POPPER MAKES ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS

One additional assumption I have mentioned is the assumption that we need positive evidence from time to time. There is another additional assumption here, which I think Popper is ambivalent about: he sometimes implies it, sometimes its rejection.

It seems to me that originally Popper tried to make his theory of science as formal and rigorous as he could. He required that of all criticizable hypotheses that hypothesis should be taken up first, which is most highly criticizable. There is clear reason for this additional requirement in the theory of science as critical debate. C. S. Peirce had already made the same proposal, but he, at least, made it on the ground of economy, which may indeed be justified occasionally, as we shall see. It is not clear by itself we must consider first the most criticizabie theory available. Nor is it clear by itself why we should accept every evidence against the theory if we cannot refute that evidence, and accept the theory if it is well sup­ported by positive evidence.

Not at all. The main problems concerning science, the problem of demarcation and of induction, are solved by the very idea of Popper’s program, and are indeed solved in his classical Logic of Scientific Dis­covery prior to any discussion of degrees of testability, of the empirical basis of science, or of corroboration. What do these additonal ideas come to explain? What problems do they come to solve?

The roles which the additional assumptions come to play are two: first to insure that the game of dialectics is played fairly, and second to explain the apparent relative stability of science and the coherence of research in various fields and within any one field. Let us take the first point first. Popper seems to fear that dogmatism may creep into science through the back-door, by the choice of barely testable auxiliary hypotheses, by doubting unpalatable factual evidence, and by hosts of other shifty tech­niques and clever twists.

In an attempt to block all attempts at dogmatism Popper has entirely isolated the open-minded from the possibly dogmatic and the dogmatic. I do not like this even as a limiting and ideal case. Why should we always be able to discern the possible apologist and dogmatist from the critically- minded and open-minded? Why not allow all practices other than the clearly apologetic ones, and leave it at that? Popper’s claim that unless we have a criterion for acceptance and rejection of factual information we may permit dogmatism is correct, but his conclusion that we should therefore have such a criterion is a non sequitor, and his criticism of those who have failed to do so is invalid. Rather, we may try to explain how was it possible to develop science in relative freedom from apologetic disputes and other dogmatic practices, even though there was no good criterion of acceptance and rejection of factual information?

This is one of the many problems concerning the relative stability and coherence within science which Popper may have tried to explain.

Whether the program has to be given up I do not know, but I think Jt is worth further examination. I think it is clear that even if Popper’s theory worked well, one might well question his additional requirements and auxiliary hypotheses - even refute them by historical evidence. The question is, has the program thus far failed?

Thus far, I think it has not. It seems clear that much as he fought against his narrow positivist environment Popper was not entirely immune to its influence - which should not be so surprising, especially in view of the fact that his positivist colleagues regularly accused him, as they still do ⁷, of exaggerating differences with them so as to stand out more dis­tinctly. If one wishes to rectify Popper’s program, one must start from the very start, from Popper’s view of dialectics and of rationality, indeed, and expurgate it of the traits of positivism which are manifest almost every­where in his writings, at least to a person as allergic to positivism as some of us are.

VI.