Introduction
Despite its role as the centerpiece of modern growth theory, the Solow model is decidedly silent on some of its basic questions: Why is average growth in per capita income so much higher now than it was 200 years ago? Why is per capita income so much higher in the member countries of the OECD than in the less developed countries (LDC) of the world? The standard implementation of the Solow model provides no answers for these questions except, perhaps, for differences across time and across countries in the production possibility set.
This is typically summarized by differences in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The fundamental reasons for why TFP might be different in different countries, or in different time periods is left open for speculation. If these differences are supposed to be due to differences in innovations, it is not made clear why access to these innovations should be different, nor is it noted that these innovations themselves are economic decisions - they have costs and benefits, and are made by optimizing, private agents.This basic weakness in the Solow model (and its followers) was the driving force behind the development of the class of endogenous growth models. This literature has been wide and varied, with the models developed ranging from perfectly competitive, convex models to ones featuring a range of types of market failures (e.g., increasing returns, external effects, imperfectly competitive behavior by firms, etc.). A common feature that has been emphasized throughout is knowledge, or human capital, and its production and dissemination. In some cases, this has been directly treated in the modeling, in others it has been more tangential, an important consideration for quantitative development, but less so for qualitative work. That this focus is essential follows from the fact that the Solow model already accurately reflects the quantitative limits of using models with only physical capital.
(That is, capital’s share is determined by the data to put us in the Solow range, technologically.) Although they differ in their details, in the end, what this class of models points to as differences in development are differences in social institutions across time and countries. Thus, countries that have weaker systems of property rights, or higher wasteful taxation and spending policies, will tend to grow more slowly. Moreover, these differences in performance can be permanent if these institutions are unchanging. As a corollary, those countries who developed these growth enhancing institutions more recently (and some still have not), have levels of income that are lower than those in which they were adopted earlier, even if current growth rates show only small differences.In this paper we limit ourselves to studying neoclassical models. By this we mean models with convex production sets, well behaved preferences and a market structure that is consistent with competitive behavior. Therefore, we do not review the large literature that addresses the role of externalities and non-competitive markets. As it turns out, most of the basic ideas behind this literature can be expressed in simple, convex models of aggregate variables without uncertainty. These are the models that are the first focus of this chapter. They have proved both highly flexible and easy to use. With them, we can give substance to statements like those above that property rights and other governmental institutions are key to long run growth rates in a society. Most of this branch of the literature is well known by now, and much of it appears on standard graduate macro reading lists. Accordingly, our discussion will be fairly brief.[4] One important, and as of yet unresolved issue, is the size of the growth effects of cross-country differences in fiscal policy. Thus, our review of the standard convex model is complemented with a discussion of the more recent findings about the quantitative effects of taxes (and government spending) on growth.
Even though the theoretical effects of social institutions are well understood, this is less true of the recent work on perfectly competitive models of innovation, and so, comparatively more space is used to discuss that ongoing development. As a second focus, one issue that comes immediately to light in studying this class of models is the possibility that uncertainty per se might have an impact on long run performance. This points to the possibility that instability in property rights and institutions might change the incentives for investment. That is, how are the time paths of savings, consumption and investment affected by uncertainty in this class of models? How does this compare with how uncertainty affects decisions in the Solow model [i.e., Brock and Mirman (1972) vs. Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965)]?Much less is known about the answers to these questions at the present time and that knowledge that does exist is much less widespread. For this reason, we present a fairly detailed discussion of the properties of stochastic, convex models of endogenous growth. To this end, we study models in which technologies and policies are subject to random shocks. We characterize the effects of differential amounts of uncertainty on average growth. We show that increased uncertainty can increase or decrease average growth depending on both the parameters of the model and the source of the uncertainty. A separate, but related topic, is the business cycle frequency properties of these models. This is left to future work.
In Section 2, we lay out the basics of the class of neoclassical (i.e., convex) models of endogenous growth. We show how differences in social institutions across time and across countries can give rise to different performance, even over the very long run. We also lay out some of the interpretations of the model, including human capital investment and innovation and knowledge diffusion sectors, that lend richness to its interpretation. Section 3 discusses properties of the models when uncertainty is added, and shows how this can affect the long run growth rate of an economy.
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