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CHANGES IN CAPACITY

Hegemonic wars were titanic conflicts weakening all European parties, including the eventual victors. Workers and material resources were diverted from productive to destructive uses.

Lives and property were destroyed, sometimes in massive cam­paigns that decided nothing. Some areas were especially hard hit: Spain in the struggle for liberation from Napoleon’s armies, northern France and what in 1830 became Belgium in three of the four wars. Britain came off best overall, being on the winning side in all four conflicts. Yet victory came at enormous cost. Its national debt rose by an unprecedented 78 percent during the Seven Years’ War,1 and it had to call in massive foreign investments to finance World War I. Its maritime dominance was effectively challenged in World Wars I and II. Loss of the Singapore naval base in 1942 was described by Prime Minister Churchill as “the greatest disaster and worst capitulation in the history of the British Empire.”2 Major urban centers were deci­mated by Nazi missile and air attacks.

The capacity of metropoles to govern colonies was severely impaired in war­time. In several cases metropoles were invaded and became temporarily unable to govern themselves, much less others: Portugal, Spain, and Holland in the wars of phase 2, Belgium in World War I, and France, Belgium, and Holland in World War II. England’s blockade of continental ports during the revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars prevented France and, at times, Holland and Spain from linking up with their overseas possessions. Naval warfare frayed and sometimes severed shipping ties con­necting far-flung empires. The usual trade flows were disrupted, and administra­tors did not circulate between metropoles and colonies as they did in peacetime. Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia removed metropolitan officials from top decision­making posts.

In contrast, many colonies were economically stimulated and politically em­powered by war. Transport and communications lines were improved to facilitate movement of war-related materiel and troops. Areas not invaded or directly involved in fighting had opportunities to develop, particularly if their exports helped the war effort and were in great demand. Some colonies adopted economic policies consis­tent with their own interests. With commercial ties to Spain cut off during the Napoleonic Wars, Spanish American colonies could violate mercantilist policies with impunity, and trade with Britain and the United States flourished. Industrialization in India accelerated in World War I, increasing economic self-reliance while assisting the war effort. Young men who had never held a rifle were recruited to fight. Their training and experiences prepared them for postwar nationalist activities, whether as soldiers or political activists. Of vital importance in the Indonesian struggle against Holland after World War II were young soldiers trained by the Japanese.

The power vacuum created by loss of metropolitan control was filled in some cases by colonial residents. After King Ferdinand VII was dethroned by Napoleon, creole-led cabildos in Buenos Aires, Mexico City, and Lima exercised executive func­tions previously reserved for royal appointees. Japan’s invasion of the Dutch East Indies gave nationalists interned by the Dutch opportunities to move about and spread their message. The invasion also increased the capacity of local people to manage the public sector. Robert McMahon writes,

Expediency led the new Japanese administration to effect a tremendous rise in socioeconomic status for the educated class of Indonesians. Within six months of the invasion, the Japanese interned practically the entire Dutch population of the Indies, opening up thousands of mid- and upper-level administrative and technical jobs. Since the Japanese had only a limited number of military person­nel, Indonesians, out of necessity, filled many of the vacated jobs. This new mobility became a significant factor after the war: now there was a large class in the East Indies whose rapid elevation in status would be threatened by a return to Dutch rule and repressive prewar conditions.3

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Source: Abernethy David B.. The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980. Yale University Press,2002. — 524 p.. 2002

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