Concludingremarks
This chapter began our discussion of the Epicurean sage by contrasting the Stoic and the Epicurean wise persons. In the characterization of the Epicurean sage that is drawn from this contrast, respect for laws and institutions, as well as a friendly attitude towards his homeland, plays an important role.
Thus, in order to deepen this characterization, it turns out to be illustrative to study the Epicurean view regarding the traditional Greek topic of actions performed without witnesses. We reconstruct the Epicurean position from the study of two testimonies in the indirect tradition: a passage from the Puzzles of Epicurus transmitted by Plutarch (Col. 1127D), in which Epicurus asks himself whether the wise man will do things which the laws forbid if he knows that he will escape detection, and an important passage of Cicero ( Off. 3.38-39) in which he presents his interpretation of the response of the Epicureans to the story of Gyges' ring. We show the difficulties raised by the interpretation of the above-mentioned passage from the Puzzles and then underline that the background of the story of Gyges' ring is Glaucon's specific contractual model, in which ‘advantage' is the essential motivation of human nature (Plato, Resp. 359c3-5; Cicero stresses this link between advantage and contractualism in On Laws 3.13, 23). Now, in Epicureanism the issue of ‘advantage' is framed by the emergence of vain desires and fears posterior to the establishment of the first covenants of justice. Next, we analyse Plutarch's and Cicero's interpretations of the position of Epicureanism vis-a-vis the ancient cliche of actions performed without witnesses, and place emphasis upon the fact that it constitutes a malicious interpretation that strips the Epicurean sage of his crucial defining traits: the study of nature and prudence. Cicero and Plutarch assume that the reason why the wise Epicurean does not commit crimes is the fear of being discovered and punished. So, in Cicero's and Plutarch's view, as long as the sage person is certain that he will not be discovered, he will act illegally; however, as we argued above, that cannot be the case. The adverb ‘honourably', so profusely used by Epicurus, along with the adverb ‘justly' qualifies the life of the Epicurean sage in different terms from the simple attachment to the laws. Indeed, there are behaviours authorized by the law that do not correspond to the life of the sage, such as ‘being sordidly stingy' ( VrS 43) and in general the love of money. Likewise, the expression ‘living honourably' [καλως ζην ] encompasses behaviours of the Epicurean sage that go beyond what is required by the law in social relations, such as, giving and donating, friendship or philanthropy. We have also analysed several Platonic considerations on punishment and pointed out some affinities with the treatment of chastisement in Epicureanism, evincing again the important presence of Plato in Epicureanism (which does not mean that Epicurus or his followers agreed with Plato on everything, but rather that Plato was an important inspiration in some key themes of their political philosophy).Finally, we have emphasized the role of friendship in achieving the demands that make a person wise and have argued that the crucial role of friendship does not occur only at the limited level of ‘the community of Epicurean friends' but must be extended to the rest of society. We close the chapter by showing how two fundamental ingredients of community life - justice and friendship - are highlighted in two famous doctrinal devices of Epicureanism: the biographical tradition of the ‘imitation of Epicurus' and the ‘becoming like god’.
130
More on the topic Concludingremarks:
- Concludingremarks
- Concludingremarks
- Concludingremarks
- CONCLUDING REMARKS
- Concluding remarks
- Concluding Remarks
- CONCLUDING REMARKS
- CONCLUDING REMARKS
- Summary and concluding remarks
- CONCLUDING REMARKS