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Conflicted Cultural Memory

The preceding account helps to explain how the term “Banderite” has over time acquired different meanings. In Soviet accounts, it was applied to all wartime nationalists. With reference to southeastern Poland, it has been associated with armed resistance to deportations.

In the postwar period, it was used to designate the OUN(B), a minority political party known in the West among postwar Ukrainian emigre communities for its sectarian behavior. Finally, during the Euromaidan, the term “Banderite” was used by Russian media to describe the demonstrators. In response, the label was jokingly accepted in some circles as an anti-Soviet and anti-imperial act. Some symbols of wartime nationalism also appeared at this time, including the red-and-black flag and the salutation “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to Heroes!” The history of wartime resistance has also recently been treated in film and literature. Two popular novels, Oksana Zabuzhko’s Muzei pokynutykh sekretiv (Museum of Abandoned Secrets, 2009) and Maria Matios’s Slolodka Darusia (Sweet Darusia, 2005), por­tray the underground without reference to any particular party, political platform or ideology, but as a movement combating evil oppressors, both German and Soviet.24 Zabuzhko’s book describes how memories are retrieved in later generations through documents, photographs, fragmen­tary recollections, children’s folklore, and personal intuitions. Members of the UPA are portrayed as courageous, uncompromising fighters for independence, and are contrasted with the ineffectual and compromised generation of the 1960s and 1970s. This image of a heroic underground struggle has now penetrated popular consciousness.

Different memories of the war have continued to clash. The experience of resistance fighters has found itself juxtaposed with the victimhood of civilian populations—Jews in the case of the Holocaust, Poles in the case of Volhynia, and Ukrainians in the case of deported populations.

An awareness that victim and perpetrator might coexist in one group or even one biography has compelled scholarly studies to develop more refined conceptual and analytical tools capable of examining these complexities. Although in the current polarized debate, the OUN and UPA have often

been presented either as guilty parties without the right to inclusion in a narrative of suffering, or as legendary heroes, a better awareness of the wartime situation and more refined tools of analysis will no doubt lead to more nuanced accounts.

Despite the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement of the 1980s and 1990s, a campaign at the time among Polish army veterans and right-wing groups continued to blame Ukrainians for all crimes committed during the war. In 1983, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Wroclaw, Wincenty Urban, described the “refined methods” use by Ukrainians in torturing Poles during the war in “every village of Volhynia.” These, according to him, included “removing skin from faces, burning alive, driving stakes into ribs.” The text was widely circulated and the descriptions republished many times in popular literature. The scenes described could easily be taken literally by most readers because they recall the stereotype of the beastly Ukrainian popularized by Henryk Sienkiewicz’s Ogniem i miec- zem (With Fire and Sword, 1884-88). In 1990, Andrei Sheptytskyi, the leader of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in wartime Lviv, was described on Polish television as “the ideologist and spiritual leader of the OUN and UPA, who blessed the axes and wooden saws used as weapons in the fratricidal massacre throughout Podillia and Volhynia” (Isaievych et al. 2003, 49). By the mid-1990s, the number of Polish deaths was being reported in the Polish press as 500,000 and described as “the Polish holo­caust” (ibid., 50). Consumers of this imagery found it easy to assume that genocide had all along been the plan of Ukrainian nationalists. This was not simply because balanced scholarly studies were less easily available, but also because this kind of narrative aligned with the stereotype of the brutal Ukrainian peasant.

A political message was also attached to such accounts. It suggested that Ukrainians as a people were incapable of creating their own state, and therefore “remaining under Polish rule was their only chance of avoiding submission to their own bloody and ruth­less nature” (ibid., 51). The disparagement of the Ukrainian peasantry, of course, has a long history; it has been noted in Daniel Beauvois’s studies of the Polish aristocracy and in the “orientalization” of Ukrainians in modern Polish literature.25

Whereas German and Jewish wartime memory has since the 1970s undergone a significant institutionalization through academic discus­sions, educational programs and government policies, in Ukraine the attempt to develop a frank and uncensored memory of the war effectively only began after 1991. This reassessment of history has come up against already existing agendas and competing memory frameworks.

Notes

1. For a survey of recent literature on Ukrainian nationalism and memory poli­tics, see Andreas Umland and Yuliya Yurchuk, “Introduction: The Organi­zation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Post-Soviet Ukrainian Memory Politics, Public Debates, and Foreign Affairs,” Journal of Soviet and Post­Soviet Politics and Society 3.2 (2017): 115-125. For the two special sections on “Issues in the History and Memory of the OUN” published in the journal, see: 3.2 (2017): 115-290 and 4.2 (2018): 29-130.

2. For the Polish translation of his book, see Wiatrowycz (2013). For the response of several scholars to the first edition of the book, see “Forum” (2012). For more recent responses, see Cohen (2015); Shchur (2015); Coynash (2015a, 2015b); Motyl (2016); Portnikov (2016); Riabenko (2016); Shkandrij (2018). For an overview of the issues facing researchers who tackle the Volhynian events, see Zaiarniuk (2016) and Zashkilniak (2005).

