Concluding Remarks

The chapter has shown that Ethiopian governmental actors apply diverse strat­egies not to relinquish entirely authority for co-regulating the private sphere and to reserve for themselves a privileged negotiation position as ‘guardians' of the constitutional state.

State recognition of local and religious legal orders may be described as challenging processes of conflict and accommodation between ‘state identity' and the self-regulation claims of social groups. It has been demonstrated that the constitutional recognition of religious law opens up a space and forum for continuous negotiation processes between various actors. These negotiation spaces allow for a continuous (re-)structuring of power relations. The constitu­tional recognition of ‘non-state' normative orders appears to be a legal tool for dealing with the fact that the de facto influence of state law is only marginal. By de Jure recognizing Islamic law, governmental actors attempt to frame and limit the scope of recognised ‘other' normative orders with a view to retain­ing a de Jure ‘final' say, striving to achieve their own hegemonic claims and to secure political and legal key areas. By taking into account the politically and demographically strengthened Muslim population, Ethiopia's political elites have realised that a state recognition of the legal perceptions of Muslim local communities may help to reduce, at least temporarily, conflicts of divergent normative values as well as to maintain the political status quo. Moreover, these state actors' efforts create the necessity to establish negotiation spaces due to the inevitable collisions of norms. Subsequent adaptations lead to in­novative institutionalised conflict resolution mechanisms. The adaptation processes demonstrate the mutually constitutive heterogeneity of normative notions of order, which are always locally translated and moulded by an inter­play of manifold actors.

As the example of the Shari^ta courts has shown, the Kadis partly contest state demands and attempt to manoeuvre their claims by utilising their of­ficially recognised status. However, the created normative spaces seem to be used to negotiate situational solutions to specific conflicts rather than to iden­tify and formulate mutual values in light of and respect for the different moral beliefs. What seems to be needed is a continuous political dialogue and process of negotiation procedures regarding the legitimate enforcement of law as well as a functioning national legal mechanism to balance the powers of the vari­ous normative orders and to develop a set of conflict rules. A precondition for the smooth application of the existing procedural rules is mutual knowledge transfer. Without ensuring adequate training in state civil procedure as well as in the constitutional principles for the appointed Kadis across the country and without teaching Islamic legal principles and values to state judicial actors, it appears to be difficult to reach a successful implementation and openness of negotiations.

As mentioned above, the fdre Constitution “shall not preclude the adjudi­cation of disputes relating to personal and family matters in accordance with religious or customary laws”^[597] so long as the parties consent. This regulation remains problematic.

Even though the fdre Constitution has established various institutional mechanisms to balance diverging interests within the interdependent spheres of state, groups and group members, including certain mechanisms of judi­cial review, it does not provide a specific mechanism to deal with decisions of Shari^ta courts that are in conflict with constitutional principles. The fed­eral constitution does not clearly state whether its ‘supremacy clause' and enshrined provisions on human rights prevail over final decisions of Shari^ta courts when they conflict. As demonstrated, the fdre Constitution and Shari^ta Courts Proclamation 188/1999 seem to have recognised the final sub­stantive decisions delivered by Shari^ta courts instead as an exception to its ‘supremacy clause'.

Moreover, gender issues might be more consistently addressed by systemat­ically promoting ‘gender equality' and its (pre-)conditions as well as by raising awareness of gender disparity so that women can make informed decisions as to which forum is to their best interest. Such pursuits coupled with the limited power of the state to encourage and facilitate reforms regarding the treatment of gender issues in Shari^ta courts can indeed gradually address the constitu­tional and human rights concerns.

Finally, one may conclude that Emperor Haile Selassie I's proclaimed idea to achieve ‘unity' by solely formal recognition of ‘diversity' seems to be insufficient. Even though the constitutionally recognised legal pluralism cre­ates certain negotiation processes, the actors involved utilise the created ‘space’ solely in the interest of their respective groups and make, if anything, situational concessions. As long as conflicts are not viewed as an opportunity to negotiate the apparent ‘differences’ with a view to identifying mutual values in light of and respect for the different moral beliefs, the project of ‘unity in diversity’ pursued by governmental actors remains unaddressed. Thus, quests for ‘unity and diversity’ by merely formal ‘recognition’ of legal plurality appear to be futile. However, state actors seem to be convinced that they must use the constitutionally granted ‘space’ to improve their co-regulatory position and thus to safeguard their own power resources.