WHEN TO MEDIATE IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS

Any analysis of mediating intractable conflicts must start by asking why third parties should engage at all (given that prior failure is a hallmark of intractability). A related challenge is to determine when they should seek to engage in an intractable conflict—and when they should not.

However, this line of reasoning depends on assessments of what “nature's course” really is. It is sometimes argued that war is akin to a forest fire in that it continues to burn until all available fuel has been consumed. Fuel, in the case of conflicts, takes the form of internally and externally derived resources (human, financial, operational) to support the war effort. In this analysis, letting a conflict burn itself out may be the most practical option and may eliminate future emergencies and disasters (Luttwak 2001). But there are other sides to this coin. First, in the modern era, most conflicts do not seem to follow this script, in part because the forces of globalization and the disappearance of the Cold War restraints make it much easier than before for underdogs to acquire tangible resources and political support. Modern wars have a tendency to continue, to sputter on or to recur rather than lead to lopsided victories. Second, in doing so, intractable conflicts do not get better, easier, clearer, or more amenable to ultimate resolution. On the contrary, there are ample examples—in places such as Colombia, Uganda, Cote d'Ivoire, Lebanon, and Kashmir—of conflicts that get more deeply impacted by layers of local, regional, and international issues and rivalries.

Finally, intractability and state failure appear to be closely associated, one feeding from and encouraging the other. The argument against intervening in intractable cases needs to take into account the potential conse­quences of abstention, including the ill effects of conflict spread, conflict metamorphosis, and the broader consequences for regional and international order of conflict spawned by or within failing states (Patrick 2006).

This analysis does not argue that third parties should reflexively engage whenever they perceive an intractable conflict; however, there are clearly certain criteria or conditions that should serve as warnings to a potential third party not to engage or to engage only after rigorous tests. These conditions relate to (a) the mediator's capacity and motives and (b) the status of the conflict and the nature of the parties' behavior. Starting with the mediator, it is harmful to propose or offer mediation if the mediator is not “ready” or equipped to undertake the task. Being “ready” has a number of political, operational, and other components that ought to be the object of serious reflection before a proposal is made (Crocker, Hampson & Aall 2003). It is also inappropriate to offer to mediate in order simply to be included in a photo opportunity or to be seen “doing something” without a serious intent to engage in the hard work of peacemaking. Another circumstance in which mediation may be inappropriate is when the prospective mediator is too closely aligned with one party or too directly involved in the conflict to be capable of meeting the minimum conditions of a balanced engagement.

Turning to the second set of criteria, a mediator should hesitate or decline involve­ment when a viable negotiating framework and mechanism already exists, and a new initiative could damage or destabilize this existing peace process. To do otherwise is poor tradecraft and only plays into the hands of parties engaged in “forum shopping” or other counterproductive games. Similarly, mediation may not be the right answer when the prospective mediator is eager to acquire a peacemaking role, but the parties themselves do not demonstrate any serious intention to explore a political solution. In such circumstances, the mediator needs to test parties' motives and avoid pleading for the assignment. The mediator should be cautious about engaging when it would play into the hands of a dominant conflict party, legitimizing actions that may cross the line of acceptable conduct. The best response in some conflict situations, in other words, may be police action, coercive diplomacy, or benign neglect, rather than mediation. There may also be intermediate steps or stages during the prenegotiation phase when the third party is best advised to undertake activities aimed at “ripening” the conflict through traditional diplomatic means or— for a non-official actor—through engagement aimed at affecting political constituencies or influential elites.

To state these ideas in a more positive manner, we assert that mediation may be the appropriate response when (a) the conflict parties know they need help and are ready at least to explore alternatives to continued fighting, (b) the mediator is “ready” and has significant links to or history with the conflict and relevant assets of leverage or influence, (c) the mediator is prepared to commit to a substantive engagement in order to shape events and not just be seen to be “doing something,” (d) a change of circumstances within the conflict or its environs offers the prospect of gaining entry and subsequent traction with the parties, and/or (e) mediation offers a possible method of containing or managing a conflict that might otherwise escalate or spread geographically.