The 1956 Suez-Sinai campaign

Israel’s victory in the 1948 war bought the country almost ten years in which to focus on the difficult process of nation- and state-building. During this period, Israel’s Mapai (Labour) Party under Prime Minister and Defence Minister David Ben Gurion strengthened its grip on Israeli domestic politics to such an extent that it virtually controlled the political scene, despite the existence of small right­wing, religious and Marxist parties.

non-alignment

A state policy of avoiding involvement in ‘Great Power conflicts’, most notably the Cold War. It was first espoused by India on its becoming independent in 1947.

see Chapter 13

The defeated Arab states also turned inwards to focus on nation- and state­building, as they too had either just achieved independence shortly before the 1948 war or were struggling to achieve it in the period thereafter. The defeat had also delegitimized many of the Arab governments and left them open to radical challenges. Syria, for example, suffered three military coups in 1949 alone and became the most unstable of Israel’s neighbours during the 1950s. Jordan’s King Abdullah was assassinated in 1951 and was replaced first by Talal and then in 1953 by Hussein while Lebanon’s President Camille Chamoun was unsuccessfully challenged in a coup in 1952. The most important changes, however, took place in Egypt. On 23 July 1952, Egypt’s King Farouk was overthrown and sent into exile by the Free Officers whose aim was to replace what they saw as a reactionary monarchy with a progressive republic based on a strong army, social equality, an end to colonialism, rapid economic development and free universal education.

Israel initially welcomed the changes in Egypt, believing that the revolution presented a window of opportunity in the search for peace. Back-channel negotiations were opened through Paris by the then Israeli foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, who believed that only negotiations would produce a lasting peace. His assumption of the premiership in 1953 upon Ben Gurion’s retirement raised hopes for a breakthrough with Egypt. His efforts, however, were foiled by his pre­decessor, who continued to exert influence over policy-making as he believed Sharett to be weak and misguided with respect to the Arabs, who, according to Ben Gurion, only understood one language - force.

The cautiously constructed and nurtured Egyptian-Israeli secret negotiations unravelled in a succession of events starting with the 1954 Lavon affair. In July

1954, a group of Israeli agents, in collaboration with Egyptian Jews, attacked British and American property in Egypt in order to create discord between that country and the West. This plan, which had been contrived behind Sharett's back, was the work of the defence minister, Pinhas Lavon, who shared Ben Gurion's fear that Nasser would successfully negotiate a withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone, effectively removing the buffer between Egypt and Israel, and that Egypt would become eligible for American military aid. The sabotage operation failed when the saboteurs were caught, virtually scuppering the secret negotiations.

The Lavon affair, the end of the back-channel talks and the continuous backdrop since 1948 of border tensions between Egypt and Israel, most of which were triggered by Palestinian refugees crossing into Israel to harvest their fields, reunite with family or carry out attacks against Israeli property or persons, per­suaded both Egyptian and Israeli leaders that a second military round was imminent. On 28 February 1955, Israel launched the so-called Gaza raid against Egypt in retaliation for the killing of a cyclist near Rehovot allegedly by an Egyptian intelligence-gathering squad. Israeli forces killed thirty-eight Egyptian soldiers in line with Ben Gurion's new policy of hard-hitting military retaliation. For Nasser the Gaza raid was the final straw. He responded to this ‘deliberate, brutal and unprovoked' Israeli attack by turning to the Soviet bloc for arms. In September 1955, he concluded the Czech arms deal. This, in turn, set in motion Israeli plans for a ground operation against Egypt.

While Egyptian-Israeli tensions were increasing almost daily and war appeared to be just a matter of time, Egypt's relations with France, Britain and the USA were also deteriorating rapidly. The main issue of contention for the French government was Nasser's support for the Algerian nationalist movement. French policy-makers believed that only by removing Nasser would they be able to hold on to Algeria. Britain, too, believed that Nasser was turning the Arabs against the West and was thus threatening Britain's position in the Middle East and particularly its regional oil production. The United States, which initially had high hopes for Nasser, also began to entertain doubts as a result of Nasser's flirtation with the Soviet bloc. The Czech arms deal, as far as Washington was concerned, was a clear sign that Egypt was rapidly sliding into the communist camp. In a desperate attempt to halt such developments, the United States decided to cancel its funding of the Aswan Dam, the symbol of Nasser's modernization programme.

In late July, France started to consider military co-operation with Israel against Egypt. Britain proved more reluctant to collaborate with Ben Gurion's govern­ment as Anglo-Israeli relations had never been good. This was exacerbated by the fact that Britain had a defence arrangement with Jordan at a time when Israeli- Jordanian border tensions were high. Thus it was only on 16 October, at a meet­ing in Paris, that Britain agreed to Israel's participation in the Suez War.

United Nations (UN)

An international organization established after the Second World War to replace the League of Nations. Since its establishment in 1945, its membership has grown to 192 countries.

On 29 October 1956, as planned, Israeli troops crossed into the Sinai; by 30 October, they had reached the Suez Canal.

The American intervention, which had the effect of saving Nasser, was moti­vated by a combination of domestic and international considerations. On the domestic side, the Suez War coincided with Eisenhower's re-election campaign in which he was stressing his commitment to peace and prosperity. With votes to be cast on 6 November, Eisenhower had little choice but to condemn the Israeli— British-French operation. Moreover, he resented what he saw as Israel's deliberate attempt to exercise pressure on the administration through the Jewish vote. On an international level, the United States felt betrayed by its allies, Britain and France, which had started a conflict that had the potential to trigger a superpower confrontation in the Middle East and one that threatened American oil supplies and its relations with the Arab states. Finally, American condemnation of the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary made it impossible for it not to condemn the invasion of Egypt. Indeed, Eisenhower was furious that the Suez War had diverted international attention from Soviet actions in Europe.

American hopes that a superpower confrontation in the Middle East had been avoided thanks to its intervention, however, proved premature. The British and French decline in the Middle East which followed the Suez disaster left a power vacuum that was soon filled by the United States and the USSR. Superpower involvement had thus only been postponed. American intervention had also only postponed another full-scale Arab-Israeli confrontation, as the key issues of security, recognition and refugees remained unresolved. Indeed, Nasser's ascen­dancy to the position of the leader of the Arab world on the grounds that he had expelled the imperialist powers, Israel's demonstration of its military might by occupying the Sinai in only one day and the Cold War framework ensured that a third round would be only a matter of time.