The Function of Legal Analogy and the Ratio Legis

Analogy, al-Shirazi says, is to “attach a derivation to a source with regard to some of its rulings based on a meaning (ma^rna) common to both.”7i One notices that al-Shirazi here uses ‘meaning’ (ma^rna) in the sense of ^rilla as a technical term, as he does throughout the chapter on analogy. Endorsing anal­ogy is part of al-Shirazi’s general concern with clarifying the believers’ religious culpability (takllf) toward God as made known in Scripture. While only the revealed word and the Prophet’s Sunna are able to establish the status of acts that fall under takllf, analogy (qiyds) functions as a way to know one’s religious accountability beyond the letter of the scriptural sources, namely in matters not addressed in the texts (masd^,il la nass flhd). Circumstances not directly expressed in the texts can only be assessed in analogy to the authoritative sources, namely the textually established rulings or Consensus?²

Like al-Dabbusi, al-Shirazi explicitly states that ^rillas of rulings are men­tioned in the sources of the Law in order to generalize the rulings to those instances not expressly addressed?³ He maintains that without being intended to be generalized, there would be no sense in mentioning ratiocination in the Qur’an or Sunna.

when somebody says^{[625] [626] [627] [628] [629] [630] [631] ‘do not eat sugar because (li-anna) it is sweet,' the prohibition [to eat] everything that is sweet is understood from it (cuqila minhu). And when he says ‘do not eat honey because it is hot,' one under­stands from it the prohibition of everything that is hot.... Because, were (law) he not to have intended (Iamyaqsid) to establish the ruling in every incident (mawdif) in which the rilla is found, there would have been no sense (Iamyufid) in mentioning the ratiocination (taclll)τ7 and it would have been idle talk (Iaghwan). 78}

We see that although al-Shirazi defines a person's obligations narrowly to the imperative and negative imperative mood, he does not restrict accountabil­ity (takllf) to the instances mentioned in the textual sources. The function of analogy (qiyas) is to extend rulings of the divine Law to circumstances not addressed in the sources in order to ensure that one does not miss a divine injunction. Analogy is a way to safeguard that one's religious responsibilities toward God are fulfilled. Al-Shirazi even proclaims that all religio-legal rulings (jaml^r al-ahkam al-shar^ciyya), on their whole and their details, their hudud rulings, penances (kaffdrdt), and fixed amounts (muqaddarat) are susceptible to analogy.7⁹ He refutes those, like Abu Hashim al-Jubba’i and Hanafis, who exclude the latter three areas from analogy by arguing that in these areas of Law many rulings are based on singular, i.e., probabilistic, hadlths8° - implying that as authoritative proof (Juijjct) analogy a fortiori should be valid to estab­lish rulings.

Al-Shirazi restricts the sources of analogy to God's words, the Prophet's words and deeds, and Consensus^¹ Despite denying ratiocination, in his analysis of these sources, he often refers to a deeper meaning or underlying purpose for God setting a particular ruling. Like al-Dabbusi, he understands this pur­pose in terms of divine wisdom (hikma). God being wise means that He acts and speaks with purpose (gharad), and this purposeful legislation is reflected in the ^rilla of rulings. While al-Shirazi considers all intelligible scriptural rul­ings susceptible to analogy, he explicitly stipulates that in order to serve as basis for analogy, the meaning of the ruling has to be intelligible (yu'qal), thereby excluding for example the number of daily prayers or the fast during Ramadan.^[632] Additionally, he excludes from analogy assessments that are not based on Revelation, namely matters pertaining to custom or personal disposi­tions (khalqa), such as the minimum or maximum length of a woman's men­struation or pregnancy, because “their meaning is not intelligible.’^^[633]

