Integration and Disintegration during the Revolutionary Cycle
Two long-term processes developed in parallel fashion throughout the vast Spanish Empire from the late eighteenth century to the 1820s: the collapse of Spanish sovereignty in America and the development of a new colonial cycle in the Antilles (Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Spanish part of the island of Santo Domingo) and the Philippines.
These two sides of the coin reflect less the disintegration of the empire than tensions arising from forced integration, excessive demands by the metropolis, and demands by the colonies that were disregarded. In general, colonists' demands were not limited to fiscal and economic issues; rather, they were the result of the partial modification of the imperial institutional framework, which upset long-standing arrangements and added to the administrative impediments to the Creoles' access to the center of government. The late-eighteenth-century state was both effective and intrusive in its regulatory capacity and its use of social and racial classifications (i. e., peninsular vs. Americans, people of European or African descent, mulattoes and free colored people; people with or without legitimate origins, etc.). Those distinctions could also work inversely, for instance through the use of royal “pardons” (gracias al sacar) for having been born with mixed blood or from illegitimate parents. All in all, there was considerable tension from below.And yet, the empire did not commence an inevitable decline in the second half of the eighteenth century. Instead, it began splitting off in various directions as old mechanisms of imperial stability could not easily be replaced. Neither demography nor economic history point toward a systemic crisis, although it is true that there were striking contrasts among regions and sectors. As we have seen, the first serious conflict grew out of the implementation of a more efficient fiscal system.
In the medium run, fiscal pressures undermined the social equilibrium and intensified competition between the royal treasury and American vested interests of traders, landowners, tribute-paying Amerindians, and intensified competition between Creoles and peninsulares in the administration and in privileged economic circles. In that sense, the transformation of the empire toward (defensive) warfare in the Caribbean, the Pacific, the Brazilian frontier, and the Thirteen Colonies signaled the end of the old empire, the end of the flexibility and authority as a tool of governance.[2292] At this point, authority sought to stifle flexibility at any cost, a dangerous policy pervaded by the sense of urgency that had prevailed since 1763. The new political entity—comprising new militias, revived plantation slavery, fiscal monopolies, and “free trade” centered on oligopolistic control of ports and sectors linked to commerce on both sides of the Atlantic (with Cadiz in the lead)—was a far cry from an older world of unwritten alliances.These modifications of colonial policy did not change the underlying foundations of colonial loyalty. But the last decades of the eighteenth-century were marked by frequent social conflict and the definition of new colonial identities that would be the origin of the final crises of the empire. These conflicts were very diverse. Some were caused by fiscal measures that affected certain privileged groups through increased consumer prices, the forced purchase of European products, or labor obligations. This financial strain was what provoked the 1765 revolt in Quito against a new liquor tax and the revolt of the comuneros in New Granada in 1781 against fiscal monopolies and new taxes on sugar and other regional raw materials. It also was responsible for the large-scale uprising in the Andes the following year, when the Quechua and Aimara rediscovered their long-dormant ability to mobilize. These conflicts were motivated by increased indigenous tribute and sales taxes but they also pointed toward more complex social arrangements.
In some cases, which could even be extended up to the Mexican revolt of 1810, they led to largescale uprisings of non-Europeans peoples, both indigenous groups and slaves. However, their leaders failed in the attempt to win the support of local elites and ended up as victims of fierce repression by Spanish imperial forces and their Creole and peninsular allies.It was a commonplace of the times to describe the Spanish Empire in terms that had little to do with notions of political representation and equality before the law, the ideology found in the North Atlantic after the independence of the Thirteen Colonies. In Enlightenment debates concerning the nature of European societies, Spain and its world, especially Spanish America, occupied the bottom rung.[2293] This perception was strengthened during the nineteenth century and intensified with the Spanish American War and the loss of the Antilles and the Philippines in 1898, which exemplified the ideological struggle against the Spanish world. But a linear interpretation of a declining empire omits several basic questions, several of which have recently been raised. To what degree was the universal language of rights and representation, underlying the American and French revolutions, also projected onto societies of the Hispanic world? To what degree was the ideological response to the crisis of the monarchy a general impulse toward political change? And how were these processes split into two distinct possibilities: preservation of imperial integrity or secession of the colonies, the latter process initially taking on both republican and monarchical forms but ending up entirely republican?
The first question is key for understanding the nature and outcome of the secession movements. The crisis, which had been visible since the end of the eighteenth century, required an alternative to monarchical legitimacy and the imperial ethos as such, particularly after the French and North American cases revealed that monarchical empires rested on unstable foundations.
