INDEX

Abdul Rahman, Tunku 179, 180, 181 Ackerman, B. 59, 63

Amarsanaa, J. 150

Ambedkar, B. R. 345, 358, 359, 360, 361

Amnesty International 426

Aquino, C. 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 237, 242, 243

Aquino, N.

Arato, A. 416

Austin, J. L. 346, 352

Baabar (Baterdenin Batbayar) 140 Bagabandi, N. 154

Bangladesh

background 364-6 caretaker governments 377-9 constitution-making 366-9 Drafting Committee 367, 368 Proclamation of Independence 366-7

design 369-71

Election Commission 371, 376-7 foundational principles 363, 364 democracy 369-70 nationalism 370 secularism 371 socialism 370

judiciary 371

unmaking 372, 382 bipartisan and competitive authoritarianism 375-6 foundational principles, tearing

up 373-5

marginalisation of the judiciary 380-82

parliamentary system switching to presidential system 372-3 Barker, E. W. 207, 208, 218

Basu, D. D. 353

Bennagen, P. 244-5

Bhattarai, Justice 425

Boldbaatar, J. 141-2

Borwornsak Uwanno 324, 325

Cambodia

causes 248 economic factors 255-7 political factors 248-54 ‘pride and suffering' 248 social factors 254-5

co-prime minister system 261 constitution-making 277 implementation 273-6

check and balance mechanism 273-4

Constitutional Council 274-6 judicial independence 274

Paris Peace Agreement 248, 252, 253-4, 257-9, 270-71

political factors 248 external factors 252-4 internal factors 249-52

process

adoption and promulgation 267-8 Constituent Assembly, debate in 263-4

Constituent Assembly, establishment of 261

consultation with His Majesty NORODOM Sihanouk 262-3 establishment of UNTAC 259-60 founding principles 257-9 involvement of the international

community 264-6 Permanent Constitution-Drafting

Commission 261-2 public participation 266-7 universal election (1993) 260-61 substance 268-72

culture and tradition 271-2 freedom of religion and belief 271 monarchy 271, 272

causes 4

see also individual countries

Chan Sek Keong 209-10, 212, 216, 217 Chang, Wen-Chen 429-30

Chautari, M.

Chen Yun 81

Chiang Kai-shek 71-2, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78

Chimid, B. 150

China (1946 Constitution)

background 55-6

causes 56-9

constitutional court 73-8 economic decline 57

five-power constitution 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 72

foreign constitutions, impact of 62, 63, 67 government structure 64 implementation 73-8 life expectancy 58 national insecurity 57

process 59-66 state-failure 56-9

State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 290

substance 66-72

Three Principles of the People 64, 66, 67 unequal treaties 57, 58 unwritten constitution 61

China (1982 Constitution)

completion and adoption 91-5 final modifications 93-5

Constitutional Revision Committee

(CRC) 83, 84, 85

drafting process 83-5, 97 exploratory phase 86-8 influencing other constitutional frameworks 96

initiating process of constitutional revision

political context 80-83

‘National Constitution Day' holiday 97 overlapping transformations 88-91 social legitimacy 97 subsequent amendments 96

Cho, J.-H. 120, 133

comparative constitutional law 1-2 constituent power 202, 312-13 constitution-making 2-3, 247

Asian models of

constitution-making 429-30 contextualising global constitution-making 430, 444

diffusion of constitution-making 433-6 coercive diffusion 434-5

mimetic diffusion 435

normative diffusion 435-6

models of constitution-making

436-44

democratic model 438-9

ethnic model 443-4

imperial model 436-8 military model 442-3 nationalist model 439-40 socialist model 440-42 waves of constitution-making

430-33

Cold War 432

collapse of the Soviet Union

432-3

decolonialization 432 early process of modernization

430-31

early twenty-first century 433 post-war constitutions 431-2 social revolutions 431

constitutionalism 159

colonialism, and 159-60 Crouch, M. 429, 442

Das, B. 357

De Silva, H. L. 387

democratic model of

constitution-making 438-9

Deng Xiaoping 81, 82, 83, 84, 87,

89, 90, 105, 110-12, 114-15

diffusion of constitution-making 433-6

coercive diffusion 434-5

mimetic diffusion 435 normative diffusion 435-6

durability of a constitution 175

Elster, J.

