The Mongols and the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368)

When the Mongols conquered the last remnants of the Song in 1279, they established a very different relationship with their subjects. Southern Chinese subjects were prohibited from owning bows and weapons, and the private manufacturing of weapons in general was also forbidden.

The Mongols themselves, as David Wright has shown, were familiar with Chinese military thought, and considered Sunzi's warnings about attacking cities when they invaded the Song.1⁸ As pastoral steppe nomads, the Mongols were acutely aware of their own military limitations as they moved from the plains of northern China into the hot, humid terrain of the south, where rivers, streams and mountains limited the scope of cavalry. The Mongol commander of the main Mongol thrust towards the Song capital at Hangzhou, Bayan, was a sophisticated strategist, and the military councils he presided over during the southern campaigns demonstrated the high level of skills possessed by his subordinate commanders as well. Bayan's decision­making process is an important indicator of the strategic capabilities of the Mongol leadership. Most accounts of the Mongol conquest emphasise the tactical advantages of their cavalry over sedentary populations.

The Jin and then the Song lost because the Mongol leadership was better politically and militarily. It may well be true that a steppe society like that of the Mongols was fundamentally more oriented towards violence than agri­cultural or urban Chinese society. This probably underestimates the regular violence of Chinese society, though this is hard to measure. Nevertheless, dynasties rose and fell because of good or bad leadership. Bad strategy and poor political skills were far more critical than the style of warfare of a given group. Chinese armies beat steppe armies when well led, and lost when poorly led. Similarly, Mongol armies conquered much of Asia when their leadership was good, and then collapsed when that leadership failed. The particular facility with violence of the average Mongol, Jurchen or Chinese was a secondary consideration in the rise and fall of empires.

The Mongol court maintained its cultural separateness from Chinese culture for most of its rule over China. Chinese officials and systems of rule were used as the easiest way to manage the Chinese population with the least friction or need to resort to violence. Mongol rule penetrated less deeply into Chinese society, leaving local power holders to dominate ordinary people. Mongol garrisons were scattered across the empire in strategic spots to prevent uprisings. As long as the government received the resources it demanded, it was not concerned to intervene in local affairs. This allowed a limited amount of violence at the local level by the powerful to go unchecked as long as it did not threaten the government.

Much of this local violence had existed during the Song as well, but in theory it had represented a threat to proper state order. Song officials colluded with powerful local groups or were bullied into doing so to maintain order. Good examples of that were large Buddhist monasteries that domi­nated their localities.^[450] Part of the test of an official's capabilities was main­taining order.

While the locally powerful were allowed to dominate their areas, this system did not tie them to the central government. There is no way of knowing if there was more or less violence at the local level under Mongol rule, but specific skills like archery were obviously seen as a threat to the state. If people were prohibited from owning bows, arrows and weapons outside of state control, then it would have been very difficult to learn how to use those weapons. The looseness of Mongol rule, however, meant that many imperial laws were not strictly enforced. Local power holders developed security forces to ensure their own authority, meaning that weapons and martial arts training were still available throughout China.

The Mongols also treated north and south China differently. North China had been conquered as the result of defeating the Jurchen Jin. By the time the final remnants of the Southern Song were conquered north China had been under Mongol rule for half a century. Indeed, considering the period of Jin rule, north China had been under a steppe regime for a century and a half. The Mongols had initially allowed local warlords in north China to control their territories as feudatories. These fiefs could be passed on hereditarily as long as they contributed to the Mongol war effort. Violence in the service of the khan was all that was required to stay in the Mongol court's good graces. The khan was willing to cede local authority to a strongman who fol­lowed him.

A good example of this was the bandit, warlord and sometime Song loyalist Li Quan. Li married into a bandit band in Shandong and drew upon Song support to fight the Jin. When it became expedient to switch sides, he joined the Mongols. He fought loyally for them until he was killed in battle.^[451] His wife temporarily controlled his forces until their son took over.

Northern Chinese ranked above southern Chinese in the Mongol hierar­chy of subjects. Since for most of the Yuan dynasty, the Mongols' Chinese- style government, civil bureaucrats were not very highly esteemed, the educational link between imperial court and literati class was severely atte­nuated. The Yuan dynasty administration required certain material resources from the subject Chinese population, and some limited military services, but spent little effort in binding local elites to the government until late in the fourteenth century.

While the subject Chinese population was legally limited in its martial arts practice, Mongols and other steppe groups that were part of the Mongol ulus were expected to practise riding and shooting. These martial practices were not just necessary for the government, but also fundamental markers of identity. Horse archery functionally defined steppe warriors and their ethnic groups as distinct from the sedentary populations. At a finer level of distinction, the variations in the bow architecture of various groups concretely manifested significant differences in arrow ballistics and combat performance. Different bows performed differently and required different tactics in battle. Jurchen bows, for example, if later Manchu bows are a good representation, were the heaviest and strongest, firing the heaviest arrows. They were good for hunting large game as well as extremely lethal in combat, but an archer carried far fewer arrows.

effectively distinguished itself not only by its language, but also by the subtle differences in its martial arts.

Wrestling remained an important martial art amongst the steppe people. As a performance it united high and low, and offered a talented practitioner a route to fame and fortune. Like horse archery, it was seen as a particularly steppe art.^[453] Few if any Chinese participated in wrestling matches with Mongols, though it seems likely that wrestling continued among the Chinese population. It was not just which martial arts people practised, but with whom they practised it.

The Mongols never fully worked out their relationship with the Yuan dynasty administration, leading to uncontrollable internal conflict. Disunity diminished their response to uprisings among the Chinese population. As the rebellions grew, some Mongol leaders withdrew back to the steppe. Vast armies of Chinese rebels, often as much at odds with each other as with the Yuan government, emerged all over China. Whatever general lack of martial arts skills or military skills characterised these rebel forces at the beginning of their uprisings, over time with continuous fighting they became efficient and effective. Some Mongol forces remained in the north while the main struggle took place in the south.