The Apex of Ottoman Territorial Expansion and the Issue of “Imperial Overextension”
With the acquisition of most of Hungary (1521-1552) and most of the Maghreb with Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers (1516-1574), the era of spectacular Ottoman conquests came to the end.
Further conquests were to be attained at much larger cost and usually did not last long. In 1576, the Porte intervened in Morocco, but the effort ended with failure within two years. In the war against Safavid Iran, which lasted with interruptions from 1577 until 1639, the Ottomans initially reached the Caspian Sea, but eventually had to withdraw and the peace of 1639 restored the prewar border. Likewise, in the long war against the Habsburgs (1593-1606), the Ottomans captured two Hungarian fortresses, Eger and Kanizsa (Nagykanizsa), but at the same time they lost Fulek (Fil'akovo in Slovakia), so in spite of incurred costs and human losses the war did not bring any substantial gains. In the sea warfare, the Ottomans secured their hold over the eastern Mediterranean by the conquests of Rhodes (1522) and Cyprus (1570-1571), but they proved unable to take Malta (1565) and suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Holy League, spearheaded by Spain, Venice, and the Pope, at Lepanto (1571). In the maritime confrontation in the Indian Ocean, Ottoman galleys were well suited to control the Red Sea and, to a lesser extent, the Persian Gulf, but were no match for Portuguese galleons and—no less importantly—violent storms on the open sea.The halt of Ottoman territorial expansion, visible from the end of the sixteenth century, caused contemporaries as well as later historians to look for signs of crisis. Typically, many Ottoman as well as Western authors pointed to “moral decay,” blaming the degeneration of dynasty, harem intrigues, the loss of martial spirit, and corruption—the most handy topoi available in the repository of negative characteristics. Today we know that it was rather “imperial overextension”—to use the term coined by Paul Kennedy—that prevented the Ottomans from further growth.
The Ottoman army needed at least two months to reach the empire's frontier, be it in Hungary, Moldavia, Georgia, or Iraq, and two months for the return march. Given the fact that timar holders were dependent on peasant deliveries, traditionally effected in two semiannual rates on the Day of Hizir (St. George's Day) and the Day of Kasim (St. Demetrius' Day), which fell on April 23 and October 26, respectively,[1845] the Ottoman army could reach the front in early July and had to leave it again by early September; this left only two months for effective combat and siege work. Winter campaigns were highly unpopular among Ottoman soldiers and hardly doable due to food and fodder shortage. Usually, janissary garrisons were left for winter in border fortresses, but a full-scale campaign could resume only the following summer.Moreover, unlike in the case of Russia, whose eastward territorial expansion remained largely unchecked[1846] until the Russians encountered Chinese troops on the Amur River, the Ottoman expansion clashed with the Habsburg and Safavid empires. Both of these states were initially weaker than the Ottoman Empire, but the Ottoman danger facilitated their consolidation, accompanied with necessary fiscal and military reforms.[1847] The Habsburg emperors and the Safavid shahs also soon initiated direct contacts, notwithstanding their religious differences. Even though large distance and political calculations prevented a formation of a
Habsburg-Safavid alliance, the very possibility of a war on two fronts constituted a constant nightmare for Ottoman statesmen.[1848]
The cost of raising large armies, equipped with firearms, constituted a heavy burden to any state in early modern Eurasia, and the Ottomans were no exception. The shortage of bullion necessary to pay the troops was only partly alleviated by foreign export, paid in return with American silver in the form of mainly Spanish and Dutch silver coins. The budgetary crisis was further aggravated by the climatic change associated with the “Little Ice Age,” in whose wake large traits of agricultural land in Anatolia, the Balkans, and the Middle East were left waste, while their inhabitants turned to banditry in order to survive or migrated to cities.[1849]
Against these circumstances, one can conclude that the Ottomans fared relatively well through the seventeenth century, escaping large-scale civil wars that devastated Russia, India, China, Germany, and England, to give a few examples. They even consolidated their position in the eastern Mediterranean with the conquest of Crete (1645-1669), and secured their hold over Central Europe by creating a series of new strongholds along the borders with the Habsburg Empire and Poland.
More on the topic The Apex of Ottoman Territorial Expansion and the Issue of “Imperial Overextension”:
- Territorial Expansion in the Early Republic
- THE OTTOMAN-POLISH DEBATE OVER THE UKRAINIAN ISSUE
- The Creation of the Frankish Empire: Territorial Expansion and Dynastic Succession
- Imperial Pageantry in Ottoman Kostantiniyye
- Part 3 PHASES OF IMPERIAL EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION
- Part III ACCOUNTING FOR IMPERIAL EXPANSION
- Imperial expansion and medical pessimism in the nineteenth century
- Historians have traditionally regarded the Ottoman Empire's failed second siege of Vienna in 1683 as a turning point in the empire's long history, bringing to an end centuries of military success and expansion.
- Reforming the Sharita Courts at the Close of the Ottoman Empire: an Ottoman Project in the Spirit of Western Colonialism
- THE “TOLERANT” MILLET SYSTEM— FROM OTTOMAN JIHAD TO OTTOMAN DHIMMITUDE
- Religious Dynamics and the Politics of Violence in the Late Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Levant
- The unipolar moment: America at the apex