The unexpected journey

The story of the island-marooned boy. Building a case for natural law based on first principles.

A young boy woke in his canoe as it edged itself onto the beach of a seemingly deserted island.

Further, if it was absolute, there would be no room for a ‘second’ absolute being, as to the boy, this would mean the first was not actually absolute — a necessary condition for the life he observed around him. Thus, if the boy could not have been, by definition, made absolute, and indeed was not absolute, he asked, what was his own nature?

Given the absoluteness of the original being, the boy reasoned that the best state of being for any other being would be one that was able to derive the most, in every possible manner, from the absoluteness of the absolute being. That is, from absoluteness. For this, he reasoned that a non-absolute being would have to be the complete opposite of absoluteness, that is, a being that is absolutely and inherently in need (faqTr bi-dhatihi). Thus, the boy saw his inher­ent need and mortal nature as perfect for a being of his kind.

This put him as a form of ‘key’ to the ‘lock’ that was the absolute being.

As the boy began to live on the deserted island, he discovered more of his innate needs. Where he felt helpless and could not will for something to occur, he would consider: His own perfection, the best state of being for himself to be in, was the polar opposite of the Absolute being. Since the absolute being was by definition able to grant its own will, and since the ab­solute being, in wishing good for him, had made the boy its polar opposite, then by definition the boy should be inherently unable to grant his own will. The boy reasoned that the opposite of granting one’s will was to ‘ask’. The act of asking the absolute being became the ultimate realization of this polarity — one between the absolute and its opposite. In an analogy, the boy, short of being an absolute being that inherently did not require food, would find that its opposite state, one that was able to enjoy food, was the best state of being for him. Thus, to the boy, asking became a realization of the grace of the absolute being towards him, an essence of the relationship — mukh al-'ibada. This led the boy to hold that the absolute would still be influential in the world today, otherwise there would be no apparent reason for instilling such a need to ask in him.

As time passed, the boy felt an innate desire for certain elements on the island and an aversion to others. He was comfortable with what brought him benefit (maslaha) yet not with harm (mafsada).

For now, he could fish to his own desire; yet, he wondered, what if another like him were to appear? He could see either the domination of one over the other, with one gaining plea­sure, the other sadness, or the cooperation of the two.

He held that even if he were to dominate, he would not wish to be on the receiving end of such dominance. A person seemed innately repulsed by the idea of being on the receiving end of an act of unfairness. Thus he held that all transactions would be best based on this idea, this axiom, ‘Do onto others what you would wish upon yourself’. He appeared to be able to discern a distinction between acts that he would wish for others — and by extension himself, and acts that he would not wish on others — and by extension himself. The first acts he called ‘Good’, the latter he called ‘Bad’.

It appeared to the boy that, given his innate need, he would appreciate when he was un­able to fish, due to injury for example, that another boy would help him. Based on the above axiom, he held that he too should be willing to help others with the same.

Then one day a new boy appeared, then many more.

The island's society

In living with the other boys, in enjoying the food of the island, the boy felt an innate grate­fulness to the original source. However, the boy then realized, that he could choose not to thank the absolute being or those around him — though he would not wish the same for himself. Thus he realized that while he had been given the opportunity to gain maximally from the absolute being, he could also fall short of what he felt was ‘owed’ based on the axiom. Thus he called these ‘rights’ — the absolute being’s ‘rights’ and those of the other boys. Further, seeing as he had not brought the other boys into existence, he held that he had no say over them; they were inherently not his, thus not at his disposal. All of the boys including himself were, however, in the mind of the boy, of the absolute. Thus he came to the conclusion that while he had the best placement — inherent — in himself to live, he could fall short of these ‘rights’. Yet, to the boy, these were not unreasonable rights. They were in accordance with the axiom and they seemed innate. Thus it appeared that the absolute being had afforded him grace by giving him the opportunity to live life in a manner that was also in line with his innate nature.

This being the case, and based on the first principles he had elaborated, the boy reasoned that any pain he endured must be due to a wisdom of the absolute that he had not yet realized.