3. For a study of anti-civilian violence by Soviet partisans, see Statiev (2014). Although the romanticized partisan myth remains intact in Russia, where archives remain closed or relevant documents have been weeded out, on the basis of documents in Ukraine’s archives, Statiev concludes that the violence was “routine, multi-faceted and most often sanctioned” (1528).

The popula­tion was plundered and “collaborators” tortured and killed in the most grue­some manner. There was no definition of collaboration, as frequently guilt was assumed (1541).

4. On 1 May 1943, for examples, in Lutsk, out of a population of 19,669, there were 10,838 Poles, 7,277 Ukrainians, and 584 Russians. In addition, there were 4,000 refugees who were escaping the violence in Polish colonies. Poles made up 80% of the administrative apparatus, and were perceived as systematically squeezing out Ukrainians from among translators, secretaries, and office staff (Bolianovskyi 2005, 87).

5. The minutes of two interrogations of Stelmashchuk from the 8-9 February 1945 are available online at the Elektronnyi arkhiv ukrainskoho vyzvolnoho rukhu (Electronic Archive of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement): http:// avr.org.ua/index.php/key/36204/?a=1. This archive also makes available Klym Savur’s written commands and other communications by the UPA. Ivan Katchanovski claims to have uncovered the minutes of another inter­rogation held on 28 February 1945 in which Stelmashchuk states: “In June 1945 the representative of the OUN ‘leadership’ ‘Klym Savur’ orally gave me secret directives from the central ‘leadership’ of OUN concerning the physi­cal destruction of the Polish population down to every last person every­where (poholovnom i povsemestnom) on the territory of western oblasts of Ukraine.” He then states that another secret directive from the leadership, also given verbally by Savur, required the “destruction of all Soviet prisoners of war on the territory of western oblasts of Ukraine,” and a third concerning the physical destruction of all “participants in the UPA who were of Rus­sian nationality.” He also claims knowledge of a fourth directive that came through the OUN’s SB (po linii SB) that “proposed the physical destruction of all members of families suspected of the pro-Soviet sympathies, including infants, women and the old” (Katchanovski 2014, 25). The document is sup­posedly from the Branch Archive of the Security Services of Ukraine in Kyiv (HDA SBU), Sprava 372, vol.

89, ark. 33). The truthfulness of this deposi­tion has been challenged, because it was produced under duress (after being “worked over” for three weeks, most prisoners would sign anything) and reads like a prepared statement of all sins committed by the OUN and UPA, precisely what interrogators required. The file and Stelmachchuk’s entire case still require detailed research.

6. Most often cited are atrocities committed in the villages of Pawlokoma (Pavlokoma in Ukrainian) near Przemysl on 3 March 1945, Piskorowice (Pyskovorychi) near Rzeszow on 17 April 1945, and Werchowyna (Verk- hovyna) in the Lublin Voivodeship on 6 June 1945. They were committed by an AK (Home Army) unit in the first instance, and by the National Military Organization (Narodowa Organizacja Wojskowa, a right-wing partisan group) in the other two. The number of victims was, respectively, 365, 358, and 197. In the last case, victims included sixty-five children under 11 years of age (Rapawy 2016, 220-221).

7. Motyka argued initially that Ukrainian losses in Volhynia were 10,000­20,000 but has since suggested that this figure should be revised down to 2,000 (Motyka 2008, 2012, 395-397).

8. See also Taras Kuzio, “Polish-Ukrainian history: time for a reset,” Euromaid- anpress.com. 28 December 2018. Kuzio points out that the figures for the number of victims are not sourced, since they represent estimates. They also vary widely and generally do not include the lands west of the Curzon line (the Lublin, Przemysl and Lemko areas), where an estimated 6,000-7,000 Ukrainian and 1,000 Polish civilians were killed.

9. The list compiled by the Ukrainian Central Committee of 500 Ukrainian community activists killed in the region in 1942 and 1943 includes only individuals for whom church services were held. The actual number of vic­tims was likely much higher. These selected killings were not random acts of violence, but must instead be understood as political assassinations (see Isaevych et al. 2003, 493-508).

10. Reinhard Heydrich on 17 June 1941 instructed the Einsatzgruppen that the “cleansing” operation “should be actively instigated, but without leaving a trace, intensified where necessary, and guided onto the right path—though without those local ‘self-defence circles’ later being able to point to any orders or political assurances given to them” (quoted in Struve 2012, 260).

11. The Ukrainian police force was initiated on 12 August 1941. It came under the command of the German Order Police, and in the countryside under the supervision of the Gendarmerie. The Germans tried to purge the police of OUN members, but these often concealed their affiliation with the organiza­tion. There were reportedly 122 former OUN militiamen in the Lviv police, 300 in Stanislaviv (Ivano-Frankivsk), and a total of 4,083 in District Galicia in the Spring of 1942. There were 2,000 German members of the Security Police (SIPO) and Order Police (Orpo) in the District (Finder and Prusin 2004, 105-106).

