Imperial Chinese society accepted and even lauded certain types of violence. Fundamental views of sanctioned violence developed in reaction to that culture's particular views of masculinity.

China represents what anthropolo­gists term an honour culture.¹ While youths in some places can publicly prove their manhood through a singular rite of passage, China lacked this sort of dramatic ordeal.

The chaotic history of ancient China attests to the regularity with which men resorted to violence as a strategy for gaining honour. Records of the tumultuous Eastern Zhou dynasty (770-221 bce) describe men starting wars, hunting and engaging in competitive archery not just for tangible gain, but also to stake a claim to successful manhood.^{[1021] [1022]} Because these acts brought manly honour, society endorsed and even encouraged certain kinds of violence, however much suffering this behaviour produced.

Not only did ancient views of manhood foster group violence via warfare, but they also destabilised society at the grassroots level by encouraging vengeance.^[1023] Both popular opinion and classical texts affirmed a man's duty to seek revenge for injustice and shame. If a man felt publicly dishonoured, he might wound or kill the person who had affronted him to restore his manly image. Men also felt shamed by the murder or mistreatment of someone in their in-group and frequently sought revenge. Historical records describe many incidents in which the murder of a family member, a teacher or even a friend provoked a violent response. Sometimes the family of a convicted criminal murdered a local magistrate who had sentenced their relative to death, even though he had merely been enforcing the law.

After the unification of China in 221 bce and the establishment of the imperial system, the suppression of sanctioned vengeance became an impor­tant political goal. Max Weber pointed to a monopoly of violence as funda­mental to the success of any political system. In early imperial China, when an untested new administrative apparatus strove to maintain national unity, this project became particularly urgent. Rulers and officials faced the extra­ordinary challenge of stabilising a state of unprecedented size. Holding together the world's most populous polity required ending extra-legal vio­lence. So, out of necessity, Chinese gradually reassessed some of the basic values underpinning classical ideas about manhood. They began to denigrate violent acts and encouraged the use of pacific activities to prove successful masculinity. For this gigantic state to remain intact, men had to reimagine Chinese manhood and eschew violence. As a result, society increasingly contained and devalued most forms of violence.

Chinese sought to decrease threats to national unity and social harmony by relegating violent acts to the margins of respectability. Instead of glorifying warrior heroes, historians put more emphasis on mythical sage rulers of remote antiquity, who created order by behaving morally and setting down the fundamental rules of civilisation.^[1024] Downplaying violence emphasised peaceful order as a regular state of affairs and implied that violent episodes represented an anomalous violation of normative civilisation.

This negative view of violence influenced its representation in art and literature. Whereas some cultures, such as Japan, took violence as a major theme in the visual arts, Chinese artists rarely depicted violent acts.

After China's unification, war and vengeance steadily diminished as mar­kers of status and male identity. Nevertheless, society still needed military men, and in times of crisis generals and warlords rose in importance. For example, during the latter part of the Tang dynasty (618-907), military commanders in the border regions became virtually autonomous. They intermarried repeatedly with the imperial house, demonstrating their social and political importance. But in times of peace, the high gentry avoided military duties and condescended towards officers. Because civil and military officials competed for power and resources, the gentry sought to decrease the influence of martial rivals. Authors associated with the civil bureaucracy portrayed military officers as marginal and inferior to civil bureaucrats.

After the destruction of the hereditary aristocracy in the final decades of the Tang, a flourishing literati culture emerged that allowed men to gain prestige by excelling in education, scholarship and other cultured activities. The rise of high culture as the primary characteristic of elite status implicitly rejected sanctioned violence. In the first century ce, if a man felt humiliated he might well respond with violence, and the community would probably condone his actions. By the tenth century, however, observers would have derided this sort of reaction as betraying a disgraceful lack of cultivation and self-control.

The elite increasingly turned to high culture to stake a claim to respect­ability, immersing themselves in an arduous educational curriculum based on literary composition and memorisation of the classical canon. In addition, they devoted themselves to mastering a range of polite accomplishments, such as poetry, calligraphy and painting. Making proficiency in high culture the key to elite manhood deliberately rejected violence as a way for the most important people in society to garner respect.