Human Beings as Both Ecologically and Socially Embedded

These thoughts are the basis for a view of human nature which takes as fundamental what we share with other species, and only through further analysis arrives at an understanding of what makes us distinct.

These questions are arguably just as applicable to the human case as to any other species. However, there is at least one respect in which the questions have to be qualified to deal with the human mode of life: the reference to ‘habitat’. To a much greater extent than other species, humans occupy a great many different habitats, and have done so throughout their history as a species by way of a huge diversity of forms of coordination of their activities in relation to one another and to external nature.

So, in terms of the relation of humans to external nature, there is no single ‘mode of life, no such thing as ‘human ecology’ in general: only the ecology of specific forms of human society. Given this open-ended variability in forms of social coordination, it nevertheless makes sense to consider both the conditions and the possible limits of that variability. One valuable source of evidence is the discipline of palaeoanthropology: the study of the evolutionary processes leading to the formation of modern humans as a species, and their differentiation from their closest relatives. This discipline has made great advances in recent decades, both in sources of evidence and in sophistication of interpretation (Stringer and Andrews 2011; Bergstrom et al. 2021). We know that the lineages that lead to modern humans diverged from the ancestors of our closest living relatives, the chimpanzees, between 5 million and 6 million years ago, that the genus Homo emerged between 2 million and 3 million years ago and that our own species (absurdly named ‘sapiens’) emerged some 400,000 years ago. Both apes and Hominini left their African homelands to colonize much of the rest of the world in a series of migrations, so that during the most recent 100,000 years some five or six species of our genus coexisted in various places and periods of time.

These species and also some of the apes had in common many of the features that are frequently claimed to be unique to our own species. These include high cognitive and communicative abilities, associated with highly developed and variable forms of social life. Both cognitive and communicative skills are associated with the ability to make and use tools, and to pass on the relevant craft skills to others in local communities and to later generations.

These early Hominini ways of life are clearly related to the evolutionary demands of survival, so what about reproduction? The currently surviving apes socially organize their reproductive behaviour in a great variety of ways. Gorillas are polygamous and live in family groupings dominated by a powerful male, while chimpanzee social organization centres on groups of males, and bonobos have a matriarchal form of organization. Gibbons rear their offspring through cooperation between monogamous pair-bonds. We know from anthropology, comparative sociology and everyday experience that there is no single human mode of reproductive activity. However, there are some distinctive aspects compared with those of the other primates. One is the extreme and prolonged dependency of human infants. This is linked to the demands of learning complex linguistic, social, cultural and material-practical skills early in life (and, reciprocally, this developmental rhythm is what makes possible the formation of the complex social life that the infant is to join). To the extent that human emotional life and behavioural dispositions are shaped by our genetic inheritance, prolonged infantile dependency would lead us to expect an evolved tendency to form strong and long-lasting emotional bonds among carers and offspring, as well as among adults who share caring roles in the immediate social group.

With the evolution of increasing cognitive, emotional and communicative capacities in Hominini lineages, ‘adaptation’ is displaced in favour of open, flexible adaptability - humans are able to invent new techniques for finding and processing their food, and to adopt new ways of ordering their social life in response to climatic and other environmental exigencies, as well as migrating to new places and acquiring the skills to survive there. From some 75,000 years ago there is evidence of what we now recognize as artistic creation, though it is arguable that from long before that artefacts showed signs of aesthetic sensibility beyond mere functionality. There is evidence of symbolic creation by modern humans and Neanderthals, in the design of tools and in ritual objects, such as bone or clay sculptures. This suggests that investment of meaning and emotional expression in the making of artefacts was already present as a common feature of human social life from very early in our prehistory. We have evidence of Palaeolithic cave art of awesome beauty and skill dating from as much as 40,000 years ago.

This sketch, mainly derived from a limited reading of palaeoanthropology, confirms each of the elements of Sayer's philosophical anthropology. Humans as inherently social beings, the centrality of dependence and caring relationships, the importance of solidarity and fellow-feeling, as well as cultural variability and creativity. The ability to form commitments, too, can be understood in terms of prolonged dependency and caring relationships, but my alternative sketch using the idea of an ecologically embedded mode of social life adds the significance of commitments not just to other humans but also to other living beings and objects, as manifested in artworks and craft skills, as well as to places. It is notable how this is expressed in peoples' desires for the disposal of bodies after death: the practices of scattering ashes in a beloved place, or of a body next to the resting place of a partner in life. As John O'Neill argues, recognizing the importance close friends and family have in our lives:

Similar claims can be made with respect to relationships to places and non­human beings that matter in the lives of people.

(O'Neill 2017)

This view of humans, not just as embodied beings, closely related to other species, but as ‘active natural beings' who depend on continuous metabolism with the rest of nature, both for survival and for the development of their full human capacities also gives some evolutionary grounding for other human attributes. These include the meaning and emotional significance of bodily interaction with external nature - in fashioning artefacts, creation ofartworks and, possibly, physically engaging with wider surroundings: running, walking, climbing - as well as studying and contemplating (‘sitting and staring'). These physical capacities and the cognitive and emotional skills and satisfactions that go with them are evolved features of our species. The psychoanalyst Sally Weintrobe (2013) has drawn on other sources to make the case that ‘loving nature is an ordinary and natural part of human nature’. A pervasive hierarchical view of human motivation (attributed to Maslow (1970)) places aesthetic need and love of nature as secondary cultural acquisitions, which come into importance only when more basic needs for food, drink, shelter and emotional security have been met. The alternative view that I argue for here suggests that these ‘self-realization’ needs may rather be fundamental features of human nature, deeply rooted in our evolutionary prehistory. Similarly with the need for meaningful work, and the special delight taken in the development of practical skills:

Craftsmanship is often equated with precision but I think there is more to it. I feel it is more important to have a long and sympathetic hands-on relationship with materials. A relaxed, humble, ever-curious love of stuff is central to my idea of being an artist.

(Perry 2011: 169)