The Age of the Province

The eighteenth century began with a series of new wars against Russia, Venice, Austria, and Persia, in which the Ottoman army still performed decently. Nonetheless, the Ottoman elites by that time recognized that in certain areas their state stood behind the West and needed to catch up in order to survive.

With the passing of time it became clear that Russia had replaced Austria as the most formidable Ottoman enemy. As a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768­1774, the Ottomans lost their suzerainty over the Crimea; the two following wars of 1787-1792 and 1806-1812 further enabled Russia to set foot in Georgia and eastern Moldavia (hereafter named Bessarabia).

Ottoman domestic policy in the late eighteenth century was dominated by the figures of ayans—unruly provincial governors and notables who owed their wealth to the malikane system.^[1855] Long-term tax farming of state incomes, paired with prolonging the governors' tenures, resulted in the marriage of wealth and military power. From then on, the pashas could legally farm provincial incomes for life and even transfer their farming rights to their descendants. On the other hand, rich local individuals could take part in auctions, investing their money in state enterprise. As holding a state office was often requisite to farm provincial taxes, they purchased state offices as well. In result, a genuine social revolution with the emergence of a new po­litical and economic elite—pashas turned entrepreneurs,^[1856] as well as entrepreneurs turned pashas—occurred on both central and provincial levels.^[1857]

For many years the malikane system had been regarded as yet another feature that fit into the paradigm of Ottoman decline.

Turkish historiography, mostly under the influence of the attitude reflected in the state papers and official chronicles, views the period of ayan ascendency in the eighteenth century as one of violence and anarchy. Recently, with the development of regional and national historiographies, the historical role of ayan in Ottoman state and society has begun to receive a more favorable treatment. It has been acknowledged that the era of the ayan was, in fact, a period that paved the way for local autonomy and even for national sovereignty.^[1859]

Numerous studies strengthened Inalcik's arguments in the following decades. It has been demonstrated that the new system allowed for keeping and investing larger sums in Ottoman provinces, enabling local economic growth. Large num­bers of local tax sub-farmers began to identify themselves with the well-being of the Ottoman state, from which they made their living. Through their local art pa­tronage, the ayans also promoted Ottoman art and culture, transferring Istanbul models to distant provinces.

Large ayans, though hesitant to obey the Porte, often saw their proper interest in defending the state when external dangers occurred. Hence, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha of Yanina (Gr. loannina) did not allow the Russians to land in Ottoman Epir, Ahmed Djezzar of Acre defended Ottoman Palestine from Napoleon, and Mehmed Ali of Egypt defended Ottoman Hejaz from the Wahhabis. Since the final result of Mehmed Ali's activity was the alienation of Egypt from other Ottoman domains, in the nationalist Egyptian historiography he had been typically presented as an Egyptian patriot, or even an Arab nationalist, in spite of his Albanian origin and poor knowledge of Arabic.

Scholars still disagree on the level of alienation of the ayans from the Ottoman state. While Ariel Salzmann stresses the inherent opposition between the men of government (rical-i hükümet) and the country dwellers (ahali-i büldan),^[1861] Dina Rizk Khoury sees “the merging of large mercantile and banking families with the bureau­cratic elite” and the sharing of common political culture by the local ayans, whose residences became provincial replicas of the imperial household in Istanbul.^[1862]

In a recent study on the famous ayan from the Balkans, Osman Pazvantoglu of Vidin, Rossitsa Gradeva stresses the strong Ottoman identity of Pazvantoglu, who repeatedly rebelled against the Porte, but was longing for the golden times of Sultan Süleyman.^[1863] Interestingly, Pazvantoglu enjoyed strong support from local Christian peasants, who arrived in his domains, induced by the relative security and lower taxes. Even more curiously, the ayan maintained close relations with local Christian notables: Orthodox clergymen, merchants, doctors, and even the future “freedom fighters” such as the Greek revolutionary Rhigas Velestinlis and the Serbian leader Kara Djordje.^[1864] Apparently provincial Christians preferred law and order provided by local patrons to weakened control from a distant center. One could even ask, somewhat provocatively, whether a person like Kara Djordje, who made a profitable career on the trade in pigs and initially did not defy the Porte but only demanded more security and legal autonomy for Serbian Christians, should not be regarded as yet another ayan,⁴⁹ and whether we should not treat the emancipation of Serbia and Greece in the early nineteenth century as yet another example of “ayanization,” parallel to the rise of Mehmed Ali's Egypt.