Nationalism as Rejection of the International Community and Support for the Far-Right

In Putin’s bi-polar world, nationalism, authoritarianism, and expansion­ism are viewed as acceptable, even admirable, if they strengthen the

Living With Ambiguities 171 Russian state.

Hiding behind this propaganda is the vision of a strong, monolithic state supported enthusiastically by all Russians, before which neighbor­ing states quake with fear. An example of strength and sovereignty, as the fascist theorist Carl Schmitt argued, can be found in the right to suspend the law and begin war (see Snyder 2014b). To follow international norms, keep agreements, negotiate in good faith, and defer to the larger commu­nity is, by contrast, seen as a mark of weakness. The strong, according to this view, can stand alone.

This stance has won Putin admirers, particularly in Europe’s far-right parties, many of which are today promoted and financed by Russia. Aleksandr Dugin, the influential theorist of Eurasianism, is in fact openly pro-fascist, as were many of the first separatist leaders and supporters of rebellion in the Donbas.⁴ After all, goes the thinking, what is wrong with fascism if it helps the Russian state? Euro-fascists weaken the EU by pitting individual nations against Brussels and each other. Domesti­cally neo-fascists work to expand the Russian state’s boundaries, and overcome internal dissent and disorder. However, this line of argument is not used by the Russian government in public discourse. It is reserved for influential propagandists of Russian fascism, such as Dugin and Alek­sandr Barkashov.

The support for far-right groups leads to a politics that is racialized and sexualized. The Western far-right parties receive money from Putin in order to promote an anti-immigrant, anti-multicultural, anti-gay, anti-EU policy that is seen as benefitting the Kremlin. Although these far-right par­ties claim to be for family values and tradition, theirs is a traditionalism that incorporates minority bashing, religious intolerance, homophobia, chauvinism, and support of violent criminal gangs and corrupt regimes. Just beneath the surface lies a political agenda that is impatient with legislative assemblies, intolerant of minorities, and opposed to press and media freedom.

All these contradictions and incoherencies in the Putin narrative are solved by accepting a simple construct: those who resist the imposition of Russian rule, and a Russocentric history and identity, are to be classified as the regime’s opponents, and the entire rhetorical arsenal can be used against them: they can be called imperialists, nationalists, aggressors, fas­cists, or Nazis.

When we begin to unpack the term “nationalism,” therefore, we encoun­ter its use in a range of key narratives. As illustrated in the cases outlined in this chapter, the term is employed to discredit another nation-state, while the same underlying concept is used to glorify or strengthen the Rus­sian nation-state. In all cases, the Putin regime applies a single test: do you agree with its version, its interpretation of solidarity, history, the meaning of shared language, the fascist/anti-fascist divide, the Second World War, the decline of the West, and with the need to support extremist parties in the EU? If you do not, you are viewed as a dupe of Western imperialism, a nationalist, or a fascist.

Notes

1.

2. It should be pointed out that in Russian the word “zhid” is a slur, but in Ukrainian, as in most Slavic languages, the word has long been used as a neu­tral term. There are two standard words for “Jew” in Ukrainian. In Western Ukraine the term “zhyd” is common, but in Central and Eastern Ukraine and in standard literary usage the term is “ievrei.” The Russian term “Zhidobandera” is therefore pejorative. Jewish activists during the Euromaidan appropriated the Ukrainian term “Zhydo-Banderivets” as a way of mocking and defying the Russian media.

3. See, for instance, “The Catechesis of a Member of the Eurasian Union of Youth” (2016).

4. For an introduction to Dugin, see Shekhovtsov (2014), and Umland (2014). On Aleksandr Barkashov, who founded the Russian National Unity Party in 1990 and holds defiantly pro-Nazi views, see Laqueur (1996). Barkashov phoned the Donbas with instructions from Moscow to proceed with the vote for a “Donetsk People’s Republic” and forge the results. This conversa­tion is available at Euromaidan Press, 7 May 2014, http://euromaidanpress. com/2014/05/07/russia-orchestrating-donetsk-referendum/. On the Novoros- siia (New Russia) Party, which held its first congress in Donetsk in the pres­ence of Dugin, Pavel Gubarev (a leader of Donetsk Republic and previously a member of Russian National Unity Party), and Aleksandr Prokhanov, a Stalin­ist, antisemite, and fascist who is fascinated by the idea that Russia is the true “mystical womb” of Aryan civilization, see Babiak (2014).

References

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“The Catechesis of a Member of the Eurasian Union of Youth” 2016.

Iampolski, Mikhail. 2015. “Judging the Victors: Why Victimhood Is a Bad Fit for Russia,” Jordan Russia Center. 5 March. http://jordanrussiacenter.org/news/

Living With Ambiguities 173 judging-victors-victimhood-bad-fit-russia/. (Orig. in Russian: “Kak sudiat pobeditelei.” Colta: Shkola grazhdanskoi zhurnalistiki. 26 January 2015. www. colta.ru/articles/specials/6088.).

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Shekhovtsov, Anton. 2014. “Russian Fascist Aleksandr Dugin’s Dreams of Dic­tatorship in Russia.” Anton Shekhovtsov Blogspot. 27 February. http://anton- shekhovtsov.blogspot.ca/2014/02/russian-fascist-aleksandr-dugin-is.html

Snyder, Timothy. 2014a. “Europe and Ukraine: Putin’s Project.” Frankfurter Allgemeine. 16 April 2014. www.faz.net/suche/

-----. 2014b. “Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine.” The New York Review of Books. 20 March.

Stewart, Will. 2014. “President Putin’s Critics Are Denounced in a Soviet-Style ‘Wall of Shame’.” Daily Mail. 17 April. Umland, Andreas. 2014. “Understanding Russia’s Role and Aims in the ‘Ukraine Crisis,’” Harvard International Review. 11 August. http://hir.harvard.edu/understanding-russias-role-and-aims-in-the- ukraine-crisis/; or www.academia.edu/8672924/Understanding_Russia_s_ Role_and_Aims_in_the_Ukraine_Crisis_

Zabuzhko, Oksana. 2009. Muzei pokynutyk sekretiv. Kyiv: Fakt.

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