environmental constitutionalism

308-9

ethnic model of constitution-making

443-4

Fang Yi 93-4

Fernando, J. 181

functions of constitutions 200-201

Gandhi, I. 361

Garcia, E. 244

Go, J. 434 Gorbachev, M. 252 Guingona, S. 240

Guruswamy, M. 429

Halash, I. 156

Hassall, G. 432

Hegel, G. 201

Hickling, H. 213

Hong Kong

Basic Law 99-101, 113-15

drafting and consultation

institutions 102-5

processes 105-7, 114

implementation 114-15

major issues 107-13 demarcation of Central and SAR powers 108, 109, 111 political system 110-11, 112, 113 rule of law 108

Hu Qiaomu 85, 86, 87, 88

Hua Guofeng 80-81

Hun Sen 249-52

Hussey, A. 23

imperial model of constitution-making 436-8 implementation 4

see also individual countries

incrementalist approach to constitution-making 201 India

background 337

Constituent Assembly 339, 344-5, 346 declaration of Emergency (1975) 361 ‘deeply divided society' 339-40 Directive Principles of State Policy 348-9, 350, 355

exceptions 351-2, 355

freedom 351, 352, 355, 358 fundamental rights 351, 352, 353, 355, 356

historical context 343-6

justice as equity 340-41, 361 categorical sovereignty of 346-7, 348-50, 355

community over individual rights 356-8

institutional sovereignty of Parliament 351-5

legacy of mass resistance 361

Preamble of the Constitution 346-7

Sapru Report 356

scholarship on 337-9 universal adult franchise 359-61

Indian National Congress 341, 345,

346

Indonesia

amendment of the Constitution

172-3

authoritarian regimes 169, 170 background 157-9 colonialism 160-61, 164-9, 173 human rights 162-3, 171 implementation 169-71 integralist concept 158, 159, 162, 163, 165, 166, 173

Islam 167-8, 172

judiciary, restricting 170-71 liberal thinking, rejection of 162, 171 Meiji Constitution, and 165, 166 nationalist model 440

People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)

163, 165, 169, 170

process 161-4

Committee for the Preparation of Independence (PPKI) 161, 167

Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence (BPUPKI) 161, 162, 164-5, 167

Japan's influence 161, 162, 167 sacred document 172 separation of power 163 temporary character 167 transition to democracy 171-3

Iskandar, P.

Japan

Ashida amendment 19

causes 11-13

Potsdam Declaration 11

Chapter III. Rights and Duties of the People 19

Constitution Popularization Society

(CPS) 27

Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee (CPIC) 13

gender gap 9

implementation 25

ceremonies, events and education 27 legal reforms 26 public perception 28-30

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) goal of amendment of the Constitution 8

longevity of the Constitution 7, 8

Meiji Constitution 437

process 13-19

SCAP Draft 13-19

collecting foreign constitutions 15, 16 foreign experts on Japan 14, 15, 16 ‘Japanisation' of the SCAP Draft

17-19

plural stakeholders 16 public participation 17 substance

fundamental principles 20 government system 24-5 human rights 24 international cooperation 23 judicial review 24 pacifism 21-2 popular sovereignty 20-21 Preamble 20

war-based constitution-making model 7

women's rights 26-7

Jayabaya, King 168-9 Jayewardene, J. R. 389, 390

Jennings, I. 181, 184, 386, 387

Jo So-Ang 48

Kades, C. 23

Kang Damin 94

Karki, Chief Justice 425

Khmer Rouge 249, 250, 251, 252, 253,

254, 255, 260

Kim, C. H. 126

Kim Il Sung 119, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127,

128, 129, 130, 134

Kim Jong Il 131, 132, 134

Konoe, F. 11, 12 Kumarasingham, H. 178, 194 Kumaratunga, C. 401, 403

Lee Kuan Yew 204, 206, 207, 208, 209,

213, 216, 221

Lerner, H. 201

Locke, J. 348

Lundeejantsan, D. 141-2

MacArthur, D. 11, 12, 13, 16

Malaya

assessment of Constitution 194-6 background 176-8

constitutional conference 176-7 causes 178-9 controversial issues 183, 187 equality and Malay special privileges 187-8 fundamental rights 191-4 status of Islam as the official

religion 189-91

durability of the Constitution 177, 194-5, 196

Federation of Malaya Agreement (FMA) (1948) 178-9

non-autochthonous nature of the Constitution 185-6, 187, 194

process 179-81, 185, 195-6 Alliance Memorandum 184 consultation 183-4 following the Reid Commission's

Report 184-5 terms of reference 182-3

Reid Commission 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 185

social contract 184, 188

Marcos, F.

