Track II Diplomacy

Track II diplomacy² evolved from Eisenhower’s “People-to-People” program. The government soon sponsored exchange programs such as the Peace Corps and Fulbright Scholars.

Conflict theorists and practitioners see Track I and Track II diplomacy as complementary. Track I diplomacy can resolve issues such as boundaries, distribution of political power, and economic structure, all of which are beyond the capability of Track II diplomacy. Conversely, Track II is better suited than Track I to resolving issues of identity, relationships, and understanding. Positive peace is not possible without resolving both types of issues. The idea is to provide a safe nonjudgmental process in which individuals caught up in intractable conflicts can explore their fears, hopes, ideas, needs, and perceptions so as to develop mutual understanding and learn problem-solving methods. In some cases, the process seeks to influence public opinion or Track I negotiators.

Chiagas (2003) identifies three Type II activities. The first involves unofficial actors serving as intermediaries between people and government. The intermediaries often are former government officials, a prominent example being former US President Jimmy Carter.³ A second occurs when neutrals bring key individuals together in their personal rather than their official capacities, for off-the-record talks focused on trust building.

Activities focus on problem solving, usually following models developed by scholars such as Burton (1969), Fisher (1989), or Saunders (1996). These “engage representative citizens from the conflicting parties in designing steps to be taken in the political arena to change perceptions and stereotypes, to create a sense that peace might be possible, and to involve more and more of their com-patriots [in achieving it]” (Saunders 1969). Knowledgeable, skilled, and neutral scholars or practitioners usually act as trainers and facilitators. Ideally, participants are involved and influential member of the community, such as journalists, religious leaders, scholars, and government personnel.

Track II seeks to impact intangibles, so is difficult to assess. Those who participate tend to be enthusiasts for peace who may not—in fact often clearly are not—representative of their community. Evaluations take place at the end of the activity when friendships and feelings are warmest. However, there is nothing to suggest that Track II activities are harmful and much to suggest that they may be helpful. At their best, Track II efforts can open channels of communication, reduce stereotyping, strengthen the moderate members of the community, and weaken the fanatics. Track II diplomacy can create a climate in which Track I diplomats can make concessions and create the rudiments of an infrastructure for reconciliation and peace (see below).

To accomplish all this, Track II activists must often overcome considerable obstacles. They must face the opprobrium of their society, the hostility of the media (often state controlled), the propaganda of their educational system, and the obstacles to meeting counterparts created by their governments. As some wit said, Track II diplomacy is least likely where it is most needed.

The Clinton administration emphasized process in the 1990s when it tried to end intractable conflicts in Colombia, Israel-Palestine, Northern Ireland, North Korea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Syria.

Since the pivotal events of 11 September 2001, perhaps influenced by Track II ideas and trying to bring them mainstream, President Obama developed the Cairo Doctrine as the centerpiece of his foreign policy. There was to be “a new beginning” based on “mutual respect.” President Obama would cleanse by confession then he would heal by virtue of his personal narrative, revolutionizing relations with the Muslim world by accommodation, concession, and retreat. The result was not the improvement predicted by advocates of peace processes. In September 2012, the Cairo Doctrine collapsed in the face of Muslim riots from Nigeria to Pakistan that saw American schools, businesses, and diplomatic facilities set ablaze. Mobs breached sovereign US territory in brief takeovers of US missions in Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen, while the mobs chanted, “Obama, Obama, there are a billion Osamas.” A US ambassador and three other diplomatic personnel were murdered in Benghazi. A third of Mali has fallen to Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, although it is not yet clear whether this will hold. The withdrawal from Iraq left Iran dominant in the region. It continued to ignore US demands on nuclear enrichment and announced that it had deployed Revolutionary Guards to support Assad in Syria. Vladimir Putin warned the US not to help the Syrian rebels. For good measure, he expelled the US Agency for International Development, and signed a law prohibiting Americans from adopting Russian orphans, additional failures of President Obama’s “reset.” China is upping the ante in the South China Sea. Three years after implementation of the Cairo Doctrine, the Islamic world not only still hated the US, but no longer respected it either—and neither Russia nor China were taking it particularly seriously. These events appear to refute the assumptions on which President Obama built his foreign policy.