Moreover, in order to analogize, the meaning in the source also has to require (yaqtadτ) the ruling, yet not in a causal fashion^{[634] [635] [636] [637] [638] Rather, religious rillas (cilal al-share), he says, are set as such by God.85 They are connected to the divine leg­islative intent (qasd) through their meaning. Intention (qasd) is the meaning, not the utterance (al-qasd huwa al-macnd dun al-lafz), and the meaning leads to the intended (al-macnd ata bi-l-maqsud).86 The intended, al-Shirazi main­tains, sometimes is known by specific terms (asamin) and sometimes by mean­ings (macdnin).87 He defends the use of a designation or name (ism) in analogy against some jurists from his own school of law as well as Hanafis,88 supporting his position with the language conventions of Arabs.}

we do not call grape juice khamr, with the occurrence of intoxication, it is called khamr, and then when it ceases, we no longer call it khamr. Thus, we know that what causes (mujab) this designation is the presence of enrapturing intoxication (shidda mutriba).^s9 This meaning (ma’na) is found in nabidh and, hence, it is obligatory to call it khamr."

Moreover, al-Shirazi maintains that there is no difference between saying ‘khamr is called that due to the enrapturing intoxication' and saying ‘every­thing that intoxicates in an enrapturing fashion is khamr.'^{[639] [640] [641] A designation, thus, has a meaning that goes beyond the lexical. Its semantic field is what allows to employ it in analogy to situations that have the same meaning. Date wine (nabldh) is analogized to grape wine (khamr) due to sharing the meaning of severe enrapture, not because the two terms are lexically inter­changeable and designate the same material substance. Al-Shirazfs defense of using a designation as ratio legis in the procedure of analogy is language-based. A designation has a meaning that is tied to it, though not necessarily exclusive to it. Hence, it is used in analogy on account of its meaning.}

What does al-Shirazi mean with the term ma’na? And how is it connected to the ratio legis in the procedure of analogy? We know that meanings found in the scriptural sources serve as rationes legis for their rulings and are set as such by God. Meanings are, however, distinct from signs (amdrdt). Although al-Shirazi considers an ’illa to be a sign for its ruling (amarat ’ala l-hukm),9^[642] he says that a sign is not an ’illa for a ruling. The setting of the sun, al-Shirazi tells us, is a sign (amdra) for entering the period of prayer.

We get a slightly better idea of al-Shirazi’s conception of ma^rna and ^rilla when he discusses the various types of analogical reasoning that he deems valid. Al-Shirazi distinguishes between three types of analogy, which are differ­entiated on account of the epistemic strength of the common element (ma^rna, ^rilla) that leads to analogize the derivation to the source. When the mean­ing in the source is known either by way of an explicit statement (mansus) or is deduced (mustanbat) from the authoritative texts, al-Shirazi calls it ratio legis-based analogy (qiyas al-4lla). When it is inferred on account of indicants (adilla), he calls it analogy of indication (qiyas al-dalala). Going against some of his Shafi'i colleagues,^[646] he explicitly denies the validity of a third type of analogy - the analogy of resemblance (qiyas al-shabah) - in which the mean­ing of the source and derivation merely resemble one another, because, he says, there is neither ^rilla nor indicant for it.9⁷

The main difference between the ratio legis-based analogy and the analogy of indication is the evidence based on which one determines the common meaning. Al-Shirazi defines qiyas al-^rilla as analogy in which the derivation is attributed to the source based on clear evidence (al-bayyina) to which the ruling is connected in the Law. This clear evidence, he says, is either a meaning in which an aspect of God’s wisdom is apparent or a meaning the elucidation of its aspect of wisdom is known to God alone - its wisdom is not intelligible, though its meaning is. As example for a meaning that contains an apparent aspect of wisdom, al-Shirazi mentions that drinking wine corrupts and pre­vents from remembering God and from performing prayer. 98 The meaning of wine is connected to the wisdom in its prohibition because drinking wine cor­rupts and distracts from worship. It has harmful consequences in this world as well as the next. An example of the second type of meaning is the prohibition of usurious exchange (riba) of wheat, barley, dates, and salt. Their meaning, according to al-Shirazi, is that they are items that are edible or measurable - although the elucidation (bayan), which al-Shirazi here uses in reference to the reason or wisdom behind prohibiting usurious transactions for these items, is only known to God.99 In both examples, al-Shirazi sees a wise meaning (or ^rilla) that is connected to the ruling of prohibition, though only in the case of wine is the wisdom of prohibition humanly comprehensible. The wisdom behind the ruling to prohibit wine is its benefit - mundane and otherworldly - directed toward humans by preventing harm and corruption from them.^{[647] [648] [649] [650] [651] [652] Like in al-Dabbusi’s explanation for the prohibition of wine, al-Shirazi asserts that the ruling is based on divine wisdom and contains an ethical dimension that is humanly comprehensible on account of what is known from experience.}

