The Center Strikes Back: The Era of Tanzimat

The developments described in the preceding, which led—according to Baki Tezcan—to the formation of a collective political identity among the Ottoman ruling class, did not involve direct participation of the Ottoman court, whose role throughout most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was largely passive.⁵⁰ Yet, this was changed with the accession of Selim III (1789-1807), the ambitious sultan who was not satisfied with the role of a figurehead.⁵¹ Displaying vivid in­terest in Western culture, Selim III corresponded with the French king Louis XVI and was deeply concerned by the outbreak of the French Revolution.

“ces deux grands haidouks,” had sworn a formal brotherhood (pobratstvo) in an Orthodox church; see Gradeva 2006, 157, n.74.

⁴⁹ In an article on the Ottoman eighteenth century, Gilles Veinstein noticed similarities between the Muslim provincial notables and the Christian kocaba^is, gorbacis, archontes, and clergy members, although he used the term ayans to refer to only the first group; see Veinstein 1999, 9.

⁵⁰ This is the main thesis of Tezcans book, whose author claims that between 1580 and 1622 the patrimonial state, founded by Mehmed II after the conquest of Constantinople, was replaced with the “Second Ottoman Empire,” characterized by the domination of elites who imposed limits on monarchical power that lasted until 1826, when the court restored its dominant role. Invoking the authority of Shmuel Eisenstadt and Wolfgang Schluchter, Tezcan claims that the main achievement of the “Second Ottoman Empire” was the creation of collective political identity among the Ottoman elites, being a prerequisite for a modern state; see esp. Tezcan 2010, 233. Notwithstanding its merits, this view can be accused of neglecting two other prerequisites for a modern state once advocated by Max Weber: a centralized bureaucracy and a modern army; cf. Kolodziejczyk 2013, 123-124.

⁵¹ For a standard narrative of his reign, see Shaw 1971. A fresh interpretation of this period that takes into account both top-down measures undertaken by the Ottoman court and alternative reform initiatives originating from provincial notables and local communities is offered in Yaycioglu 2016.

Ruschuk (Bulg. Ruse), Mustafa Bayraktar, who even tried to organize the first Ottoman parliament, but it was too late for Selim, murdered in the palace in 1808, and Bayraktar himself died shortly after. The turbulent period of 1807-1808 ended with the revocation of reforms, to the satisfaction of the janissaries, who worried that their privileges would be gone due to the formation of new elite troops.

The catastrophe of Selim III provided a useful lesson for the new sultan, Mahmud II (1808-1839), who realized that any serious reform had to start by breaking the janissaries. In 1826, the sultan conducted a well- prepared coup d'etat, abolishing the janissary corps and massacring revolting soldiers with artillery. This event, some­what cynically termed in Ottoman historiography as Vaka‘-i Hayriye (“Auspicious Event”), opened the way to further reforms, aimed principally at improving the per­formance of Ottoman troops vis-à-vis external as well as domestic enemies.

It is the Russian tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855) who is credited with having labeled the Ottoman Empire as “the sick man of Europe.” Indeed, in the 1830s the European powers began to discuss the so-called Eastern Question—namely, how to divide the lands of the Ottoman Empire after its expected collapse. The leading Ottoman statesmen were acutely aware of the danger and prepared a package of reforms (Tur. tanzimat) aimed at the strengthening and modernization of the state (see, Reynold and Mitter in chapter 39 for a more detailed comparative analysis of the pressure for reform and slow unravelling of the power of the Ottoman and Qing dynasties during the long 19^th century). This package was formally announced in November 1839 in the name of the new sultan, Abdulmejid (1839-1861), and envisioned an or­derly taxation, a fair system of conscription to the army, and the protection by law of all Ottoman subjects, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. If the reformers expected to gain European support in appreciation of their Westernizing efforts, they were not to be disappointed, at least for the time being. When in 1853 Russia began a new war in the hope of reaching an easy victory, Great Britain and France came to the sultan's aid, and the Crimean War—as it was termed after the main theater of combat— ended with Russia's defeat. The sultan hastily issued a new privilege, proclaimed in February 1856, announcing that foreigners would be able to purchase land in the empire and, more importantly, that his Muslim and non-Muslim subjects would be entirely equal under the law, even though the latter provision in fact contradicted Muslim law, which required that non-Muslims be subjected to special taxes.