At this point, the recent past mattered a lot. The collapse of the old order was preceded by two superimposed crises: the growing distance between Creoles (who proudly defined themselves as “Americans” instead of as Spaniards or Europeans) and peninsular Spaniards in America; and deep resentment by the popular classes over growing state intrusion, generally in the form of excessive “caste” distinctions as a means for enforcing increasingly harsh social and fiscal policies.[2294] The first of these crises grew out of the sacrifices imposed upon colonial groups and their gradual exclusion from administrative posts, while the second was the result of labor, taxation, and consumer policies predicated on social distinctions which determined who had to pay and, sometimes, how much. Together they constituted the basis for the explosion of particular (sectional) interests in the heart of the oldest and largest European Empire in the Atlantic. For many years, excessive insistence on the empire's archaic nature and its lack of economic freedom has prevented us from truly grasping the breadth of that experiment to create a unitary society, a Catholic community, bound by loyalty to the Crown. That experiment did not preclude—on the contrary—segregation of those deemed inappropriate for this new society, which explains the secular use of the panoply of procedures associated with limpieza de sangre toward Jews, Protestants, illegitimate children, and others with impure origins. This was “modern Spain's lexicon of blood,” used in the absence of any other classification system.[2295] To transform that unitary society of unequal members into something different, to modify that fluid amalgam and make it a society of citizens (as averred explicitly by the Spanish Constitution of 1812)—that was, indeed, a Herculean task.In this context, the collapse of monarchical legitimacy after Napoleon's “kidnapping” of the Spanish royal family triggered an enormous crisis, as a result of which only appeals to national sovereignty could guarantee ties between varied and distant societies.
Once news of the event reached America, the leaders of the upper and middle classes, among whom the distinction between American Spaniards and European Spaniards was always an issue, took the initiative.[2296] In some places, such as Rio de la Plata and Venezuela, past events pushed things toward open secession, though in the rest of the continent an uneasy loyalty to the metropolis reigned for a while. That was the case in the two great historical viceroyalties, New Spain and Peru, where imperial control remained effective enough until 1822 and 1824, respectively.Loyalty by Americans and Filipinos was encouraged from the start by promises of general imperial reforms by a center that was very weak in 1808-1809 and needed financial assistance from the colonies and from the British. Starting in 1810, the promises were kept as Spain guaranteed equality for the colonies in the refurbished monarchy. As had been the case in similar processes in North America and the French world, the key point of the reforms was not so much the elimination of colonial servitude as it was the establishment of effective political representation. In the old empire, representation of colonial subjects had always been rejected. The proposal by the territories that assumed authority to form a single representative assembly (the Cortes) was unprecedented. That endeavor was the outcome of an outdated constitutional tradition and competition by Napoleon and his Spanish supporters in Bayonne (France), and the example of the Atlantic revolutions. When the Cortes met in Cadiz under British protection, it appeared that reconstruction of the empire along conservative lines was assured, pending only the outcome of an international war which, in 1812, appeared to be tipping toward the anti-French alliance. But competition between Spaniards and Americans, along with Haitian and British intrusion and the insurrections of Venezuelans, Chileans, and Rio de Plata, made any such solution almost impossible.
Today we know more about the causes behind the rivalry between Spanish and American (and Filipino) representatives at what was the largest elected assembly in the history of the empires.[2297] Debates in Cadiz centered on two issues: the nature of representation and the form the new liberal monarchical state should take. Demands for legislative pluralism and representation in America, usually within the former boundaries of the audiencias, colonial courts of law that were the empire's political space par excellence, indicated who would have the ability to transform these societies through legislation. The second set of thorny issues followed from the first: suffrage and elections. These would determine the degree to which the political system would be open to dominant social forces. The contest between united sovereignty and legislative pluralism was resolved in favor of the former after a long battle, resulting in the 1812 Constitution and legislation. Throughout this ideological battle, the Americans were accused again and again of wanting disaggregation along the lines of North America, evoking the specter of federalism. The second debate concerned who would dominate the future legislative chamber, the center and guide of the Crown's new political architecture. Political equality between metropolis and colonies, as in the French constitutions of 1793 and 1795, made the number of (free) male inhabitants over the age of 25 critical. Given the impossibility of ensuring peninsular parliamentary majorities in the future, the constituent Cortes, which had been elected under different criteria, imposed a clear separation between nationality and citizenship, excluding mixed-blood people known as castas pardas (afrodescendants) from the latter. Spanish liberals, doing their best to increase divisions among the Americans (Cubans favored exclusion while New Spain was radically opposed), tried to undermine the likely political majority of Americans by introducing controversial phenotypic criteria. Nevertheless, despite some doubts, the peninsulares themselves admitted that local citizenship had a historical legitimacy that could not be denied without undermining Spanish sovereignty as such.
The debates in Cadiz and again at the liberal Cortes of 1820-1823 definitely divided American societies and undermined a liberal consensus, favoring those (and their international allies) who wished for separation. Attempts to restore military rule during the absolutist interregnum of Ferdinand VII (1814-1820), one of which (led by Pablo Morillo y Morillo) was partially successful, further eliminated any chance of an empire-wide solution. The collapse of negotiations in 1822 with Mexico and Peru, and the defeat of the royal army in Peru in Junin and Ayacucho between August and December 1824, put an end to the prospect of maintaining the unity of the Empire.
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