Al-Shirazi further elaborates that the meanings of the ratio legis-based anal­ogy may be either perspicuous (jalι) or non-perspicuous (khafl), depending on their epistemic strength.101 In perspicuous analogies, the ratio legis does not allow for more than one meaning and is established by a definite indicant (dalll qdti^r) that is not susceptible to be interpreted differently. ™2 There are degrees of perspicuity, with the most perspicuous ratio legis explicitly mentioned in the text by a word indicating reason (lafz al-taTd) such as ‘lest’ (li-alla) or ‘due to’ (li-ajl). Lower on the scale of perspicuity are rationes legis that inform (nab- baha) about other situations a fortiori (awla). The qur’anic prohibition to say ‘fie’ to parents, al-Shirazi maintains, informs that it is even more prohibited to hit them.™³ Into the category of perspicuous fall, in addition to textually apparent rationes legis, those that are agreed upon by Muslims. As examples al-Shirazi mentions the Consensus that the Aadd-punishments serve to pre­vent and deter from committing sinful acts; as well as the Consensus that the enslaved receive half of the Aadd-punishment meted out to a free person due to their enslavement.™⁴ In the first example, the wisdom of the ruling is apparent, whereas in the second the wisdom behind an enslaved person only receiving half of the punishment of a free person is known only to God. Yet, enslavement is the only meaning that makes sense as ratio legis, and it is, addi­tionally, ascertained by Consensus.

By contrast, in non-perspicuous (khafl) analogies, rationes legis are not explicitly stated but are deduced (mustanbat); they are not certain and allow for multiple possibilities. The ^rilla is often deduced from additional evidence of other sources. Again, there are degrees of obviousness of this type of 4lla. The highest degree is when the meaning is apparent (zdhir), such as ‘food’ for prohibiting usurious transactions, which, al-Shirazi says, is known from the Prophet’s statement not to sell “food for food unless equal for equal.”™⁵ Lower on the scale of non-perspicuous ^rillas is a characteristic that is known by deduction and indicated by efficacy (ta^,thlr). As example al-Shirazi refers to the characteristic of ‘enrapturing intoxication' (shidda mutriba) of wine. From the observation that the consumption of khamr with the presence of enraptur­ing intoxication is prohibited and ceases to be so with its absence (i.e., as juice or vinegar), one deduces that the characteristic of enrapturing intoxication is the ratio legis.^{[653] [654] [655] [656] [657] Efficacy, we notice, is understood here by al-Shirazi in terms of co-presence and co-absence or concomitance (see also below).}

The analogy of indication (qiyas al-dalala) differs from the ratio legis-based analogy in that the meaning in the source is determined on account of indica­tions (istidlal), as opposed to explicitly stated or deduced from the texts, and is in the derivation not identical but only similar (nazir).'^l07 In this type of analogy, the common meaning is inferred based on both situations (source and deriva­tion) exhibiting similar features or principles of legal reasoning. In illustration, al-Shirazi mentions that the obligation of a youth to pay alms tax (zakat) on property (mdl) is made in analogy to the ruling that he has to pay tithe (^cushr) on agricultural produce (zar^t) like an adult. In this analogy, Ushr does not have the same semantic-lexical meaning as zakat and one is levied on agricultural produce (zar^e) and the other on property (mal). However, al-Shirazi says, the ruling on tithe indicates the existence of an ^rilla in the Law.10⁸ The jurist infers from this ruling that reaping the fruits from agricultural production, i.e., earn­ing income, is a meaning that obliges paying the tithe; whereas being a minor is not taken into consideration. Paying zakat on one's property follows the same legal reason (4lla). Another example that al-Shirazi mentions for an anal­ogy by indication is the validity of the zihdr divorce^w9 uttered by a protected non-Muslim (dhimml). He infers its validity in analogy to the general validity of dhimmls’ repudiation (taldq) and from the validity of zihdr for Muslims. 110 Zihdr and taldq are not the same semantically but are similar (nazlr).

