Ethnicityand ethnic group

In some cases, it is the ethnic commu­nity that proves most successful in uniting many of society's members for some of life's primary purposes: cultural fulfillment, belongingness, social intercourse, psycholog­ical security, and physical survival.

Ethnicity as a subjective basis for col­lective consciousness becomes relevant to the political process when it spurs group formation and underpins political organiza­tion. A group mythology, observes Stuart Kaufman (2006, 52), “must exist before a politician can manipulate it.” In its capacity to stimulate awareness and a sense of fellowship among the potential members of a group, the psychological dimension of ethnicity complements and buttresses the political dimension of interest-oriented action. Thus, a sense of peoplehood—often linked to other potentially mobilizable bases of identity such as language, religion, tribe, caste, or clan— can be instrumental to group formation and participation in the political process (Posner 2005). Nevertheless, initiative on the part of elite members remains critically important for the promotion and defense of group interests and security. Success in building a sense of community often remains a precondition for effective political initiatives by a group spokesperson. Ethnicity acts as a connector around which group members can mobilize and compete effectively for state power, economic resources, governmental and parastatal positions, contracts, awards, and protection.

Where ethnic identity is in essence “a sub­jective self-concept or social role” (Young 1976, 65), the ethnic group is a culturally based social organization. The notion of a group suggests organized activities by people linked by a consciousness of a special identity who jointly seek to maximize their collective political, economic, and social interests. Ethnic groups persist in modern times, Robert Bates notes (1983, 161), because they have proved effective in extracting “goods and services from the modern sector and thereby satisfy[ing] the demands of their members.” In this respect, ethnic groups have an important functional role to play, being managed by ethnic entrepreneurs who rally the call for an increased share of state-controlled resources to benefit both group and his or her own interests (Arnson 2005, 9-11). When groups feel threatened, moreover, their memberships can coalesce to protect themselves and safeguard the future of generations to come. The ethnic group engages in ongoing social interactions with state elites and with the elites of other cultural and social groups to advance their group's (as well as their own) interests. “To the extent that actors use ethnic identities to categorize themselves and others for purposes of interaction,” Fredrik Barth comments (1969, 13-14), “They form ethnic groups in this organizational sense.” The ethnic group joins the subjective dimension of peoplehood with the articulation of objective interests. It operates socially in a relationship governed largely by formal and informal rules of interaction that are recurrent and predictable. In practice, the ethnic group acts as other political interest groups do, using influence, concessions, alliances, and threats, and in the way that these groups make claims upon the state. Although it seems reasonable to include the ethnically inspired grouping under the broader category of political interest groups, it is important not to overlook an important difference: most political interest groups can terminate their existence by enact­ing an appropriate resolution, but the ethnic group, which seeks to advance the common concerns of its members, cannot end its existence so simply.

Several characteristics of ethnic groups have important implications for the activities of these groups in the political arena— their fluidity, their lack of homogeneity and cohesiveness, and their espousal of the common (or indivisible) interests of its membership. With respect to the fluidity of these identity groups, it is inaccurate to characterize them as having a fixed, centuries- old, primordial consciousness. Among such African groups as the Yoruba and Igbo of Nigeria, the Kikuyu and Luhya of Kenya, and the Karamojong of Uganda, the initial affini­ties were based on coresidence in a region and on similarities of culture, traditions, and legal and economic practices. Aidan Southall (1970: 33), writing about the Luhya, notes that this group is a striking example of a named entity that was first identified as a “tribe” during the colonial era “and must in this sense necessarily be considered a product” of colonial rule.

Thus, an awareness of the ethnic group as a distinct entity in relation to other identity groups is, in many instances, a relatively recent phenomenon (Forrest 2004, 28). It reflects competition with other interests for political power, status, and scarce state resources. The struggle among Nigeria's political parties, based largely on the country's ethno-regions, for control of the political center during the First Republic was described in the Report of the PoliticalBureau (1987,25) as “extremely vicious and combative; no tricks or methods, however dubious, were regarded as inappropriate.” With respect to perceived threats to group security, Rene Lemarchand (1994, 27) points to “collective fears of the future” in Burundi as a source of political mobilization along ethnic lines (Lake and Rothchild 1998, 8). The emergence of Hutu consciousness in Burundi points up the importance of local security and economic resources as sources of contention.

The relatively recent origins of many ethnic groups point to another characteristic—the groups' lack of homogeneity and cohesive­ness. Although ethnic groups differ from other economic and social interests in the diffuseness of the obligations placed upon their memberships, they all allow for the emergence of multiple identities and inter­nal interests (Barrows 1976, 162; Marenin 1981, 27). The control that group elites exercise over members is frequently insuf­ficient to prevent the emergence of diverse concerns and commitments. The individual member, variously involved in a host of dissimilar social and economic roles, devel­ops crosscutting ties of religion, language, socioeconomic class, subregion, and social cause that modify the exclusivity of primary group obligations. As Lewis Coser (1956, 76-79) observes, such an interdependence of group identities and affiliations can have a stabilizing effect because it avoids the division of a society along a single line, thereby creating a polarized situation. The presence of intraethnic cleavages also creates important possibilities for protecting minority groups.

