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Many Remaining Questions

The previous section provided a narrative emphasizing how technological changes trans­formed the world economy starting in the 18th century and how certain societies took the advantage of these changes while others failed to do so.

Parts of the story receive support from the data. The importance of industrialization in the initial takeoff is now well documented. There is broad consensus that economic institutions protecting property rights and allowing for free entry and introduction of new technologies were important in the 19th century and continue to be important today in securing economic growth (see Chapter 4). There is also general consensus that political instability, weak property rights, and lack of infrastructure are major impediments to growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, the narrative above is speculative. These factors might be important, but they do not need to be the main ones explaining the evolution of the world income distribution over the past 200 years. Moreover, as yet there is no consensus on the role of political institutions in this process.

Thus what I have presented above should be taken for what it is; a suggested answer that needs to be investigated more. But this is only one of the many remaining questions. The political economy of growth is important because it enables us to ask and answer questions about the fundamental causes of economic growth. But many other aspects of the process of growth require further investigation. In some sense, the field of economic growth is one of the more mature areas in economics, and certainly within macroeconomics it is the area where there is broadest agreement on what types of models are useful for the study of economic dynamics and for empirical analysis. And yet, there is so much that we still do not know.

I will now end by mentioning a few of the areas where the potential for more theoretical and empirical research is clear.

First, while in this chapter I have largely focused on factors facilitating or preventing the adoption of technologies in less-developed nations, there is still much to be done to understand the pace at which technological progress happens at the frontier economies. Our models of endogenous technological change give us the basic framework for thinking about how profit incentives shape investments in new technologies. But much needs to be done to understand how market structure affects innovation. Chapter 12 highlighted how different market structures will create different incentives for technological change. We saw in Chapter 14 how competition among firms within an industry can be important for the growth process. But most of our understanding of these issues is at a qualitative level. For example, we lack a framework similar to that used for the analysis of the effects of capital and labor income taxes and indirect taxes in public finance, which we could used to analyze the effects of various regulations, of intellectual property right policies and of anticompetitive laws on innovation and economic growth. Since the pace at which the world economic frontier progresses has a direct effect on the growth of many nations, even small improvements in the environment for innovation in advanced economies could have important dividends for the rest of the world.

In addition to the industrial organization of innovation, the contractual structure of in­novation needs further study. We live in a complex society, in which most firms are linked to others as suppliers or downstream customers, and most firms are connected to the rest of the economy indirectly through their relationship with the financial markets. All of these relationships are mediated by various explicit and implicit contracts. Similarly, the employ­ment relationship that underlies the productivity of most firms relies on contractual relations between employers and employees. We know that moral hazard and holdup problems occur in all these contractual relationships.

But how important are they for the process of economic growth? Can improvements in contracting institutions improve innovation and technological upgrading in frontier economies? Can they also facilitate technology transfer? These are basic, but as yet, unanswered questions. The contractual foundations of economic growth are still in their infancy and require much work.

The previous section emphasized how many economies started the growth process by importing technologies and thus integrating into the global economy. Today we live in an increasingly globalized and globalizing economy. But there is still much to understand about how technology is transferred from some firms to others, and from advanced economies to less- developed ones. The models I presented in Chapter 19 emphasized the importance of human capital, barriers to technology adoption, issues of appropriate technology, and contracting problems. Nevertheless, most of the models are still at the qualitative level and we lack a framework that can make quantitative predictions about the pace of technology diffusion. We have also not yet incorporated many important notions related to technology transfer into our basic frameworks. These include ideas related to tacit knowledge, the workings of the international division of labor, the role of trade secrecy, and the system of international intellectual property rights protection.

The reader will have also noticed that the material presented in Chapter 21 is much less unified and perhaps more speculative than the rest of the book. Although some of this reflects the fact that I had to simplify a variety of models to be able to present them in a limited space, much of it is because we are far from a unified framework for understanding the process of economic development and the structural transformations that it involves. We know that economic growth is accompanied by structural change. Some of the structural change can be viewed as a simple byproduct of economic growth, such as the increase in services relative to agriculture.

But other structural transformations, including developments in financial markets, changes in contract enforcement regimes, urbanization, and the amount and composition of human capital investments are not simple byproducts of economic growth. They are intimately linked to the process of economic development. Moreover, it may be the case that lack of certain structural transformation might delay or prevent economic growth. To understand these questions, we require models with stronger theoretical foundations, a unified approach to these related issues, and a greater effort to link the models of economic development to the wealth of empirical evidence that the profession has now accumulated on economic behavior in less-developed economies.

Last but not least, given the narrative in the last section and the discussion in Chap­ters 4, 22 and 23, the reader will not be surprised that I think many important insights about economic growth lie in political economy. But understanding politics is in many ways harder than understanding economics, because political relations are even more multifaceted. Although I believe that the political economy and growth literatures have made important advances in this area over the past decade or so, much remains to be done. The political economy of growth is in its infancy and as we further investigate why societies make different choices, we will gain a better understanding of the process of economic growth.

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Source: Acemoglu D.. Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton University Press,2008. — 1248 p.. 2008
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