Although the analogy of indication is epistemologically inferior, al-Shirazi says that it functions like the non-perspicuous type of the ratio legis-based analogy, but with lower probability for the ratio legis. Yet, should its indication be agreed upon (i.e., by Consensus), then, he says, the analogy of indication is treated like a perspicuous ratio legis-based analogy.^{[658] [659] [660] [661] This latter statement implies that al-Shirazi actually conceives of analogical reasoning as only one type, namely the ratio legis-based analogy (qiyas al-4lla), since the analogy of indication is, like one type of the former, based on either a non-perspicuous (khafi) meaning or, when there is Consensus, this meaning becomes perspic­uous. The difference between analogies is epistemic only, depending on the degree of overtness of the ratio legis in the source(s).}

2.1 Identifying the Ratio Legis

That analogical reasoning is only differentiated by the degree of apparency in meaning is confirmed when looking at al-Shirazi’s presentation of ways to correctly identify the ^rilla. Al-Shirazi differentiates between two types of indi­cation, namely of a source (asl) or by deduction (istinbαt).^π2 A source is, as mentioned above, either the word of God or His messenger, the reported deeds of the Prophet (i.e., textual sources), or Consensus (ijma^e). Textual sources indi­cate the ratio legis either by the utterance or wording (nutq) of the text or by its tenor (fahwa) and implication (mafhum). The most perspicuous (ajla) types of utterances are those that signify reason (lafz al-ta^cHl), such as the words li-ajl, min-ajl, and the like. Lower in degree of perspicuity are characteristics that only make sense (Ja¹ida) to be mentioned when they indicate the ratio legis (ta^clll), such as Qur’an 5: 91 saying about wine (khamr) that “the devil only seeks to sow enmity and hatred among you.” Or, for example, the Prophet’s remark that the cat wanders around people in connection with its ritual purity.^π3 The ratio legis may also be indicated by a descriptive characteristic (sifa) to which the ruling is connected, especially when it is connected to the ruling either by a conditional particle or by another syntactic construction that indicates ratiocination. For example, al-Shirazi argues that Qur’an 65: 6 "... if they are pregnant, then provide for them...” shows that being pregnant is the ratio legis for the ruling to provide maintenance. The particle ‘fa’ in Qur’an 5: 38 that links the male and female thief with cutting off their hand indicates that the pun­ishment is on account of their theft. The Prophet’s saying not to sell food for food unless equal for equal indicates that being ‘food’ is the ratio legis for the prohibition of increase in the exchange.^π4

As examples of ratiocination indicated by the tenor and implication of the wording of the textual source al-Shirazi mentions the prohibition to hit parents, which, he says, is understood a fortiori (awla) upon hearing that one should not say ‘fie’ to them. Less apparent is when the text mentions a char­acteristic from which one understands a meaning that encompasses that characteristic, such as the Prophetic saying that a judge should not adjudicate while angry. According to al-Shirazi, one understands by “some type of think­ing” (darb min al-fikr) that being angry while adjudicating is prohibited due to (li) the preoccupation of thejudge’s mind (lit. heart) - which in analogy also applies to being hungry or thirsty.^{[662] [663] [664] [665] [666] We see here that even with textually expressed (mansus) rationes legis, one may have to go beyond the letter of the word and ‘think’ in order to infer the meaning of rulings.}

