volscian nation was almost wiped out there. I find in some of the annals that 13,470 men fell in the battle and the pursuit, and 1,750 were taken prisoners, whilst twenty-seven military standards were captured.

Around 400 bce Rome conquered the Etruscan city ofVeii, doubling its size and population. This was a key moment in the state’s rise to dominance over the Italian peninsula. A Gallic raid that led to Rome’s sacking in 387 bce led to the building of a defensive wall, but it did not interrupt this trend of conquest. In the century between this setback and the Battle of Sentium (295 bce), Rome defeated the powerful Samnite confederation in central Italy, drove the Gauls out of the Etruscan territory and secured control of the valuable Campanian coastline. The conquered Italian peoples were institutionalised as socii or allies, who were nominally (and to some extent actually) independent. The allies were not taxed but were compelled to provide soldiers for Rome.

Rome faced intermittent revolts from these peoples from the earliest conquest, as well as some civil unrest, although the details and scale of both are difficult to ascertain reliably; nevertheless, there is no direct evi­dence of particular Roman brutality. Whatever its original motivations for establishing primarily indirect control over Italy, Rome’s way of organising power had a significant impact over time. In the short run, it may well have lessened the level of military violence vis-à-vis the allies, as the Roman army was not generally responsible for garrison or police duty. In addition, this method suggests less of an ideology of domination such as one sees in other imperial states. If there was an unusual feature to Roman expansion, it is not its bellicosity but its willingness to assimilate foreign populations and share power with them.

By 280 bce Rome had subjugated, directly or indirectly, both northern and central Italy. In that year a war broke out against the Greek city-states of southern Italy, which were supported by King Pyrrhus of Epirus. Though defeated tactically, Rome's ability to raise new armies led to its ultimate success, something that became a trend over time. This period saw the Roman hoplite-style legion gradually transformed into the more flexible manipular legion, which combined light and heavy infantry, some probably armed with shortswords, and used a more open formation than the hoplite­style phalanx. Now a major power in the Mediterranean, in the middle of the third century bce Rome came into conflict with Carthage, leading to two Punic wars.