The ethnic group, as a culturally based social organization, interacts with other eth­nic, economic, and social interest groups to promote the salient interests (political power, status, resources, and protection) of both the elite and the membership. In a process that can be likened to a two-level game, leaders must negotiate a common position within the group before engaging in a meaningful bargaining encounter with ethnic patrons at the top of the system (Putnam 1988). No matter how successful these coalition­building efforts may be, intragroup cleavages along the lines of ethnicity, region, ideology, and socioeconomic class are likely to persist. These cleavages allow political entrepreneurs an opportunity to interact with rival factions on a separate track rather than compel them to negotiate with the ethnic collectivity as a whole.

In addition to class cleavages, the political behavior of African ethnic groups since inde­pendence reveals a persistence of subethnic schisms along the lines of age-set, clan, and regional cleavages. Zartman (1980,87) points to “evipolitical” (i.e. time of life or age) groups as important bearers of demand within as well as between ethnic units. These people band together “either because their individual action is insufficient or because their demand is for a collective good shared with others” (1980,88). Recent statistical data indicate that these age-set differences are quite significant in terms of views held by older Russians toward other groups in their midst (Bahry et al.

Although the relations among the leaders of the major ethnic groups (the Shona and Ndebele) are important to an understanding of Zimbabwe’s politics, a comprehensive picture of the political process must also include negotiations and conflicts among such Shona subethnicities as the Manyika, Karanga, and Zezuru. Similarly, Kenya’s interethnic conflicts are not simply an exchange of political goods at the top; for example, predominantly Kikuyu Central Province is divided into the three rival districts of Muranga, Nyeri, and Kiambu, and generational differences remain strong. Kenya’s other major ethnic groups—the Luo, Luhya, Kamba, and Kalenjin—are also torn by divided interests and leaderships and are not, as is so commonly assumed, internally united (Gertzel 1970, 17).

Clan politics are also highly significant in Somalia, which is divided into six clan­families and many subclans. During President Siad Barre’s rule, the powerful Mijerteyn clan felt disadvantaged in relation to Barre’s own Marehan clan and his mother’s clan, the Ogaden. “The more [Barre’s] political foes voiced their opposition,” Anna Simons writes (1995, 51), “the more he relied on people he knew he could trust—namely his relatives— and the more he rewarded his relatives the more distrust this sowed within the popula­tion at large.” Following Barre’s overthrow in January 1991, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, the military commander of the United Somali Congress (USC), fought a series of engagements with several Darod factions in the area between Mogadishu and Kismayu and in the central part of the country. Bitter battles also broke out within the Hawiye-based USC for control of Mogadishu itself. These ongoing encounters pittedAidid’s Habir Gedir subclan against Ali Mahdi Mohamed’s Abgal subclan. With no Somali state to enforce the peace, there was no effective institution in place to manage the conflict. The result was an unstable balance of subclan power in Mogadishu (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 10-16; Menkhaus and Lyons 1993, 2-4).

This internal diversity has a significant effect on the process of intergroup bargaining. Rather than a simple exchange relationship between homogeneous unitary actors, group differences require a more complicated bi­level process of negotiations, both within the heterogeneous ethnic group at the local and regional levels and among the ethnic patrons and central leaders at the top. In this two-level encounter, the political entrepreneur faces double jeopardy. A Kalenjin leader in Kenya must forge a united position among diverse representatives of the Kipsigis, Marakwet, Nandi, Pokot, Elgeyo, Tugen, and others before dealing with the leaders of important ethnic interests (the Kikuyu, Luo, Embu, Meru, Masai, Luhya, Mijikenda) at the political center. Similarly, a Somali leader must reconcile the differences among the many clans and subclans in his own country before entering into exchange relationships with his counterparts in Kenya or Ethiopia. It is this bi-level aspect of negotiations that so often frustrates state leaders, as they seek to bargain with ethnic patrons who may not be able to maintain a united front within their own constituency.

Finally, class and ethnicity are both viewed as situational variables, fluid and changing in the circumstances of contemporary Africa. Both are products of the state, which must respond, to some extent, to their various demands for public resources. Certainly, these socially constructed groups rest upon different attributes and types of behavior. Yet, in practice, they often overlap and become intertwined with each other. The appeals of ethnic elites, patron-client ties, articulation of interests, language, and occupational patterns are not static and are indeed influenced by the new political and economic developments in the postindependence environment. The effect of these realignments is to shape and give meaning to both class and ethnic attachments. Hence, class and ethnicity, rather than being interpreted as fixed, rigid, and exclusive categories, can more accurately be viewed in terms of the political, economic, and social contexts in which the various groups interact and attempt to achieve their collective purposes.

In light of this overlapping, the issue of which, if any, of these variables is salient at any particular time is largely determined by the setting in which it operates. As Nelson Kasfir (1983, 6) observes: “Class and ethnicity, as well as regionalism or religion, are organizing principles of social action that may act alone, may reinforce, or may work against each other, depending on the social situation.” Ethnic and class leaders can make various appeals to gain support for their claims upon the state. Which identity is salient in a particular conflict situation often depends on the symbols used by political elites to mobilize their supporters (Giliomee 1989, 49).