Conclusion

‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan’; these words from Robert Schuman’s famous declaration that in May 1950 launched the ECSC are symbolic of the nature of post-war European integration.

Almost six decades later, building ‘Europe’ remains a work in process, lacking a clear single-minded direction. Neverthelees the emergence of the EU is an impressive achievement. By 2007 a grouping of previously antagonistic countries had somehow managed to form an entity that, in the end, did represent an island of stability in a perilous and rapidly changing world. The twenty-seven countries of the EU had previously often fought against each other, and even in the Cold War had formed such military (offensive or defensive) alliances as NATO and the Warsaw Pact. By 2007 they were co-operating, belonging to a community that accounted for about a fifth of the world’s exports and imports, and more than 30 per cent of the global gross domestic product. While the future of the EU remains uncertain, further enlargements (to Croatia and possibly to Turkey) appeared more or less a certainty. Furthermore, the deepening of integration is similarly on the cards, despite the often negative attitude of the citizens of EU states. While lacking in the global clout reserved for more traditional nation-states like the United States, Russia or China, the EU is clearly an integral part of the global community in the early twenty-first century. Moreover, outside Europe the success of the EU has acted as an inspiration to politicians who have sought greater strength for their countries both economically and politically through regional unity and the pooling of sovereignty. These extra-European institutions have, however, achieved relatively limited success, which only helps to underline the impression that the EU has benefited from a number of distinct advantages that are difficult for others to emulate.

The ‘European experiment’ rested, after all, on the need to overcome the trauma created by two disastrous wars and the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Moreover, it had the advantage that all of its members were committed to liberal democracy and the rule of law, as well as sharing a common culture. Built on these solid foundations, the EU has been able to widen and deepen in a continuous process of evolution, while its imitators, lacking the same base for consensus building, have not made much progress.

Where scholars disagree: realists, liberal inter- governmentalists, functionalists and federalists

The basic debate about European integration focuses on a simple question: how to explain the emergence of the EEC and EU? There are two broad ways of answering the question: by emphasizing the role of member (nation-)states or by stressing the impact of supra-national institutions.The answers reflect the cleavage between those who think that the creation of the common market has been the central outcome of the integration process and those who believe that it is the shared institutions, customs and laws that truly define the 'new Europe'.

Those who maintain that nation-states have and will remain the main movers of the process of integration are, in general, referred to as realists or neo-realists.Their key argument is that the decades of integration have not fundamentally changed the role of the nation-state as the prime actor in European international relations. States are simply pursuing their national interests in a changed context, as maintained by such authors as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. Relatively close to the 'realists'are those scholars labelled as 'liberal inter-governmentalists'. Like the realists, they stress the role of individual states, but they also tend to emphasize the domestic political setting in EEC and EU member states as the key determinants of how these nations act within the inter-governmental playing field. A key practitioner of this school of thought is Andrew Moravcsik.

A third broad approach to explaining European integration is usually called functionalism or neo-functionalism. Building upon the theories of Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg, such scholars explain the integration from the early 1950s to the present as a gradual spillover process. While the original ECSC was limited to two industrial sectors, the functionalists argue, various interest groups and political parties responded to problems in related sectors by pushing to enhance the competence and scope of the Community and the Union. The 'deepening' of integration, such as the move from a common market to a common currency, is often cited as a more recent case that 'proves'the neo-functionalists' argument. Among its most prominent representatives is Stanley Hoffman.

Lastly, there are the federalists. Authors like John Pinder generally maintain that the deepening of integration was not due to some spillover effect but was rather a reflection of the inability of individual governments to deal with a growing number of transnational issues - security, trade, environment - without close co-operation. The federalists also stress the idealistic aspects of the process of European integration, namely the fact that democratic governance is at the heart of the integration experience. Perhaps more than the analysts in other groups, the federalists are concerned about the so-called democratic deficit within the European Union. This seems like a legitimate concern, for if European integration is simply a modern expression of nationalism it is based upon shaky ground.

Recommended reading

Much has been written about European integration, but a great deal of it remains too detailed for a general audience. Perhaps the best general overviews are John Gillingham, European Integration 1950—2003: Superstate or New Market Economy? (Cambridge, 2003), John Pinder, The European Union: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2007) and Pinder, The Building of the European Union (Oxford, 1999).

Derek Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945 (London, 1994) offers a slightly dated survey of the history of integration, while Ben Rosamond (ed.), Theories ofEuropean Integration (London, 2000) offers an interesting contrast of the various ways in which scholars have explained the phenomenon of integration. For a magisterial account of Europe's post-war history, including integration, see Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York, 2005). Further examples of overviews include James Dean, Ending Europe’s Wars (New York, 1994), James E. Goodby, Europe Undivided (Washington, DC, 1998), M. Emerson, Redrawing the Map ofEurope (New York,

1998), Michael J. Brenner, Multilateralism and Western Security (New York, 1995), F. Cameron, The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (London,

1999), A. Mayhew, Recreating Europe (New York, 1998), Tom Buchanan, Europe’s Troubled Peace, 1945—2000 (Oxford, 2006) and M. A. Smith and G. Timmins, Building a Bigger Europe (Aldershot, 2000). A comprehensive collection of essays discussing the various aspects of the European Union is Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford, 2000).

For the controversies over British entry into the EEC see N. Piers Ludlow, Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC (Cambridge, 1997), James Ellison, Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European Community, 1955—1958 (London, 2000) and Helen Parr, British Policy towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964—1967 (Aldershot, 2005). For the ‘Empty Chair' crisis, see N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge. (London, 2006). For the Maastricht Treaty see Cole Mazzucelli, France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union (London, 1999).

The most detailed analyses of the EU's foreign policy include Paolo Foradori, Managing a Multilevel Foreign Policy: The EU in International Affairs (Lanham, MD, 2007), Cameron Fraser, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy (London, 2007), Neil Winn and Christopher Lord, EU Foreign Policy beyond the Nation-State (London, 2001) and Simon Nuttall, European Foreign Policy (Oxford, 2000).

European integration in a global context is discussed in a number of books. See, for example, David Calleo, Rethinking Europe’s Future (Princeton, NJ, 2001) and Gregory Treverton, America, Germany, and the Future of Europe (Princeton, NJ, 1992). There is no shortage of works on the development and impact of European integration. For an account exploring America's role in this development, see Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire’ by Integration (New York, 1997). For an influential perspective on the transatlantic relationship, see Thomas Risse- Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ, 1995).

For studies of ASEAN see Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects (London, 2003), David Jones, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion (Northampton, MA, 2006) and Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder, CO, 2002). In regard to ASEAN's relations with Japan, see Sueo Sudo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN (Singapore, 1992). See also P. Korhonen, Japan and Asia Pacific Integration: Pacific Romances 1968—1996 (London, 1998). On NAFTA and free trade see George Grayson, The North American Free Trade Agreement (Lanham, MD, 1995), Barry Bosworth et al., Coming Together? Mexico—US Relations (Washington, DC, 1997) and Silvia Saborio, The Premise and the Promise: Free Trade in the Americas (New Brunswick, NJ, 1992).

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Source: Best Antony. International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. Routledge,2008. — 638 p.. 2008

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