Mobilisation Schemes in the Estate System

The security of estates often depended heavily on local families, and absentee proprietors were often quite reluctant to evict aggressive residents if they were deemed useful for the overall control of an estate.

That absentee proprietors often relied heavily on local strongmen in the management of their estates does not mean, however, that local conflicts necessarily revolved around such warriors or warrior-like characters.

It is well known that the military leaders mobilised warriors primarily through promises of rewards, and only secondarily through threats of reper­cussions for failing to report for duty.^[408] The prospects of reward were so integral to the motivation of warriors that one warrior apparently had no scruples in admitting that ‘the way of the bow and arrow is to do what is worthy of reward’.^[409] Fame seems also to have been a common motivation, but physical rewards stand out as the most pertinent reason for warrior mobilisation in times of war throughout the medieval period. However, the reward-for-military-service system was far from limited to the vertical relationship between the shogunate and the warriors. The reward system seems also to have been deeply integrated into the estate system, even where no shogunate warriors were present. Let us therefore look more closely at a few examples of how estate defence was organised and mobilised and how rewards were meted out.

From an official in the Toji Estate Yugeshima in lyo province in 1340, we have an interesting account of how the defence was organised in practice.

We have no way of knowing for certain who these ‘dozens of fighting men’ were, but they should probably be seen as the upper levels of the village communities in the area, and they included able men of some social standing and martial training. Some of them were probably outsiders from other estates in the area and it shows that estate defences did not rely solely on their own fighting forces but could also in some cases call on assistance from a much wider network.^[412] As a mediator and coordinator, the proprietor played a key role in local conflicts over water rights and other managerial issues, but was also a unifying power in the defence of a group of estates.

The Yugeshima document furthermore mentions that, after the attack, testimonies would be taken from the residents and submitted to the temple investigators in expectation of rewards or other compensation.^[413] Accordingly, the residents did not engage in battle only to protect their families and belongings during the attack; they were also acting as the first line of defence on behalf of the proprietor, who would reward them for their services. If estate residents did not respond to a mobilisation order from the manager of the estate, on the other hand, they would in some cases be punished for their negligence.^[414]

As we saw above, the rules of how to engage invading forces were clearly spelled out to the estate manager in Yugeshima, but a case sixteen years earlier in the estate provides us with a very concrete example of how private initiative could work in the protection scheme of the estate: ‘When several hundred mounted warriors, led by bandits from the Sanuki province...

The military provisions collected by Shoyo should probably not be taken simply to refer to the part of the crops and other revenues from the estate used to feed his army, but also a part of the revenue used as payment and reward for the aiding force. If we compare with the regulations mentioned earlier from the estate, we can put together the following chain of events. The estate was attacked by a large force of armed men. Apparently the managers in the estate were not successful in organising the defence and in beating back the enemy, since Shoyo took the initiative although he was not an appointed official in the estate but probably a local strongman with considerable local status and legitimacy. Using revenues which had been collected and stored to be shipped to the proprietor at a later date to feed and compensate a fighting unit, he managed to collect enough men to defeat the invaders and chase them away. Immediately after the fight, a report on the events was written and sent to the proprietor in the capital, who dispatched a delegate to verify the story on location. The amount of provisions collected by Shoyo would be calculated and included in the budgets of the temple. Finally, rewards would be meted out for outstanding military service.

His military exploits were not ignored by Toji, who subsequently rewarded him handsomely by appointing him to a lucrative administrative position in the estate. Shoyo took the initiative and mobilised the residents in the estate and was rewarded for his efforts. Yet the absentee proprietors were not always pleased with officials who were too active, as the following example of a violent conflict in Oyama-no-sho in Tamba province will show.

Around 1312, a leading Toji administrator by the name of Genso was relieved of his position in the temple, but as we also saw previously with Tarumi Shigemasa, his degradation did not go down well. Going rogue and becoming a bandit, he gathered a gang of armed followers, and he started collecting revenues from a number of the temple’s estates.^[416] Some time in the winter of 1315 /16, Genso and his men also attacked the estate of Oyama-no-sho, where it came to a violent confrontation with armed residents.^{[417] [418]} One of the residents in the estate, Fujiwara Ieyasu, called for reinforcements from outside the estate in order to fight off Genso’s forces.⁵⁹ leyasu seems to have been successful in chasing away Genso’s forces, and the battle in Oyama-no-sho is the last we hear of Genso. Based on his resolute actions and initiative in the fight against Genso, Fujiwara Ieyasu asked for a reward for his loyal services to the proprietor. However, against all expectations, his request was flatly refused. On the contrary, he had his title of ‘local leader’ revoked.^[419] That leyasu was denied the anticipated reward for his loyalty and on the contrary was punished for his actions may at first glance seem odd. After all, he had fought off a group of invaders and prevented the estate from being laid waste without wasting time on waiting for directions from the temple.

Some clues to the motivation of the temple in denying the claim of leyasu can be found in the text from the Yugeshima Estate discussed above.

As we can see from these examples, residents in private estates were far from meek and powerless victims of violent predators from the outside, and recourse to violence does seem to have been an integral part of daily life in many estates. The mobilisation of estate residents in the case of attacks from armed groups should therefore not be seen as oppressive policies of either absentee proprietors or their local representatives. Villagers were the first and primary targets in the case of such attacks and they had a deep interest in maintaining and supporting this mobilisation structure. Not only could they hope for financial stress-relief and/or military aid from the proprietor, but a powerful lord could also embody a legitimacy to use armed force in disputes over fields and wastelands.^[421] The symbolic value of a nominal or real proprietorship by one of the great temples or aristocratic families played a decisive role in this process, where villagers engaged in violent negations with neighbours over rights to resources.

The proprietor and his deputies furthermore acted as a unifying element around which the community could rally in times of crises or for the organisation of large collective projects. If the balance for some reason or other was disrupted, or if the mutual trust started to wear off, the whole system of mutual dependency threatened to collapse.^[422] This is well illustrated by the conflict in the Hiranodono Estate discussed above, where the residents of the estate claimed on multiple occasions to be targets of violent raids from neighbouring estates. While this in many cases would have made the pro­prietor, in this case Toji, initiate the formation of a militia or other defensive units in cooperation with deputies or other local leaders, this did not happen in Hiranodono. On the contrary, soon after the initial attacks we find Toji and the residents in a bitter exchange of accusations and threats. While the residents on the one hand claimed that they would be unable to secure the deliverance of dues to the temple if the attacks were not stopped, Toji's estate manager accused the residents of rebellious acts and using the attacks as an excuse to enrich themselves at the cost of the temple.^[423]