The ratio legis of a source ruling may also be indicated by a sequence of action, such as when the Prophet ordered a Bedouin who had intercourse dur­ing the Ramadan fast to manumit a slave. Intercourse is a meaning, al-Shirazi says, that becomes apparent as ratio legis for obliging atonement. As examples for a ratio legis that is indicated by Consensus, al-Shirazi references the caliph ‘Umar’s statement about the fertile lands of Southern Iraq (sawad) becom­ing state property so as to not be circulating only among the rich members of the community; and ‘Ali’s pronouncement to punish the wine drinker with the Aadd-punishment for slander (qadhf), arguing that someone who is drunk slanders. Nobody of the community, al-Shirazi maintains, objected to the ratiocination (ta'llli) of these rulings and, hence, Consensus indicates their correctness.^π6

Should the ^rilla of a ruling not be explicitly or implicitly mentioned in the authoritative sources, one needs to turn to deduction (istinbat). Al-Shirazi mentions two methods by which one can deduce the correct ratio legis - efficacy (ta^,thlr) and source attestation (shahadat al-usul)-^m The most impor­tant method is efficacy, namely “if the ruling is present with the presence of the meaning, then it is overwhelmingly probable that [that meaning] establishes the ruling for its source [case]."^u8 Al-Shirazi further explains efficacy, saying that it is known in two ways, namely from co-presence and co-absence^π9 and from classification (taqslm). As example for the first, al-Shirazi references again khamr, drinking of which prior to the occurrence of enrapturing intoxication (shidda mutriba) is permitted (halal), with severe enrapture prohibited, and again permitted when it ceases (i.e., as vinegar).^{[667] [668] [669] [670] [671] Another way to deduce the efficacy of the rilla is classification (taqsm). All but one meaning in the source are eliminated as valid. For example, when considering whether bread falls under the prohibition of being traded usuriously (riba), the potential criteria are being sold by measure (kayl), by weight (wazn) or being edible (ta’am). The first two do not apply to bread, which leaves edibility as the ratio legis for prohibiting selling bread with interest.121 We see here that al-Shirazi considers efficacy to be determined either by co-extensiveness and co-exclusiveness or by classification and successive elimination; both result in showing that the meaning/'illa is effective on the ruling.}

Al-Shirazi mentions source attestation (shahadat al-usul) as the second method of deduction that indicates the correctness of the ’illa. This type of indication, he explains, is specific to the analogy of indication (qiyds al-dalala). As we have seen, this method is not a one-on-one deduction of the ’illa from a specific source text (explicit or implicit) to a derivative case but is inferred from one or more additional sources and the two cases are similar in conceptual meaning. As example al-Shirazi refers to the ruling that cackling (qahqaha) during prayer does not invalidate ritual purity (tahdra) based on the indica­tion that whatever does not invalidate one's purity outside of prayer, does not do so while praying.122 This indication (which constitutes the ratio legis) is attested to by other sources that equate what happens during prayer with what happens outside of prayer, like rulings on cleansing (wudu^,) and impurities (ahdath).12³ These methods, al-Shirazi claims, are the only ones that indicate the correctness of the ratio legis. Like al-Dabbusi, he explicitly rejects that the absence of invalidating factors or co-absence of ’illa and ruling can indicate the ratio legis™ One needs positive evidence.

2.2 Three Dimensions of Meaning

When al-Shirazi talks about what technically is the ’illa, i.e., the common ele­ment that provides the justification for transferring the ruling of the source to the derivative case, he often uses the word ma’na almost interchangeably with ’illa, though these two terms are not identical. ’Illa, insofar as it refers to the humanly knowable ratio legis in the procedure of analogy, has to be an intelligible meaning. Every ’illa is a meaning but not every meaning is an ’illa for a ruling. When looking at his writings, we can see that al-Shirazi uses the term ma’na in the sense of ’illa on three levels, depending on the degree of interpretation needed to understand the texts. On one level, ma’na arises out of the narrow lexical-semantic and syntactic field of the textual statement containing the ruling in question. On a second level, it arises out of the wider conceptual semantic field of the textual statement including similar ones in other sources. On a third level, ma’na is connected to the divine wisdom in laying down the ruling; the wisdom of legislation provides the meaning for the ruling. All of these dimensions of meaning can be known with certainty or with probability.