McIlwain, C. 159

Meechai Ruchuphan 325

Merieau, E. 330

military model of constitution-making 442-3 models of constitution-making 436-44

democratic model 438-9

ethnic model 443-4

imperial model 436-8 military model 442-3 nationalist model 439-40

socialist model 440-42

Mongolia

background 137-41

‘The New Generation' 139

causes 141-2, 155 economic aspects 143-4 intellectual framework 145-6 political aspects 142 social aspects 144-5 spiritual aspects 146

differences between the constitutions of 1960 and 1992 151-2

implementation 152-5, 156

legal system 149-50, 155-6

process 146-9

substance 156

Monzon, J. M. 160

Mujib, Sheikh 372, 373

Munoz Palma, C. 240

Myanmar

background 295

causes and process 295-9, 310

Cyclone Nargis 298

environment

environment as a constitutional

issue 305-9

intersectional status of the

environment 301-4 implementation 301, 306-9, 310 international legitimacy 299 military coup 293-4, 300, 309 military model of

constitution-making 442-3

National Convention 296, 297 referendum 297-8

State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 295, 296, 297, 298, 299

State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) 297

substance 299-301, 310

Narangerel, S. 146 nationalist model of

constitution-making 439-40

Nehru, J. 339, 354, 355

Nepal

causes 411-16

constituent assemblies 409, 410, 413,

416, 417-18, 419-20, 427 constitutional change and peace-making, relationship between 427 diverse society 413-14 High Level Political Committee

(HLPC) 418-19

identity politics 414 implementation 424-6

judiciary 425-6

social inclusion and representation

of marginalised groups

424-5

social rights 426

interim Constitution 415, 416

process 416-21

role of international actors 416-17 rejection of Constitution 409-10 substance 421-4

citizenship 423 judiciary 422-3

LGBTQ rights 423-4 organisation of power 421-2 system of government 421

Ngoc Son Bui 159-60

Norodom Sihanouk 249-52, 262-3

North Korea

April 15 th Literary Production Unit (LPU) 130

Constitution (1948) 120-23

inmin 12-3

substance 121-2

Constitution (1972) 123-4, 134 collectivism and state ownership

127

contextual understanding 124, 134-5

culture 130-31, 132 external and internal factors 118-19 ideology 124-6 revamping of the education system 128, 129, 130

socialist Constitution 123, 133-4 substance 124-7, 128, 129, 132-3 technology 126

cultural revolution 118, 119, 130-33, 134

Juche ideology 125, 126, 129 organisational life 132-3 perceptions of 117 rewriting history 127-8 ‘seed theory' 131-2 self-discovery process 119-20

Taean Work System 126

Three Revolutions 124 unification policy 122, 128

Peng Zhen 84, 90, 91, 92

Philippines

background 223-5

People Power Revolution 224

Basic Christian Communities

(BCCs) 226-7

causes 225-30

endurance of the Constitution 225

Family Code 243

gender equality 243 implementation 241-4 land reform 241-3

National Citizens Movement for Free

Elections (NAMFREL) 227 people power 226, 227, 228 process 230-37

Constitutional Commission 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235

franking privileges 233, 234 public hearings 230, 232, 233, 234 ratification 235-7

substance 237-41

direct participation 238 judiciary 239-40 socio-economic rights and goals 238-9, 245

wider representation 238 process 4, 176

see also individual countries

Qian Duansheng 85

Rau, B.

