Japan's ‘Monroe Doctrine' for East Asia

The most important result of Japan’s new policy was that from 1933 it shifted towards espousing the idea that it should establish its own ‘Monroe Doctrine’ for East Asia. This arose out of the belief that the foundation of China’s antagonism towards Japan was its reliance upon and manipulation by the Western Powers.

It was therefore held that if Japan limited Western activities in the region, China could be persuaded to co-operate, and that this would pave the way for the development of regional prosperity under Japanese leadership. The clearest exposition of this view came in the Amau statement of 18 April 1934, when the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Eiji Amau, expounded these ideas to the press. There was, of course, a sizeable pan-Asian element in these sentiments, but in addition there was a clear economic rationale. In a world in which the major Powers were retreating into their own economic blocs, and where Japanese exports, such as cotton textile goods, were the subject of economic discrimination, Japan was keen to establish its own trade bloc in East Asia. The increasing trade rivalry between Japan and the European colonial Powers in South and South-East Asia from 1932 to 1936, which was caused by the increased competitiveness of Japanese goods after the devaluation of the yen in late 1931, only helped to fuel this sentiment.

Monroe Doctrine

The doctrine declared by President James Monroe in 1823 in which he announced that the United States would not tolerate intervention by the European Powers in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere.

The problem, however, for Foreign Minister Koki Hirota was that he was not allowed to pursue this policy unhindered, for the army had its own rationale for supporting a bloc economy, which differed from that of the Foreign Ministry. The army saw China as a vital source of raw materials for the achievement of autarky, which was now considered more desirable than ever as a result of the rising tensions with the Soviet Union along Manchuria’s borders with Outer Mongolia

and Siberia.

Indeed, such was the level of hostility within Japan that as early as 1932 the army minister, General Sadao Araki, began to talk openly of a ‘year of crisis' coming in 1936, when preparations for war with the Soviets would be completed. In this situation the army soon grew impatient with the slow progress made by Hirota in weaning the Nanjing government away from its reliance on the West. In addition, it had serious doubts about whether such a policy stood any chance of success, for it believed that Jiang Jieshi was not negotiating with Japan sincerely, but only in order to gain time. The army therefore pursued its own China policy, which often conflicted with that of Hirota. As early as 1933—34 the Kwantung Army, in order to expand Japanese influence and pre-empt the Soviets, supported forces in Inner Mongolia seeking independence from China. In 1935 it went much further and took measures in the summer and autumn to establish autonomy for the five provinces of northern China, thus undermining Hirota's efforts and heightening Sino-Japanese tensions.

Still fearing the prospect of war and concentrating on the extinction of the CCP, Jiang reluctantly acquiesced to the Japanese army's demands, but this was to be the last act of his ‘non-resistance' policy, which had only ever been designed to appease the Japanese for as long as his domestic position remained weak and there was no chance of foreign support. In 1935—36 conditions began to change and make resistance possible. One key development was the strengthening of the Nanjing government. In 1934 Jiang's German-trained army drove the CCP out of its Jiangxi stronghold, forcing it to engage in the Long March to Shaanxi province. While the fortitude shown in this event by the CCP would become part of party mythology, in the short term its main effect was to cripple the party and thus reduce its challenge to Nanjing's authority. In addition, it appeared that the modernization policies that the GMD had pursued since taking power were finally paying off.

For example, the Nanjing government began to grow financially stronger, particularly after the successful introduction of a new currency in the autumn of 1935. This change in political and economic fortunes meant that when, in 1935—36, the humiliation in north China led to a ‘National Salvation Movement' clamouring for an end to appeasement and for resistance against Japanese aggression, Jiang was able to risk toughening his policy towards Japan, even though he felt these calls to be premature.

In addition, Jiang's fortunes were changing on the international front. In August 1935, owing to the Soviet Union's fear of Japanese attack, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern called for a united front in China to resist Japan. Against the will of the CCP, within which Mao had now emerged as the dominant figure, the Comintern announced that Jiang had to be included in this ‘united front' as he was the only truly national figure in the country, and therefore resistance against Japan could not work without him. To reinforce this policy, the Soviet Union promised its support if the Nanjing government found itself at war with Japan. At the same time, Britain and the United States also appeared to be taking a greater interest in China, seeing its market as a valuable spur to their own economic recovery. Jiang therefore could take comfort from the hope that, if resistance did provoke Japan, he might be able to garner support from some of the major Powers.

Jiang's tougher stance first manifested itself in the autumn of 1936 when, after a number of incidents involving attacks on Japanese nationals and property, he rejected the usual litany of demands that issued from Tokyo. However, he still wished for the eradication of the CCP before engaging upon a policy of full resistance, and in early December 1936 flew to Xi'an to goad Zhang Xueliang, now the commander in Shaanxi, to pursue the campaign against the still weak CCP Zhang, however, believed that full resistance against Japan was long overdue.

He therefore responded to these exhortations by taking Jiang prisoner and, with Soviet and CCP backing, refused to release him until he had undertaken to resist Japan and end the civil war in China. Jiang had no choice but to comply. The Xi'an incident marked the point of no return for Jiang, for now he was publicly committed to resist Japan. All it would take would be another incident and a conflict with Japan was assured.

At first, however, it appeared that the clouds of war were receding, for major changes were under way in Japan. After a failed coup by a group of disaffected officers in February 1936, those within the army who sought to build a ‘national defence state', such as Ishiwara Kanji, the head of the operations section of the army general staff, became more powerful. This group had come to believe that the confrontational policy towards China practised by the Kwantung Army was counter-productive and that it distracted Japan from preparing to meet the Soviet challenge. They therefore sought to rebuild Sino-Japanese relations, while endeavouring at home to promote greater state control over industry. In June 1937 the prospects for this new direction appeared favourable with the appointment of Prince Fumimaro Konoe as prime minister. Konoe sympathized with the army, but at the same time was well placed to reconcile Japan's financial and industrial elite to further rearmament.

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Source: Best Antony. International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. Routledge,2008. — 638 p.. 2008

Japan's ‘Monroe Doctrine' for East Asia

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