At the first level, the ratio legis is perspicuously indicated by the syntactic- semantic field in which the textual statements are embedded; its meaning is epistemologically the strongest. The meaning is either indicated directly by words and syntactic constructions indicating ratiocination. Those words only make sense (fa Ida) if they are the ’illa, or if they distinctly characterize the fact situation to which the ruling pertains. Or, the meaning is indirectly indicated, namely understood from the tenor and implication (fahwa and mafhum) of the semantic field of the textual statement, such as a fortiori implications and other immediately understood mental associations. The implied meaning does not have to be based on the wording of the textual statements but might be implied from a sequence of action or ascertained by Consensus.

On a second level, the meaning that serves as ’illa of a ruling is derived from the wider conceptual field of the wording of the textual statements. The word­ing of the source text is not connected to the ruling lexically or semantically, but only conceptually. Its meaning is epistemologically weaker than the first level of meanings. Words mentioned in the ruling can be grouped into a gen­eral category which provides ‘meaning’ to the ruling, such as ‘food’ as apparent category of meaning shared by the items prohibited to be traded usuriously.^[672] The conceptual meaning captures one or more features that makes these items different from other items that are not mentioned, and, thus, delineates actions that are subsumable under the same ruling. The conceptual meaning can also be a characteristic that is associated with a term, like ‘severe enrap­ture' for khamr, which is determined by its efficacy.^{[673] [674] [675] At the conceptual level, the meaning may also be derived from other textually attested rulings and cases that are similar (nazιr), as in the case of tithe and alms, or cackling dur­ing prayer and rulings on ablution and impurity. The rilla of the ruling on alms due from minors is taken from another ruling, which is only remotely related to alms but shares in the concept that earned income is taxable.}

A third level on which al-Shirazi uses ‘meaning' in the sense of ^rilla is with reference to divine wisdom. Some ^rillas have a meaning in which an aspect of God's wisdom and intention is apparent.^⁷ Although al-Shirazi does not con­nect wisdom directly to any ethical considerations in his discussion of the ratio legis, it is obvious in his example of prohibiting wine that its prohibition is connected to preventing corruption and neglect of worship - something that is understood as good and beneficial for humans. Similarly, the Consensus that the Aadd-punishments aim at deterrence and prevention is also a meaning that displays aspects of wisdom. In these examples, the wisdom, and good­ness, of these rulings is directed toward the mundane world. In his definition of legal values, presented above, al-Shirazi holds that divine command means that the commanded is good, in the sense that it aims at something that is good and beneficial, which is known by the act's being commanded. God's wisdom means that He does not command something bad. We see that in al-Shirazi's thought, the ^rilla of a ruling is connected to the divine legislative intent. This intent is sometimes knowable and understandable as wise by preventing something ‘bad' - be that worldly corruption or disobedience to God's com­mands and its otherworldly consequences. The third level in which al-Shirazi employs meaning/^rilla has overt consequentialist considerations, despite not mentioning this level of meaning as a way to identify the ratio legis. This sup­ports Soufi's argument that al-Shirazi, like Juwayni as we will see below, con­siders mundane beneficial consequences when determining the ^rilla behind God's impositions.12⁸