Regmi, Chief Justice 419

Reinsch, P. 61

Rhee Syngman 41, 43, 44, 49-50, 53, 54

Rousseau, J. J. 347-8

Saunders, C. 432, 433

Scheppele, K. L. 435 Selenge, K. 143 Shah, K. T. 360

Shidehara, K. 12-13

Singapore

1963 State Constitution 209, 210, 211,

216

amendments 219-20

background 197-200, 203-7 compulsory land acquisition 205-6 constituent power 219 continuity amid change 220 Independence of Singapore Agreement 199, 207-8

judiciary 218-19

Malaysia's Constitution and Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Act 210-11

pluralism 214-15

Proclamation of Singapore 216, 217,

220

Reprint of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 207

Republic of Singapore Independence Act (RSIA) 199, 205, 211-13 rule of law 218

substance 213-17

water agreements 215-16

Sinha, Chief Justice 381

Sirota Gordon, B. 14-16 socialist model of

constitution-making 440-42

Soekarno 157-8, 162, 167, 169, 170 Soepomo 158, 162, 163, 165-6

Son Sann 264

South Korea

‘April 19 Revolution' 54

causes 37-40

Constitutional Committee 51

context 34-7

features 44-5

constituent assembly 44 independent of foreign involvement 44-5 representation and legitimacy 45 founding constitution 33-4, 54 guiding principles 46-8 implementation 52-3 independence movement 35-6, 37 legacy 54 process 40-44

‘Kwon Seung-nyol Draft' 42

‘Yu Chin-O Draft' 42

substance

governing structure 49-51 historical acts 52 judicial review 51 rights and duties 48-9

Sovd, G. 151

sovereignty 341-2

Sri Lanka

13th Amendment to the Constitution

(1987) 398

19th Amendment to the Constitution

(2015) 399-400

20th Amendment to the Constitution

(2020) 400-401

background and context

Donoughmore Constitution

(1931) 384-5

Independence Constitution 385-7, 394, 405

republican constitution (1972) 387-8, 394, 405

bill of rights 387, 388, 394-6

Buddhism 397-8

constitutional reform (1995-2000)

401-3

constitutional reform (2016-2019)

403-4

current Constitution (1978) 389-93 drivers 389-90

key elements 391-2

process 390-91

electoral system 396

ethnic model 444 failure of transformative constitution-making 405-7 power-sharing and devolution of power 398-9, 402, 403 presidentialism 389, 390, 391, 392, 400-401

referendum 396

violence 393

state formation 201-2

substance 4

see also individual countries

Suharto 170

Sun Yat-sen 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66

Tadeo, J. 232

Thailand

background 311-12

causes 319-20

afterlife impact of 1997

Constitution 320-22 anti-establishment movements 320 binary-star scenario 320-22 military coups 320

constituent power 313 binary-star system 312, 318 liberal-democratic constituent power (LDCP) 313-15

Royal Constituent Power (RCP) 315-17

Democratic Regime with the King as Head of State (DRKH) 315, 316, 317, 335

implementation 333-5

Constitutional Court (CC) 333, 334, 335

military model 443

process 322 adoption 326-8 Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC) 323, 324, 325

draft preparation 323-5 interim constitution 322-3 legitimacy 322-3, 328-9 referendum 326-7

substance 330-33

amendments 332-3

co-opting and containing norms and institutions of the LDCP 330-32

foundational principle 330

Mixed Member Apportionment System (MMAS) 330-31

Thaksin Shinawatra 319, 320

Tingson, G. 233, 234

Vietnam

Committee for Management of State Capital (CMSC) 282, 290 constitutional and economic development 291

Land Use Rights Certificates (LURCs)

285

socialist model 441-2

State Capital Investment Corporation

(SCIC) 282, 289-90

state-owned enterprises (SOEs) background 280-82 discourse on SOEs in the constitution-making process 285-8

driving the constitutional-making process 282-5 implementation of the Constitution, and 289-90

state economic groups (SEGs)

281-2

substantive results relating to

SOEs 288-9

Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin) 284

waves of constitution-making 430-33

Cold War 432

collapse of the Soviet Union 432-3 decolonialization 432 early process of modernization 430-31

early twenty-first century 433 post-war constitutions 431-2 social revolutions 431