Then came the calamities. A number of disagreements and fights broke out between the boys. His ankle was badly injured. He felt the urge to retaliate, to become bitter and vengeful. Retreating for time to consider, he came to a realization: He seemed innately cognizant that in choosing between Good and Bad, he would have wished any other boy to take the Good option. This would have been the Good thing to do since he would want it for himself. He realized that while he could take the Bad option and strike down his adversaries, he could gain by acting on the Good, given his innate appreciation for it. While he may outwardly be in pain, inwardly, he felt innately at peace in choosing this option as he felt he had gained something he would not have otherwise, namely compassion and patience. These two qualities he would wish for others. Thus it appeared that given his innate appreciation for Good, he had gained by choosing to do Good.

Yet, what about compensation? He held, according to the axiom and by extension his ‘rights’, that the boy who injured him should compensate him. Yet what ‘right’ would he have to force the boy to compensate him?

He reasoned: One boy had no right over another — he had not created him. Thus to main­tain the victim’s right to not be harmed, one could use force to deflect an attack. After such an attack, the offender then ‘owed’ what he had damaged. Such was in line with the axiom and in line with his ‘rights’. Further, even though the offending boy had acted in a Machia­vellian manner, seeing harm as justifiable for personal gain, the offending boy still would not wish the same to be done to him. The axiom appeared inescapable, innate. Even if a person saw being unfair as justified for gaining power, the same person would not wish it on himself.

The other boys, having subscribed to the same axiom and idea of ‘rights’, helped him obtain what was customarily known to be the amount of fish one could gain without such an injury.

From that day, the boys etched in a piece of timber two axioms: ‘No one shall harm an­other’ and ‘Custom serves as precedent’.

The idea of such etching was new to him and he quickly realized that the more boys that went against their innate axiom, the longer the list of ‘laws’ would become. Then an event occurred that challenged the very place of the first axiom.

One of the young men had been caught by a wild animal. Armed only with spears, the others realized it meant the death of the boy if they attempted to spear the wild animal. While the axiom was that no one is to be harmed, they knew that the animal would turn and kill the younger boys trapped nearby. Not doing anything would result in a greater harm. Thus the boy reasoned that, in this case, throwing the spears was acceptable, though in and of itself a Bad act. The spears were cast, both animal and boy perished. Thus was born a new perspective — one based in circumstance, its premise: ‘An act can be acceptable though Bad — for its own sake — due to an impinging circumstance’.

The main distinguisher between this and the axiom was that such circumstances, by virtue of the first axiom, must be ‘actively avoided and, where possible, removed'. Thus the third axiom became: ‘Harm must be removed’.

None of the boys faced punishment, as their appeared intention was Good. The fourth axiom was born: ‘Actions are considered by intention’.

These axioms continued to be etched into the plank of wood. This became useful to some, acting as a small and quick reminder where required.

A market had grown where the fish were often caught. One day a disagreement broke out over an order of fish. One boy had paid another for some. However, as it transpired, the seller had caught no fish, but had made the sale based on what he expected to catch that morning. As an ax­iom was to treat others fairly, this was deemed an unfair transaction, as the buyer could not collect on his purchase. Therefore, such practice was stopped, and the seller returned the buyers money.

As the number of those on the island grew, new circumstances came about. These en­tailed new considerations of past judgements made in light of the axioms. One such example was buying a boat to go fishing. Based on the judgement that it was unfair to sell something that was absent, the default expectation would be that a boat ought to be built first before it could be sold. However, given the great costs and time involved in constructing a new boat for fishing, a boy would find it difficult and highly risky to build if no buyer was potentially interested. This appeared to put the seller, the one with the skill to build, in a seemingly unfair position. As such, the judgement was re-evaluated. Sellers could sell an unbuilt boat but with the proviso that they provide the customer a full specification of what was expected of the boat to include, a time of delivery and guarantee. Thus the axiom: ‘Hardship brings ease’ was born, allowing for dispensations to be made where and when needed so long as the axioms were seen through. In such a case, the ‘law’ had been adjusted to meet the objective of the axiom. Hence the legal philosophy of the Island of Boys was articulated: The objectives of the axioms are of greater importance than the axioms.

As the boys grew older, it was said that the boy, now a man, heard a voice from the heav­ens, a voice from the absolute. A set of axioms was revealed. They were:

There should be no harming others nor the reciprocation of harm. Harm should be lifted. Actions are by intention. Certainty is not lifted with doubt. Hardship brings ease. Custom has authority. These laws are best lived according to the tradition ‘Love for your brethren what you love for your self’.

The boy was surprised to be the recipient of such a message, yet it came as no surprise to him that the axioms and the tradition were consistent with what had been practised.

Here ends the story.