<<
>>

UNDERSTANDING AND CONTENT

We are now in a position to return to understanding. It is my contention that A understands q only if A knows a correct answer to Q which is a complete content-giving proposition with respect to Q.

(For a definition of this concept see chapter 1, section 9.) That is, A understands q only if

(1) ($p)(A knows of p that it is a correct answer to Q, and p is a complete content-giving proposition with respect to Q).

Thus, one who knows of the proposition

(2) The reason that Nero fiddled is that he was happy

that it is a correct answer to

(3) Why did Nero fiddle?

satisfies this condition for understanding why Nero fiddled, since (2) is a complete content-giving proposition with respect to (3). By contrast, one who knows the truth of

(4) The reason that Nero fiddled is difficult to grasp

does not thereby understand why Nero fiddled. For one thing, (4) is not a correct answer to (3). For another, (4) is not a complete content-giving proposition with respect to (3).

Let me mention four other cases in which (1) is violated. First, consider the question

(5) How high is the Matterhorn?

and the proposition

(6) The height of the Matterhorn is 14,700 feet.

Someone might know of (6) that it is a correct answer to (5). Moreover, proposition (6) is expressible by a sentence obtained from a complete an­swer form for (5)—“The height of the Matterhorn is ”—by filling

the blank with a number plus a term for a distance. Nevertheless, (6) is not a complete content-giving proposition with respect to (5), since it is not a content-giving proposition (for the concept expressed by “height”). (The sentence “The height of the Matterhorn is 14,700 feet” violates all the conditions for content-giving sentences given in section 9.) Therefore, someone could not be said to understand how high the Matterhorn is in virtue of the fact that he knows of (6) that it is a correct answer to (5).

By contrast, one who knows of (6) that it is a correct answer to (5) can be said to know how high the Matterhorn is. In general, knowing q, by contrast with understanding q, does not require knowledge of content­giving propositions.

Second, consider the question

(7) What execution is now occurring?

and the proposition

(8) The execution now occurring (alternatively: the event now occurring that is an execution) is the one that is being covered by the Associated Press. Someone might know of (8) that it is a correct answer to (7). Yet it seems wrong to conclude that, in virtue of this, such a person under­stands what execution is now occurring. And, indeed, (1) thwarts such a conclusion, since (8) is not a complete content-giving proposition with respect to (7).

For a third violation of (1), consider the question

(9) What caused the explosion?

and the true proposition

(10) The cause of the explosion is what caused the explosion.

For the sake of argument, let us suppose that (10) can be counted as a correct answer to (9). Proposition (10) is expressible by a sentence ob­tained from a complete answer form for (9)—“The cause of the explosion is ”—by filling the blank; and “cause” is a content-noun. But surely

we would deny that someone who knows of (10) that it is a correct an­swer to (9) in virtue of this fact understands (or even knows) what caused the explosion. Such a denial is indeed justified by condition (1) for un­derstanding. Proposition (10) is not a complete content-giving one with respect to (9). For one thing, it is not expressible by a content-giving sen­tence for “cause.” (“What caused the explosion” in (10) is not a nominal.) For another, (10) is presupposed by (9).

Suppose that knowing of p that it is a correct answer to Q does not suffice for understanding q. Can we conclude that q is not understand­able? Of course not. (9) is understandable—one can understand what caused the explosion. The point is just that one cannot understand this in virtue of knowing of (10) that it is a correct answer to (9).

Indeed, condition (1) does not even preclude someone from understanding (7), namely, what execution is now occurring. “The event now occurring that is an execution is the killing of the prince” expresses a complete content-giving proposition with respect to (7). One who knows of this proposition that it is true satisfies condition (1) for understanding. We cannot, of course, conclude that such knowledge entails understanding, since condition (1) is not being claimed to be sufficient. (See the last part of section 6.)

Finally, it might be objected, it will be possible for p to be a complete content-giving proposition with respect to Q when p and Q are expressed in one way but not another. Consider

(11) What person was elected U.S. president in 1980?

On my account the proposition expressed by the sentence

(12) The person who was elected U.S. president in 1980 is Reagan is not a complete content-giving proposition with respect to (11). By con­trast, with respect to

(13) What outcome of the 1980 U.S. presidential election obtained?

the sentence

(14) An outcome of the 1980 U.S. presidential election is that Reagan was elected

expresses a complete content-giving proposition. But, it seems, (11) and (13) express the same question, and (12) and (14) the same proposition.

More generally, there will be questions expressed without content­nouns that are expressible using such nouns. Thus, “What number will win the lottery?” can be rephrased as “What will be the result of the lot­tery?”; “Will it rain today” as “What possibility concerning its raining today will actually obtain?”; and so forth.

My response is twofold. First, if a question and answer are expressible in such a way that the latter is shown to be a complete content-giving proposition with respect to the former, then we do have a candidate for understanding. But, second, I am dubious that these cases are illustrations of this. In particular, e.g., I am dubious that interrogative sentences (11) and (13) express the same question.

(13) is broader than (11); it can be answered in ways not open to the latter, e.g., by

An outcome of the 1980 U.S. presidential election is that the Democrats lost control of the Senate.[57]

To be sure, there are cases in which an interrogative sentence beginning with “what” which lacks a content-noun is transformable into an equiva­lent interrogative with such a noun. (“What execution is now occurring?” we took to be equivalent to “What event is now occurring that is an execution?”) But what I am now claiming is that this is not universally the case. When such transformations are made the new interrogative will not always be equivalent to the old. Thus, “The result of the lottery will be that the state will go broke” expresses an answer to “What will be the result of the lottery?” but not to “What number will win the lottery?” and “A possibility concerning its raining today that will actually obtain is that my airplane flight will be delayed” is an answer to “What possibility concerning its raining today will actually obtain?” but not to “Will it rain today?”

4.

<< | >>
Source: Achinstein P.. Evidence, Explanation, and Realism: Essays in Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press,2010. — 344 p.. 2010

More on the topic UNDERSTANDING AND CONTENT:

  1. REVIEW OF FORENSIC ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS
  2. Reviewers
  3. Oetzel John, Ting-Toomey Stella. The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Communication: Integrating Theory, Research and Practice. SAGE Publications,2013. — 912 p., 2013
  4. References
  5. On Warfare Origins
  6. Punishments were moderated as the state expanded its power.
  7. After Foundations
  8. Abrams Peter A.. Competition Theory in Ecology. Oxford University Press,2022. — 336 p., 2022
  9. Harker C., Horschelmann K. (Eds.). Conflict, Violence and Peace. Springer,2017. — 456 p., 2017
  10. From Social Satisfaction Maximization to Welfare: Walras’s Specific Conception of Individuals