Xie Guansheng 72, 75, 76, 77

Ye Jianying 84, 86

Yu Chin-O 42, 47, 48, 50

Yu Haocheng 94

Yun, J.-I. 431

452

RYAN MARTINEZ MITCHELL

The current Constitution of the People's Republic of China is a document whose political importance is equalled by the ambiguity of its legal status. While much scholarship on the 1982 Constitution, especially in English, focuses on its lack of judicial enforceability - a doctrine first challenged and then reaffirmed in the course of the handling of the famous Qi Yuling case¹ - many other features of the Constitution and its relationship with the state order it undergirds are deserving of focused attention and comparative research. Recent work has begun to explore in detail, for example, the functionality of the Constitution as an integral, if still generally backgrounded, element in the legislative drafting process.²

Pursuit of a holistic analysis of the 1982 Constitution and its wide range of impacts outside of the courtroom would do well to begin with the process of its drafting and adoption. While unique in many respects, the episode of constitution-making that generated China's current constitutional order was in some ways typical of major moments of constitutional transition that occur outside of the context of state founding, revolution, or regime change. The 1982 Constitution's example shows that, even in the setting of a continuous state order and system of government, vast political, ideological, social, and economic trans­formations can be negotiated and codified via constitutional norms embodying new consensus views.³ Given its close link with the termination of Cultural Revolution-era policies and formation of the policy platform framing China's post-1978 ‘Reform Era', the drafting of the 1982 Constitution, often called the ‘Reform Constitution', has had major and lasting impacts.

¹ See, eg, Zhang Qianfan, ‘A Constitution without Constitutionalism? The Path of Constitutional Development in China' (2010) International Journal of Constitutional Law 8, 950-76.

² For a recent discussion, see Changhao Wei, ‘Reigning in Rogue Legislation' (2021) Made in China Journal, available at https://madeinchinajournal.com/2021/09/19/reining-in-rogue-legislation/

³ For some other accounts ofsuch constitutional transformation, see, eg, Bruce Ackerman, ‘The Living Constitution' (2006) Harvard Law Review 120, 1737-1812; Hsu Dau-lin, Die Verfassungswandlung (Berlin and Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1932).

² Refer to Jae Hyun Cho's ‘A Study on the Constitution History about the Background and Characteristics of North Korea's Constitution Amendment' (2018) 12 Study on the American Constitution 273 and Hee Kyung Suh's ‘A Comparative Study of Constitution Establishment in South and North Korea, 1947-1948' (2007) 6 Korean Political Science Review 41(2), 47-75.

BRYAN DENNIS G TIOJANCO

A few years before the dictator's men gunned him down in broad daylight, Ninoy Aquino foresaw the six attempted coups that many years later his widow Cory, as revolutionary Philippine president, would have to endure.^{* 1}

‘Look, you have a situation when Marcos falls,' he said.

‘The thing I can say is, the first guy that will come in will be blown out in six months. Then a second guy will come in and he'll be blown out in six months.'²

Ninoy was a fellow at Harvard and in exile from the Philippines at that time - the dictator's archrival studying waves of democracy at the centre Samuel Huntington directed.³ He had visited Iran and Nicaragua and studied Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala and had come to believe what Huntington and his colleagues believed: a revolution would unlikely beget a stable democracy.⁴ Juntas and communists would violently lurch the Philippines to and fro in its wake.⁵ Finding inspiration in the movie Gandhi, Ninoy planned to persuade the dictator Ferdinand Marcos to bring back democracy to the archipelago.⁶

¹ The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission (pursuant to RA No 6832) (Bookmark 1990) (hereinafter ‘Davide Report') 118-20.

²Quoted in Walden Bello, ‘Benigno Aquino: Between Dictatorship and Revolution in the Philippines' (1984) 6 Third World Quarterly 283, 308.

³ Mary Humes, ‘The Scholarly Life of a Leader' (The Harvard Crimson, 21 September 1983), avail­able at www.thecrimson.com/article/1983/9/21/the-scholarly-life-of-a-leader. See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1993) 13-26.

⁴ Sandra Burton, Impossible Dream: The Marcoses, The Aquinos, and the Unfinished Revolution (Warner Books, 1989) 15-16; Marian Courtney, ‘Filipinos Form Aquino Group' New York Times (18 September 1983), available at www.nytimes.com/1983/09/18/nyregion/filipinos-form-aquino- group.html. Huntington (n 3) 276; Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale University Press, 1971) 40-43.

