The twice-promised land

The First World War had a profound impact on Palestine. Economically, it almost destroyed the agricultural sector through the Ottoman army's confiscation of food, the conscription of the fellaheen (peasants), and a European blockade on the ports, which prohibited the import of grain.

As a result, the population was on the brink of starvation. Politically, Palestine's competing nationalist movements were both harshly suppressed through sweeping arrests, the expulsions of foreign Jews and the execution of some Arab nationalists. Yet, while the population in Palestine suffered greatly, Arab nationalist and Zionist leaders outside Palestine were able to strengthen their respective territorial claims as a result of British alliance policy.

The Ottomans' entry into the war in November 1914 on the side of Germany resulted in two independent yet inextricably linked developments. First, it provided an opportunity for both Arabs throughout the Middle East and the Zionists in Palestine to shake off Ottoman control. Second, it pitted Britain against the Ottomans in the Middle East, initiating a British search for allies. This search culminated in a number of secret agreements with the Russians, Italians and French on the future of the Ottoman territories in the event of an Entente victory. The most important such agreement was the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement which mapped out British and French zones of control. It also resulted in agreements with the Arabs and with the Zionists, known as the Hussein— McMahon correspondence and the Balfour Declaration.

see Documents 5.1 and 5.2

The Hussein—McMahon correspondence consisted of a set of letters in 1915 and 1916 between the British high commissioner in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon, and Sharif Hussein, head of the Hashemites and the guardian of the holy places in Mecca and Medina on the Arabian peninsula.

Sharif Hussein's requests for British military aid to help the Arabs rid themselves of the Turks preceded the outbreak of the war, but had then been rejected as the Ottomans were still considered a friendly power and necessary for maintaining the European balance. Britain's interests in Hussein's plans, however, changed once it declared war on Turkey. The British now believed that Hussein might be able to inspire an Arab revolt which would undermine the Turks, stretch their resources and divert them from threatening Britain's link to the rest of its empire, the Suez Canal. This change of interest laid the foundation for the Hussein—McMahon correspondence, which ultimately contained the British promise of Arab independence in return for their support against the Ottomans. The Hussein-McMahon correspondence was not a formal treaty in any sense. Its lack of formality, however, was not the main problem. Rather, it was the territorial ambiguity and its implicit definition of ‘Arabness’.

Hashemites

The family of the Sharifs of Mecca who trace their descent to the Prophet Muhammad.

Document 5.1

Letter from McMahon to Sharif Hussein, 24 October 1915

... it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their [HMG’s] behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction:

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif of Mecca.

Source: Reich (1995, pp. 19-25)

The territory to be given to the Arabs thus explicitly excluded portions of what became Lebanon and Syria but made no reference to either Palestine or Jerusalem. Thus it is not surprising that the Arabs believed Palestine would be part of their national territory.

Consequently, when the British after the end of the war claimed that Palestine had been excluded, the Arabs felt bitterly betrayed. This was especially so as Hussein’s campaign had contributed significantly to the British war effort — first, through the seizure of the Red Sea port of Aqaba, which opened the way for attacking Ottoman forces in Palestine from the south-east, and, second, through encouraging the Arab uprising in the northern provinces towards the end of the war. Hussein thus believed he had upheld his end of the deal honourably, while the British had not only failed to uphold theirs, but had also promised Palestine as a home to the Jews.

If the First World War provided the opportunity for Arab nationalists to push for independence through a military alliance with the British, it also provided the opportunity for the Zionists to obtain international recognition of their aspirations in Palestine. In 1917 the war in Europe started to go badly for the Entente and once again the British began to explore alliances to shift the balance of power in their favour. The Zionist movement had already been involved in the war through the Zion Mule Corps attached to the British forces at Gallipoli and several Jewish battalions attached to General Allenby’s forces in Palestine, but up to this point it was considered a marginal player. This situation, however, was soon to change, for the British prime minister, David Lloyd George, and the foreign secretary, Arthur James Balfour, came to see support for the Zionist movement as a means of preventing Russia from exiting the war after the February Revolution, of undermining Germany from within and of galvanizing the American war effort.

The key Zionist player in the formation of this alliance was a chemistry lecturer at Manchester University by the name of Chaim Weizmann. A Russian-born British subject and an eloquent Zionist spokesman, Weizmann had already come into contact with and lobbied a number of British politicians prior to the war, including Arthur Balfour, whom he had first met during the 1906 general election campaign.

The notion of a Jewish state pushed by Weizmann gained prominence among British politicians owing to his importance as a scientist involved in the synthesizing of acetone, which was essential for making explosives. Weizmann, through his diplomatic skills and his personal contacts, was able to obtain from the British what had eluded Herzl in all his years of futile diplomacy with the Ottomans: an international, in this case British, guarantee for a Jewish home in Palestine. This guarantee was embodied in a letter from Balfour to the prominent British Zionist Lord Rothschild and is commonly known as the Balfour Declaration.

Document 5.2

The Balfour Declaration, 2 November 1917

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status of Jews in any other country.

Source: Reich (1995, p. 29)

As in the Arab case, the land promised to the Jews had no specified territorial boundaries and the notion of a ‘national home' was also vague. Even more important for the development of the conflict in Palestine was the fact that the same land — Palestine — seemed to have been given to both Jews and Arabs for what by now had become mutually exclusive state-building projects.

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Source: Best Antony. International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. Routledge,2008. — 638 p.. 2008

The twice-promised land

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