12. For a discussion of the OUN’s collaboration during wartime, see Barinov 2018; for a brief overview of the literature on collaboration, see Solonari (2017, 190-191, 203).

13. For an overview of the issues and scholarship, see Brandon and Lower (2010, 1-22).

14. For the OUN leadership’s statements of fascism, see Shkandrij (2015, 105-116).

15. The Third Extraordinary Assembly declared:

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists is fighting for a Sovereign United Ukrainian State and for all nations to live free lives in their own sovereign states. The destruction of national enslavement and exploita­tion of one nation by another, [and the creation of] a system of free peo­ples in their own sovereign states is the only order that will provide the entire world with a just resolution of the national and social question. The OUN is fighting against imperialists and empires, because in them one ruling people culturally and politically subjugates other peoples and exploits them economically. Therefore, the OUN is fighting against the USSR and against the German “New Europe.” The OUN is fighting with all its determination against internationalist and fascist, national

The Ukrainian Underground of the 1940s 127 socialist programs and political conceptions, because they are instru­ments of the imperialists’ politics of conquest. Therefore, we oppose Russian communist bolshevism and German national socialism.

(Postanovy 1943, 14)

16. For their collected writings from the late forties and early fifties, see Diakiv- Hornovyi (1968), and Poltava (1959).

17. The postwar debates within the different wings of the OUN are outlined in Shkandrij (2015, 72-76, 128-131). After the war, some leading writers, such as Ulas Samchuk, Yurii Klen, and Leonid Mosendz, who in the thirties had been OUN sympathizers, criticized the organization’s policies. In 1956, Borys Andriievsky, a former OUN(B) member, wrote an article criticizing the leadership for trying to keep all power in its own hands, refusing to coop­erate with other Ukrainian organizations, being cut off from mainstream opinion, and being a “regional Galician party that cannot claim universal, all-Ukrainian positions” (Andriievskyi 1981, 18 February). The article was refused publication and only appeared in the newspaper Svoboda twenty-five years later.

18. Orest Martynowych, for example, points out that Michael Pohoretsky, the editor of Canada’s pro-OUN newspaper Novyi shliakh (New Pathway), con­sistently expressed views that were antisemitic, pro-fascist, and pro-Hitler, and ridiculed Western democracies (Martynowych 2016, 497-566).

19. Statiev gives the figure of 782,582 Poles deported by November 1946 and 497,682 Ukrainians sent to the Soviet Union. He also points out that most Ukrainians were settled outside Ukraine (Statiev 2006, 993). The “repatriations”—or “evacuations,” as they were euphemistically called— took place chiefly as the result of two postwar agreements. The first was between the Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego (Polish Committee of National Liberation) and the USSR. On 21 July 1944, Stalin allowed the cre­ation of this body, which subsequently became the government of communist Poland. It oversaw the first wave of population exchanges. A second wave was the result of a treaty signed on 6 July 1945 by the USSR and Poland’s new pro-Soviet Provisional Government.

20. The secret policy document drawn up in 1938 by the governor of Vol- hynia, Alexander Hauke-Nowak, is discussed in Kucherepa (2003), 65-68. It was a departure from the policies followed since 1929 of the previous governor Henryk Jozefski, which it dismissed as “developed in a period of demo-liberalism that has since been reassessed throughout the entire world” (ibid. 69).

21. Almost 60% of the deportees were ethnic Poles, more than 20% were Jews, 10% were Ukrainians and more than 7% were Belarusians. Other estimates are higher, placing the number of deportees at over 1 million. See Mick (2011, 342). Statiev has argued that these deportations were the pragmatic action of a state facing an insurgency cleavage and an attempt to clear frontier regions. However, he indicates that there was no definition of what constituted a fifth column, that the expulsions were made to fulfill quotas, and that most fami­lies were victims of social profiling (Statiev 2006, 980-982).

22. For figures on the number deported in 1944-46 by region and month, see Rapawy (2016, 302, 346-348).

23. A number of memoir collections have now been published. They provide micro-histories of specific villages and describe in detail the complex situa­tion on the ground, the experience of villagers, and the behavior of the UPA, Polish army, and police. See, especially, Ivanyk (2014, 41-93), and Howan- sky Reilly (2013).

24. Motyka has stated:

I read The Museum of Abandoned Secrets by Oksana Zabuzhko very carefully, pen in hand, and I am sorry to say it but parts of the book con­cerning the UPA’s attitude to Poles and Jews are simply a falsification of history. In any case, the Poles in the novel are caricatures. I have not found a single sentence that would present the Poles in a positive light, and the massacres in Volhynia are presented in a bizarre way, to say the least.

(quoted in Zinchuk 2012, 315)

25. See Beauvois (1985, 1993, 2003).

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Source: Shkandrij Myroslav. Revolutionary Ukraine, 1917-2017: History’s Flashpoints and Today’s Memory Wars. Routledge,2019. — 216 p.. 2019

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