⁵ Burton (n 4) 16

⁶ Mark Thompson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (Yale University Press, 1995) 112.

RATANA TAING

Constitution-making could be compared to the process of building a house. It needs experts, structural designs, materials, processes, work-art, time, and commitment. The house model expresses the sentiment of its owner; hence simi­larly a constitutional design shall express the common will of the citizens of a state. The constitution-making process could not exclude one nation’s historical and political experiences.¹ The process should be consistent with one nation’s values. Again, a constitution should be applicable and be beneficial to one nation’s inter­est, not just theoretical composed text.

A constitution is written by a small group - the elites of the nation, but it is applied overall by a big group - the people of a whole society. Therefore, the guar­anteeing of the gap of understanding between these two groups must be taken into consideration. The ideal scenario is that all groups should accept the core princi­ples enshrined in the constitution, which are beneficial to the nation’s interests. In order to maintain the groups’ acceptance and the nation’s interests, the entire constitution-making process should be democratic and transparent.

The constitution should be a great accomplishment for a nation and its people and be well promoted, protected, and fulfilled by all actors of that state. However, if the key actors are not able to implement its constitutional principles, a constitution is merely a written text. As a result, it is an obligation that all those actors achieve the main constitutional principles - a set of contractual principles stipulated in the constitution. To do so, it should be accepted that all the actors have a real commit­ment to this obligation.

Constitution-making in Cambodia shall also be consistent with those aforesaid concepts. This chapter will explore these points in the context of the making of the 1993 Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the sixth constitution of this

¹ HE IM Chhun Lim, President of the Constitutional Council, provided this point of view to the author in May 2021.

JONATHAN LILJEBLAD

On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, overthrew a democrati­cally elected civilian government, bringing the country back to its authoritarian past with the imposition of a new military junta.^{* 1} The Myanmar military coup incited mass unrest, with popular protests spanning all levels of the state, sectors of society, and areas of the country.² The Tatmadaw deployed increasing levels of violence and suppression to quell the protests, but such actions only served to incite resistance and harden opposition.³ The tensions have spurred the rise of armed conflict, with the military junta facing a growth of armed civil society groups, or People's Defence Forces, and a recommencement of historical hostilities with ethnic armed organisations (EAOs).⁴ The result is an increasingly intractable

¹Russell Goldman, ‘Myanmar's Coup Explained' New York Times (February 2021), available at www. nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html.

² Irrawaddy Staff, ‘Millions Expected to Join General Strike in Myanmar on Monday to Oppose Regime' (Irrawaddy, 21 February 2021), available at www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/millions-expected- to-join-general-strike-in-myanmar-on-monday-to-oppose-regime.html; Jen Kirby, ‘Myanmar's Pro-Democracy Protest Movement Is Strengthening' (Vox, 22 February 2021), available at www.vox.com/ 22295138/myanmar-protests-strike-coup-militar; United States Institute of Peace (USIP), ‘Myanmar in the Streets: A Nonviolent Movement Shows Staying Power' (United States Institute of Peace, 31 March 2021), available at www.usip.org/publications/2021/03/myanmar-streets-nonviolent- movement-shows-staying-power.

³Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Myanmar: Post-Coup Legal Changes Erode Human Rights' (Human Rights Watch, 2 March 2021), available at www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/02/myanmar-post- coup-legal-changes-erode-human-rights; S Strangio, ‘Myanmar Junta Arms Itself with Repressive New Laws' The Diplomat (15 February 2021), available at https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/ myanmar-junta-arms-itself-with-repressive-new-laws/; Irrawaddy Staff, ‘Under Martial Law, Myanmar Military Commanders Empowered to Issue Death Penalty' (Irrawaddy, 16 March 2021), available at www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/martial-law-myanmar-military-commanders-empowered-issue- death-penalty.html.

⁴ International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Myanmar's Coup Shakes Up Its Ethnic Conflicts' (International Crisis Group, 12 January 2022), available at www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/319- myanmars-coup-shakes-its-ethnic-conflicts; Irrawaddy Staff, ‘Ethnic Armed Groups United with