Does al-Shirazi operationalize the divine legislative intent or the wisdom behind rulings in analogical reasoning? The answer is yes, but rarely - or rather in addition to the semantic-conceptual meaning of the texts. Al-Shirazi holds that 'illas, as meanings requiring their rulings, provide knowledge of the inten­tion of the Lawgiver and His wisdom, even if that meaning is not explicit but inferred.^[676] When one finds a meaning that reflects the divine wisdom else­where, al-Shirazi says, the associated ruling is applied in analogy, as is the case with nabldh and khamr. 1³⁰ Moreover, when determining the correct ratio legis among multiple possible criteria (i.e., in the procedure of classification and elimination), al-Shirazi gives preponderance to a characteristic that pertains to wisdom (sifa hikmiyya) over a characteristic by itself (sifa dhatiyya) that does not display the divine wisdom.™ However, as we saw, not all meanings display the divine wisdom. Wisdom is not a criterion to determine the meaning of a ruling independently of support from authoritative sources.™

While al-Shirazi accepts wisdom as ratio legis, he rejects that it is recog­nized by looking at whether something attains benefit (intifa^f) or averts harm. Benefit, for him, is not connected to the indicants of the Law.133 A meaning (in the sense of ratio legis) that constitutes benefit is not analogized on account of its benefit but because God attaches a ruling to it. In the same way that being beneficial is not determining the legal status of an act,13⁴ benefit does not con­stitute a meaning/'illa for analogy without source attestation. For al-Shirazi, an unattested ‘benefit’, i.e., a maslaha mursala as endorsed by many later jurists, does not constitute a valid ratio legis. This position aligns with his ethical the­ory that God does not command because something is good but we know that it is good because God commands it.'¹-⁵⁵ In Ash^tari fashion, he maintains that rationally evaluating benefit and harm is not a criterion to understand the rea­son or ’illa for divine actions (ta’lll afal Llah.)™ Benefit, as Eissa says, has no role in deducing the ratio legis, because God is not obliged to guarantee human benefit.13⁷ Rather, when one identifies an intelligible meaning that requires the ruling, this meaning is valid irrespective of its beneficial consequences, such as the meaning of ‘food’ for usurious transactions. Analogizing such a ruling is not done on account of its benefits but on account of its meaning, which is concomitant with the ruling. Like our previously discussed jurists, al-Shirazi emphasizes that one acts upon divinely imposed ruling not for their (poten­tial) beneficial consequences, but primarily out of obedience to one’s Master.

Does al-Shirazi understand the ^rllla of rulings as maslaha, otherworldly or mundane? The answer is no. He explicitly says that God’s impositions (taklf) do not need to be maslaha for humans, though they, of course, can be.^{[677] [678] [679] [680] [681] While he holds that meanings of rulings are connected to maslaha™ he rarely uses the term maslaha unless he is rebutting the views of those (likely Muttazilis) who deem rulings to be legislated for the maslaha of the religiously accountable?40 He explicitly demands that analogy can only be done when the meaning of the source is known,i4i which excludes scripturally unattested maslahas and unat­tested benefit or harm. One of the times that al-Shirazi uses the term maslaha in reference to mundane matters, he specifically says that mundane matters concerning warfare, architecture and agriculture belong to the maslahas of this world (masallh al-dunya) and are outside of the purview of Consensus.^ In short, while the 'ι'lla, i.e., the intelligible meaning requiring the ruling, may display God’s wisdom behind establishing the ruling, beneficial consequences and mundane maslahas are not criteria to identify the correctness of the rllla or God’s legislative intent. In the few examples al-Shirazi mentions for wise meanings as ratio legis of a ruling, the wise meaning is supplementary and explanatory to the conceptual or semantic meaning. While he deems the meaning of the prohibition of wine to reflect divine wisdom, he does not need to refer to wisdom to analogize this to date wine - the meaning of wine as intoxicating beverage, and the permissibility of consuming it when intoxica­tion is absent, suffices as effective llla. The same holds for the wisdom behind the AααW-punishments; it is supported by Consensus. The third level of mean­ing, thus, is not operationalized independently from attestation in the sources of the Law and neither benefit nor maslaha serve as sole criterion to identify the ratio legis of rulings. rIlla, in al-Shirazi’s conception, is an intelligible macnd that requires the divinely established ruling. The ‘content’ of marna can only be drawn from the wording of the texts.}

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